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 For more than three decades, citizen engagement in the political process in South Korea 
was strictly hampered by the harsh control of the public sphere by authoritarian regimes and 
mainstream media’s failure to provide a democratic public forum. With the penetration of online 
and social media, the participatory culture of South Korea has significantly and qualitatively 
changed. During the last 10 some years, citizens actively used Internet media, such as online and 
social media, in mobilizing people for social and political causes. In recent elections, the use of 
Internet media has been considered one of the decisive factors of turnout and election results. The 
wide availability of information, the supply of unfettered discussion forums, and constant 
connectedness beyond space and geographical boundaries of the Internet are believed to work 
efficiently in leading citizens to the political process.  
However, unlike in Western countries, research to investigate the mechanism through 
which citizens engage in political affairs has been scant in South Korea. Drawing on the 
participatory democracy theory, this study examines how old and new media use in South Korea 
possibly change citizens’ political attitudes and perceptions and how such changes subsequently 
trigger civic engagement in political affairs. Among various possible factors of political 
communication, this research pays special attention to the mediating roles of political efficacy 
and deliberation behaviors of the electorate during an election period in South Korea. A 
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multitude of studies have proven that political efficacy is one of the most immediate attitudinal 
explanations of political action. As one acquires feelings of heightened political efficacy, one 
becomes more likely to get involved in the democratic process. Also, deliberation behaviors, 
such as political conversation and reflection on news played an important role in citizens’ 
political life. This study explores how political efficacy and deliberation jointly affect the 
pathway that connects news consumption with political participation, drawing on prior political 
communication frameworks, such as the cognitive mediation model, the communication 
mediation model, and the O – S – R – O – R model.  
This study suggests a two-step mediation model which centers on the roles of deliberation 
and political efficacy in political communication. Particularly, the hypothesized model 
incorporates the interpersonal discussion component of the communication mediation model and 
the political efficacy component of the cognitive mediation model into one, in order to theorize a 
holistic information processing framework that channels the influences of news consumption on 
political engagement. The current study provides empirical evidence to the hypothesized model 
by carrying out two cross-sectional analyses and one auto-regressive analysis from the data of a 
two-wave panel survey that was conducted during the 2012 presidential campaign in South 
Korea.  
Findings reveal that political efficacy mediated the relationship between news attention 
and political participation. Political efficacy also played a mediating role between deliberation 
behaviors and political participation. In addition, deliberation behaviors mediated the relationship 
between news attention and political efficacy. Most important, the deliberation behavior and 
political efficacy jointly mediated the impact of news attention on political participation, 
supporting the hypothesized model of this study. Such results imply that interpersonal political 
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discussion and intrapersonal reflection on political issues help citizens make sense of the 
information obtained from the media, and at the same time, boost the level of competence of 
their political beliefs. The results also suggest that deliberation and political efficacy play a 
pivotal role in connecting citizen’s information seeking behaviors with political participation.  
The findings also show that, among diverse news channels, social media have the biggest 
performance power in explaining citizen engagement in the political process. In addition, the 
results of path comparisons demonstrate that the paths from news attention via online and social 
media to deliberation, political efficacy, and political participation were stronger in the Wave 2 
model than in the Wave 1 model. The findings imply that online and social media are providing 
South Koreans a more effective pathway toward democratic participation than traditional media 
by motivating their deliberative and by shaping political attitudes.  
The present study makes a significant contribution to the understanding of the ways in 
which South Korean citizens take advantage of recent new media technologies to engage in 
political affairs. Considering that many South Koreans have long been excluded from the actual 
political process, this study’s findings provide practical meanings in understanding how we can 
boost citizen engagement in the democratic process in this digital age. Additionally, the 
hypothesized model of the present research helps organize a large body of theories on news 
consumption and political participation in political communication. It also suggests larger social 
and cultural implications for a healthy democracy across countries beyond South Korea.  
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PREFACE 
 
The media landscape in South Korea is rapidly changing mainly due to the wide 
penetration of digital media just as it is in other countries. Digital media, such as blogs, social 
networking sites, microblogging, wikis, and podcasts, provide political content to the public in 
ways that depart from convention. While controversy continues over the political implications of 
digital media, digital media based on the Internet have substantially changed the way that the 
public relates to political information, politicians, parties, government, and political processes. 
Debate about the digital media’s role and implications for politics and democracy has 
been widely sparked in academia. Some argue that digital media have the potential to spur a 
positive change in the existing political culture. Digital media can generate interest in politics 
among politically inattentive citizens, facilitate public discourse, and even stimulate citizen 
participation in the democratic process. They also act as a check on the mainstream media, which 
many people perceive as too closely aligned with politicians and government to play a watchdog 
role that the public expects. On the other hand, critics contend that digital media have not been 
an effective means to foster citizen engagement in democratic processes. Digital media often 
contribute to alienating people from public issues and trivializing politics. Critics say that digital 
media rarely create avenues to genuine participation.  
The digital media’s political role is complex and mixed. Since digital media are 
characterized by highly diverse forms of communication, it is not easy to reach a conclusion 
without finding exceptions. A good way to understand the digital media’s political implications 
is to examine the mechanisms by which digital media use relates to the change in citizens’ 
attitudes and behaviors. For instance, the motivations of using digital media content can 
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influence whether audiences end up reinforcing their disillusionment toward politics or engaging 
in political activities. The goal of the current study is to examine how people process news they 
obtain from diverse media channels and, as a result, how they get involved in the political 
process. 
The dissertation starts by introducing previous academic efforts to explain the 
relationship between media use and political participation. It then reviews several mediation 
models of political communication that delineate information processing. Drawing on prior 
mediation models, the dissertation theorizes a new mediation model – a two-step mediation 
process in which deliberation and political efficacy jointly mediate the relationship between news 
consumption and political participation. It then analyzes a dataset obtained from a two-wave 
panel survey in South Korea in 2012, using a structural equation modeling method. The 
concluding remarks focus on the political implications of digital media (especially online and 
social media) and the roles of deliberation and political efficacy, in terms of their ability to 
cultivate a more participative democracy in South Korea. 
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CHAPTER 1 
RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
1.1 Introduction 
Citizens’ active engagement in public affairs is one core element of a healthy democracy 
(Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1948; McLeod, Kosicki, & McLeod, 2002). According to the 
theory of representative democracy, a baseline for well-functioning democracy is the presence of 
actively participating citizens who have access to a wide array of ideas, acquire necessary 
information, and have a certain amount of knowledge of public issues (Brants, 1998). Put 
differently, citizens’ disengagement from public and political affairs is a serious threat to 
democracy (Bennett, Wells, & Rank, 2009). In the contemporary era, various signals of political 
alienation have been observed across countries (Kim, 2005). For instance, people’s level of trust 
toward governments or politicians has been on a gradual decrease. The increase of political 
cynicism has been documented in various nations, such as the United States (Moy & Pfau, 2000; 
Norris, 1999), Great Britain (Curtice & Jowell, 1997), and Sweden (Holmberg, 1999). World 
Economic Forum surveyed 50,000 people in 60 countries and found that 63 percent of them 
believed politicians are dishonest (The Voice of the People, 2004). Research also has identified a 
growing level of public discontent with the operation of representative democracy (Dalton, 2004; 
Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000; Norris, 1999; Pharr & Putnam, 2000). The increasing political 
discontent is observed from both old and young generations. In a study that targeted high school 
seniors, only 28% believed that people in government care about what people demand (Kahne & 
Middaugh, 2005).  
 ２ 
 
Presumably, due to the increasing level of dissatisfaction about the political process and 
the attenuating political confidence in the political system, electoral and conventional 
participatory actions have gradually decreased in recent several decades in most countries (Blais, 
2000; Caul & Gray, 2000; Franklin, 2004; Wattenberg, 2002). Voter turnout in the United States, 
for instance, went down from 65.0% in the 1950s to 57.5% in the 2012 elections (Center for the 
Study of the American Electorate, 2012). This trend of turnout decline has also been observed in 
other countries. Since South Korea adopted a system of direct election of the president in 1987, 
the turnout in this country has been on a gradual decline, with the turnout at presidential elections 
falling from over 89.0% in 1987 to 63.0% in 2007. Decreasing political engagement has often 
been attributed to a diminution in political interest, spread of individualized life style, and 
declining trust toward politicians and political parties (Kim & Kim, 2008).  
However, such a trend toward turnout does not describe the whole picture of the current 
situation of South Korea. In the 2002 presidential election, an amateur politician, Roh Moo-hyun 
succeeded in becoming president mainly due to the explosive support by young Internet users. 
Even though the actual turnout of 20-year-olds was not as high as that in other age groups, South 
Korea saw the first case in which young voters channeled their votes toward a presidential 
election (Han, 2007). Since then, South Korean Internet users frequently demonstrated their 
collective power in various social or political decisions. In the 2010s, collective actions by 
Internet users became more common than before (Park, 2012). In the 2012 presidential election, 
even the turnout rate, which has gradually decreased for a decade, has changed its direction for 
the first time. The average turnout rate in 2012 was put at 75.8%, which is remarkably high when 
compared with 63.0% in 2007 and 70.8% in 2002. Especially, the turnout of young voters 
increased drastically. The turnout rate of 19-year-olds moved up from 54.2% in 2007 to 74.0% in 
 ３ 
 
2012. The turnout rates of 20 year olds (47.0% in 2007, 68.5% in 2012) and 30 year olds (54.9% 
in 2007, 70.0% in 2012) also have significantly increased. Scholars and political pundits 
associated the sudden surge in the turnout with the wide penetration of social media, such as 
Facebook and Twitter (Chang, 2012; Lee, 2012). 
Across the world, it is not uncommon for voters to rely increasingly on new types of 
media based on the Internet in order to obtain information about public issues. The Internet 
provides new content hitherto unavailable from the traditional media. During the 2012 
presidential election in South Korea, 20.4% of eligible voters said that the Internet and social 
networking sites were most useful in deciding which candidate to vote for (Korea Election 
Management Commission, 2013). Today, the number of consumers of online newspapers, 
political blogs, and current affairs podcast shows are increasing at a stunning speed (Park, 2012). 
In addition to an enormous volume of information, Internet-based media tend to offer new 
opportunities for citizens to talk about political issues. Within the Internet, people can easily 
interact with other individuals with little spatial and temporal constraints. Vibrant exchanges of 
information online increase the possibility for people to improve their level of knowledge about 
politics and to change their existing attitude toward politics. A multitude of studies documented a 
positive association between exposure to online information and civic or political engagement 
(Chang, 2005a; Tolbert & McNeal, 2003).  
Thus, it is logical to speculate that online media use is related to the recent trend of 
political engagement in South Korea. Increasingly, citizens find in the Internet an alternative 
channel that may provide new modes of participation (Kim, 2011). Here one question arises: 
Through what mechanisms do online media users end up engaging in the political process? 
Although it is, by and large, admitted that Internet-based media may motivate citizens to engage 
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in the political process, it is not clear how information-seeking behavior leads to involvement in 
political affairs.  
According to the “participatory democracy” (Pateman, 1970; Thompson, 1970; Mason, 
1982), political action becomes realized in the actual world when people believe that their action 
brings about positive results to them. In other words, scholars who study participatory democracy 
explain the feasibility of participation in terms of how citizens’ behaviors can be associated with 
their demands and needs (Finkel, 1985). Then, what might link citizens’ demands to their 
participation in the political process? Regarding this question, the current study attends to the 
concept of political efficacy. Political efficacy can be defined as the sense of being capable of 
acting effectively in the political realm. It is a belief that one can influence the government or 
politics (Craig & Maggiotto, 1982). As one acquires feelings of heighted political efficacy, one 
becomes more likely to get involved in the political process.  
Initially introduced as a partial explanation for political participation in the United States 
in 1950s, political efficacy has become an important theoretical component in studies of political 
behaviors (Craig, 1979). Political efficacy has been considered a pivotal construct in the studies 
of new media’s impacts on citizens’ political perception or attitudes (Kenski & Stroud, 2006; 
Shah et al., 2007). Wolfsfeld (1986) also documented that political efficacy is “the most 
immediate attitudinal explanation of political action” (p. 108). 
Political efficacy is useful in understanding the mechanism of political engagement in the 
digital age. Frequent information seeking via online media may help increase citizens’ level of 
political efficacy, and increased efficacy in turn may contribute to expanding political 
engagement (Hardy & Scheufele, 2005; Nah et al., 2006). Increased political efficacy may result 
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in the increase of political interest, social capital, and social networks, which in turn may 
motivate people to get involved in diverse political activities (Gibson et al., 2005). 
In addition to the concept of political efficacy, this study pays attention to the role of 
political discussion. Since Lazarsfeld and his colleagues (1948) first raised the importance of 
interpersonal conversation in political communication, interpersonal talk has been the main topic 
of the study of political information processing for several decades. Discussion is an integral 
component in democracy because it draws citizens into matters of public interest. It promotes the 
exchange of ideas and opinions and the blending of diverse viewpoints. In the process, vague 
arguments are clarified, contrasting opinions are compromised, and competitive ideas are 
justified to guarantee public support. Today, the discussion occurring in the online environment 
often creates a deliberative space by providing ample opportunities for citizens to access public 
issues and by motivating them to make sense of public affairs (Lee, 2009; Zhang, 2012). In other 
words, digital technologies are shaping a new possibility of democracy by promoting citizen 
engagement in the deliberations. 
The present study mainly focuses on investigating how political efficacy and deliberative 
behaviors work in citizens’ processing of information. Few attempts have been made to 
incorporate simultaneously political efficacy and deliberation into the political communication 
mechanism. This study explores the role of political efficacy and deliberative behaviors, based on 
mediation models that deal with media effects on attitudes toward the political process. The 
current study also investigates how information processing mechanisms vary depending on three 
media types – traditional, online, and social media. By doing so, this research theorizes a new 
model that accounts for media’s role in triggering citizen participation in the political process. To 
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this end, this study relies on national data from a two-wave panel survey during the 2012 
presidential election in South Korea. 
 
1.2 Significance of Research 
A number of scholars blamed the traditional media for isolating citizens from the 
democratic process (Brants, 1998). For example Putnam (2000) criticized television as one of the 
strongest evils for weakening social capital, an essential foundation of a healthy democracy. The 
trend of sensationalization and commercialization in media industry has often been cited as 
reasons for disenfranchising citizens and dissuading them from engagement in political processes 
(Blumler & Gurevitch, 1995; Butler & Kavannagh, 1997; Hallin, 1996).  
In South Korea, the negative impact of traditional media on citizens’ cynicism seems to 
be relatively greater than in other countries. The level of trust in traditional media in South Korea 
is excessively low. According to the Edelman Trust Barometer (2012), only 44% of South 
Korean citizens trust traditional media such as television. Only 20% of citizens trust newspapers. 
Such low level credibility for traditional media stems mainly from people’s disappointment in the 
media’s close connection with the political power and their ignorance of basic journalism norms 
(Kim & Hamilton, 2006).  
The media market of South Korea has been dominated by three network TV stations and 
the same number of newspapers for more than three decades (Kang, 2005). Under the military 
rule until 1987, major media outlets served as mouthpieces of the ruling bloc in return for 
securing oligopolistic privileges from it. After the massive democratic movements in 1987, they 
transformed themselves from the handmaiden of the political power to an independent power in 
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their own rights. Since then, the major media outlets became “independent political institutions” 
(Chang, 2005a).  
The rise of the Internet-based media has created an alternative force to this solid media 
bloc. The public began to actively use various Internet media to obtain hitherto unattainable 
information from the traditional media. For example, the rising popularity of current affairs 
podcasts is notable. One podcast show, Naggomsu, used to be downloaded more than 600,000 
times per episode during the 2011 Seoul mayoral campaign, which is larger than the combined 
readership of the three mainstream newspapers of South Korea (Park & Yoon, 2013). Ordinary 
citizens are also capitalizing on Internet media in order to expand the opportunity to participate in 
various elite-challenging political activities (Han, 2007; Kim, 2008). 
This study starts from the observation of the recent penetration of social media in South 
Korea and its impact on the political behaviors of Korean citizens. Even though there have been a 
number of attempts to establish the relationship between social media and political engagement, 
research examining the role of political efficacy in the context of social media has been scant. In 
the West, the sense of political efficacy has been considered the most immediate attitudinal 
explanation of political action. This assertion is self-evident, considering that individuals are 
motivated when they feel that their involvement in politics will be consequential. This study 
investigates how political efficacy and deliberative behaviors work individually and jointly in 
motivating citizens to engage in the democratic process as a result of news consumption. 
This study investigates the role of mass and interpersonal communication between 
political orientation variables and political participation. It attempts to provide insight into the 
direct and indirect effects of political communication on political behaviors using an advanced 
social cognitive approach. This study expands several mediation models, such as the cognitive 
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mediation model (McLeod et al., 1999), the communication mediation model (Eveland et al., 
2003, 2005), and the O – S – R – O – R model (Cho et al., 2009), by mainly focusing on the 
individual and joint role of deliberation and political efficacy between news consumption and 
political participation.    
Despite considerable efforts to understand the impact of mediators in political 
communication, few studies have taken into account deliberation behaviors and political efficacy 
simultaneously. To suggest an advanced mediation model in political communication, this study 
conducted a two-wave panel survey based on a national sample. The current study aims to 
provide a more thorough and appropriate test of a mediation model and ultimately to contribute 
to the understanding of the change of citizens’ political-psychological attitudes and behaviors as 
a result of news consumption. By doing so, this study fills the void in the studies about the 
relationship between information consumption via digital media and political participation in the 
context of South Korea.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 New Media & Political Participation 
“Cherish, therefore, the spirit of our people, and keep alive their attention… if once 
they become inattentive to the public affairs, you and I, and Congress and Assemblies, 
Judges and Governors, shall all become wolves” (Jefferson, 1787[1967], p. 65). 
 
Active citizenry is a basic tenet of democratic theory (Bennett, 1986; Conway, 1991; 
Flanigan & Zingale, 1991; McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, 1999; Milbrath & Goel, 1977; Verba & 
Nie, 1972 ). Democracy, by its own definition, expects citizens to actively participate in the 
process of self-governance. Participation is a core element of a healthy democracy (Lazarsfeld, 
Berelson, & Gaudet, 1948; McLeod, Kosicki, & McLeod, 1994). The presence of an enlightened 
and engaged citizenry is an prerequisite for a democracy to exert its effective function (Almond 
& Verba, 1963; McClusky, Deshapande, Shah, & McLeod, 2004; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 
1995). Participation enables people to take on their roles as good citizens. Political participation 
provides a means for citizens to have their voices heard and for ‘‘empowering the powerless in 
society’’ (Eveland, 1993, pp. 24–25). When citizens actively engage in political affairs, 
democracy becomes stronger. Therefore, democratic societies expect that all citizens have the 
capability and motivation to get involved in the political process (Filicko & Boiney, 1994). 
The emphasis on participation has been repeated by philosophers, such as Aritstotle, 
Hobbes, Mill, and Rousseau. For instance, Aristotle said that only those who participate in 
governance should enjoy the rights of citizenship (Lipset, 2001). Rousseau emphasized that 
individuals who play an active role in governance would be free from control by others and 
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subject only to their own choices and decisions (Lipset, 2001; Wright & Street, 2007). John 
Stuart Mill stressed that a citizens’ strong involvement in governance is crucial in guaranteeing 
the liberty of a society (Biagini, 1996). Rousseau (1913) contended that the participation of each 
citizen in political decision-making is vital in making the state function well. 
Then, what does political participation mean? How can it be defined? Verba and his 
colleagues (1995) conceptualized political participation as a behavior that seeks to influence 
government action by affecting public policymaking. Political participation can include behaviors 
in elections, such as voting, working for political campaigns, donating money to candidates, and 
displaying political bumper stickers. It can also include conventional political behaviors, such as 
protesting, boycotting, and buying products for political reasons. Conway (1991) defined 
political participation as the activities that citizens perform in order to influence different levels 
of the government, such as its structure, policies, or election procedures. Therefore, political 
participation can be conceptualized as one’s intentional behaviors to influence political processes 
by engaging in various political activities.  
Since early 1990s, the Internet has significantly changed the way people consume news 
and participate in politics. The rise of the Internet has substantially expanded the opportunity to 
access news. The availability of information on the Internet has increased to an unimaginable 
level (Bimber, 2001; Papacharissi, 2009). At the same time, the Internet has provided 
uncountable spaces for interpersonal conversation (Dahlgren, 2000; White, 1997). Highlighting 
such unique characteristics of the Internet, many studies pointed to the medium’s democratizing 
potential free from restrictions of time and space (Coleman & Gotze, 2001; Dahlberg, 2001a; 
Dahlgren, 2005; Freelon, 2010). Especially, the wide use of the Internet as a discursive medium 
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with newer technological advantages has made the relationship between Internet use and political 
participation all the more interesting.  
Despite the immense potential of the Internet, views differ over the effects of the Internet 
on political participation. Skeptics argue that a reduction in levels of political participation could 
be expected as a result of the frequent use of the Internet. They contend that the Internet takes up 
a large part of people’s free time (Nie & Erbing, 2000; Kraut et al., 1998) and even weakens 
social cohesion (Davis, 1999; Noveck, 2000). They also assert that the Internet does not make 
people become politically active or motivated. Like television, which can deflect people from 
involvement with public matters, the Internet may have contributed to further atomization of 
society (Davis, 1999). Many studies indicate that the kind of talk that occurs online is not 
different from face-to-face discussions in its political influence (Castells, 2007; Kerbel & Bloom, 
2005; Shah, Cho, Eveland, & Kwak, 2005; Trammell & Kaid, 2005). Internet use may erode 
social connections through time displacement and social withdrawal (Kraut et al., 1998; Nie & 
Erbring, 2000). Kraut et al. (1998) assert, “Watching television, using a home computer and the 
Internet generally implies physical inactivity and limited face-to-face social interaction” (p. 
1019). Their longitudinal analysis concludes that frequent use of the Internet harms the 
communication with family and friends. Similarly, Nie (2001) argues that the increase in time 
spent online tends to decrease the time for socializing and attending events outside home. He 
argues that when preexisting differences are taken into account, Internet use causes people to lose 
touch with their social connections. 
An alternative view, put forward by those who defend the normalization hypothesis 
(Bimber, 1999, 2003; Scheufele & Nisbet, 2002), states that the Internet has barely affected 
levels of political participation. Bimber (2001) showed that political interest is less strongly 
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associated with obtaining campaign information on the Internet than with watching television 
and reading newspapers. He found that access to the Internet had little impact on voter 
participation. Zhang and Chia (2006) also reported that time spent reading newspapers and 
watching public affairs shows on television was positively related with political participation 
whereas frequency of the Internet use and entertainment television viewing was not associated 
with participation. Nisbet and Scheufele (2004) argued that the role of the Internet in promoting 
active and informed citizenship would be modest at best.  
Lastly, optimists view that the Internet will contribute to forming a more participatory 
society (Negroponte, 1996). Many studies show the potential of the Internet to influence levels of 
citizen participation (Livingstone, Bober, & Helsper, 2005; Shah, McLeod, & Yoon, 2001; 
Wellman, Haase, Witte, & Hampton, 2001). Such optimists believe that the abundance of 
information available on the Internet and inadvertent exposure to political information online 
may instigate political interest, encourage political expression, or increase political motivation 
(Bonchek, 1997). Tolbert and McNeal (2003) found that people who had access to the Internet 
were more likely to cast their ballots in the 1996 and 2000 US presidential elections. Gennaro 
and Dutton (2006) argued that Internet experience had a significant impact on political interest, 
political efficacy, and online political participation (Wang, 2007). Polat (2005) argued that the 
Internet should be viewed as an expanded information source for politics and an expanded forum 
for discussing politics. 
Optimistic research has found that communicating about politics over the Internet 
complements face-to-face political talk (Shah et al., 2005; Shah et al., 2007). The Internet allows 
people to “post, at minimal cost, messages and images that can be viewed instantly by global 
audiences” (Lupia & Sin, 2003, p. 316). Online expression may spur various forms of 
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participation, such as letter writing and petition signing, as well as attending speeches and 
working on campaigns (Corrado & Firestone, 1996).  
      But most of the aforementioned arguments, to a considerable extent, are based on the 
claim of “technological determinism.” The technological determinism argues that a technology 
itself can exert a direct influence on individual people, society, and culture. Marshall McLuhan 
emphasized the importance of media, saying that “medium is the message” (1964, p. 8). The 
phrase indicates that the form of a medium embeds itself in the message, creating a symbiotic 
relationship by which the medium influences how the message is perceived. For McLuhan, it was 
the medium itself that shaped and controlled “the scale and form of human association and 
action” (1964, p. 9). Following McLuhan, scores of studies contended that the use of traditional 
media can exert a significant influence on individuals’ perception of social and political issues. 
The same conclusion is being drawn from the study of the effects of new media technologies. 
Media “effects” have been frequently studied by measuring direct effects with little consideration 
for contextual backgrounds and mediated processes (Norris, 1996, 1998; Prior, 2005; Uslaner, 
1998). Numerous studies tested the direct impact of media messages on participation, relying 
solely on the exposure to the messages.  
Notably, an important issue in the examination of the impact of new media on 
perceptions and attitudes toward the political process is that media influences can vary depending 
on intervening or surrounding factors, such as individual, cultural, or geographical differences. 
For example, in China, where freedom of speech is considerably limited owing to its unique 
social system (Communism), the use of new media for political purposes can be controlled by the 
strict regulation or control by the government. According to one of the most influential models in 
the study of political participation (Verba et al., 1995), the cost of participation is a determining 
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factor in the decision to participate: the higher the cost, the lower the activity. Depending on 
available resources, people can participate more or less easily. For members of the public with 
little time, money or cognitive or organizational resources, the costs of participating are too high. 
As a result, they choose not to participate. Thus, the impact of costs on participation is contingent 
on the level of resources available (Anduiza et al., 2009). 
Technological skills can also serve as an important factor that can provide a resource for 
participation. Skills can be useful when people carry out an action with a political end: Being 
knowledgeable of the virtual world and being able to engage in specialized uses make it easy to 
acquire necessary information for political purposes and subsequently engage in political affairs 
in a simple and easy way. The use of the Internet can increase the availability of other resources. 
The increased availability of resources is fundamental for participation. In this sense, frequent 
use of the Internet offers an opportunity to process and analyze information, which will be useful 
for people who wish to get involved in political activities. 
Concerning the possible factors that channel the impact of new media on political 
engagement, the current study pays special attention to individual-level variables rather than 
cultural, societal, or collective-level variables. As possible individual-level factors, we can think 
of cognitive elements, such as motivations to use a medium, reflection on media content, and 
interpersonal conversation with friends, acquaintances, or colleagues. Searching for information 
about a specific subject requires a series of complex cognitive operations, such as selecting 
relevant information, evaluating the credibility of the information source and summarizing and 
using it. In the next section, this study reviews prior theories that deal with the links among 
diverse cognitive elements, interpersonal discussion, intrapersonal reflection on information, 
psychological orientations, and political engagement.  
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2.2 Mediation Models in Political Communication 
Research into media effects on individuals and society has been influenced by the 
evolution of social psychology. According to Markus and Zajonc (1985), research in social 
psychology has developed from a simple stimulus – response (S – R) approach into more 
complicated social cognitive approaches (Tian, 2011). In the West, there have been numerous 
efforts to investigate plausible mediating variables between media consumption and political 
engagement. Among the possible mediators, psychological characteristics of human beings have 
often been examined. Information processing theories (Neuman, 1976), the uses and 
gratifications approach (Blumler, 1979), and the knowledge-gap hypothesis (Tichenor et al., 
1970) are examples of such efforts. Simply put, media effects are conditional. More recently, 
some scholars attempted to consider individual motivations, interpersonal discussion, and 
political learning in the research of political information processing (Kosicki & McLeod, 1990).  
2.2.1 The Cognitive Mediation Model 
The cognitive mediation model (Eveland, 1998, 2000) was established by synthesizing 
theories in cognitive and educational psychology, the uses and gratifications (U&G) approach, 
and information-processing studies. It proposes that learning from news is determined through a 
causal process in which certain learning motivations drive the processing of news information 
and that this processing, to a great extent, determines the amount of political learning. This 
model explains, at least partially, why prior studies fail to show that individuals learn little from 
news even when they consume it (Graber, 1994; Neuman, 1976). The model suggests that 
individuals must want to learn from the news, and then, this motivation must produce 
information-processing behaviors conducive to learning. Only then will media exposure produce 
a certain level of political learning (Eveland, 2001). 
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The cognitive mediation model (Markus & Zajonc, 1985; McLeod et al., 1994; Eveland, 
1997, 2001) is summarized as O (Orientation) – S (Stimulus) –O (Orientation) – R (Response). 
The first O includes cognitive motivation of the audience. The second O represents what people 
do with media content – news attention and elaboration. News attention refers to the amount of 
mental effort given to the news. Elaboration refers to “the use of news information to make 
cognitive connections to past experience and prior knowledge and to derive new implications 
from news content” (Eveland et al., 2003, p. 363). In short, this model integrates both 
motivational variables and information processing into one unified process and argues that 
information-seeking motivation and news elaboration improves the knowledge level of news 
consumers. In the following, each variable in the cognitive mediation model is reviewed in more 
detail.  
First, audience motivation is considered one of the important factors that account for the 
impact of citizens’ media use on political engagement. In the early age of communication 
research, especially when the strong effect theory was dominant, the audience was usually 
deemed as passive. During the period from 1948 to 1960, the perspective of minimal effects was 
widely accepted by researchers (Iyengar, 2011). But since the 1960s, the extreme-effects models 
were gradually replaced by “considerable effect models,” such as agenda-setting and priming 
theories (Iyengar, 1991; McCombs & Shaw, 1972). Simultaneously, “active audience” was raised 
as an important concept in communication research. Later, the concept of active audience 
developed into the uses and gratifications (U&G) theory. 
According to the U&G theory, audiences seek the media that satisfy their social and 
psychological needs (Katz & Foulkes, 1962). Researchers turned to the U&G approach to 
examine why people strive for certain types of information from the media (Wimmer & 
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Dominick, 2011). The U&G approach was utilized as an important conceptual tool in studies that 
explored audience interaction with emerging technologies, such as VCRs, cable channels, and the 
Internet (Ruggiero, 2000). The Internet confirms the usefulness of the U&G perspective because 
it requires a higher level of user activity in comparison with other media (Rayburn, 1996). For 
instance, many Internet users deliberately choose a website they prefer rather than randomly 
visiting websites. Papacharissi and Rubin (2000) relied on the U&G approach to identify five 
motives associated with Internet use: information seeking, interpersonal communication, 
entertainment, convenience, and time killing. Stafford, Stafford, and Schkade (2004) also 
examined why people use the Internet by focusing on social, content, and process gratifications. 
A study carried out by Kaye and Johnson (2002) identified four motives for using the Internet to 
access political information: guidance, surveillance, entertainment, and social utility. 
Many previous studies on media effects failed to grasp the concept of “motivation” to 
consume media content. Research neglected the distinct patterns, needs, and motivations of 
people’s media use, focusing instead on simple total volume of usage. It is not just the time spent 
with media that matters, but how and why people use media that affects civic engagement (Gil de 
Zúñiga & Rojas, 2010; Shah, Kwak, & Holbert, 2001). As Gil de Zúñiga and Valenzuela (2011) 
emphasized, “It is not the media per se that affect individual’s participations, but the specific 
ways in which individuals use the media” (p. 401). Indeed, numerous studies demonstrate that 
individuals intentionally choose particular types of content and wish to gain certain gratifications 
as a result of content consumption (Blumler & Katz, 1974; Katz & Gurevitch, 1974; Rosengren, 
Palmgren, & Wenner, 1985; Swanson, 1987; Zillmann & Bryant, 1985). Today, the active 
audience concept is widely admitted in communication studies. The actual mechanisms through 
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which an active media user leads to increased level of deliberation, interpersonal communication, 
political efficacy, and political engagement is yet to be solved. 
The second component of the cognitive mediation model is attention to news. Many 
studies of learning from the news have focused on news media exposure as a central independent 
variable. That is, the number of days per week that an individual reads a newspaper or watches 
television news is used to predict a score on a test of items covered in the news media. The 
general conclusion from the literature is that exposure tends to increase knowledge to a certain 
extent (Atkin, Galloway, & Naymnan, 1976; Bennett, Flickinger, Baker, Rhine, & Bennett, 1996; 
Drew & Weaver, 1990; Robinson & Levy, 1996). However studies examining only exposure to 
media content to explain learning from news tell us little about the process because measurement 
of exposure cannot distinguish those who pay attention to content and those who habitually 
access it with little attention. In addition, only measuring media exposure fails to catch the 
differences in effects. For example, print media content often requires audiences to pay careful 
attention to it in order to get clear understanding of the content. Consumption of content from 
television and radio should not be considered equal. 
A number of scholars explicitly noticed the above problem in information-processing 
research and suggested that we should consider another variable associated with news use. As a 
result, attention to news started to attract academic attention. Scholars began advocating news 
attention as an important factor in determining learning from the news (Chaffee & Schleuder, 
1986; Chaffee, Zhao, & Leshner, 1994; Drew & Weaver, 1990; McLeod & McLeod, 1985). In a 
similar vein, attention to news is important in the studies that deal with the Internet. This study 
assumes that passing through content and paying attention to it on the Internet is fairly different. 
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The third component of the cognitive mediation model is elaboration on media content. If 
motivations do influence information processing (Burnkrant, 1976; Sadowski & Gulgoz, 1996; 
Simon, 1967), they should have an indirect effect on learning through information processing 
behaviors they instigate. News consumers depend on their own choice of information-processing 
strategies for learning. In other words, decisions about how to process information are subject to 
individual differences (Schmeck & Phillips, 1982). Then, what types of information processing 
are likely to produce effective learning? In the early 1970s, cognitive psychologists suggested 
that the depth of processing, “where greater ‘depth’ implies a greater degree of semantic or 
cognitive analysis” (Craik & Lockhart, 1972, p. 675), should produce more effective learning. 
Some psychologists suggested elaboration as an important factor in the information processing 
for learning (Bradshaw & Anderson, 1982).  
Elaboration refers to the process of connecting new information to the information stored 
in memory, such as prior knowledge or personal experiences. Elaboration includes the activity of 
connecting diverse pieces of information in a meaningful way. By engaging in the elaboration on 
media content, people can expand the scope of the memory storage as well as the ability to recall 
information via complex mental mechanisms. Studies demonstrated that elaboration tends to 
facilitate learning of new information (Eveland & Dunwoody, 2001; Hamilton, 1989; Johnsey, 
Morrison, & Ross, 1992; Mayer, 1980; Miller et al., 1987; Perse, 1990b; Wolsoshyn, Pavio, & 
Pressley, 1994). Furthermore, Estes (1988), Greene (1992), and Haberlandt (1994) all found that 
the level of recall was substantially greater when people engaged in elaborative processing than 
when they did not. 
Although elaboration relates to a specific cognitive action that may fluctuate over time, 
research shows that each individual possesses a unique pattern of elaboration. That is, 
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elaboration may be an individual-specific variable; on a given piece of information, some people 
are more likely to elaborate than others, and some people spend more time in figuring out the 
meaning of the information than others. Miller, Alway, and McKinley (1987) said, “An 
elaborative processing style is characterized by associating new ideas and new information with 
what is already known, using visual images, imagining new situations, looking for similarities 
with prior experiences, and looking for new ways to apply the information” (p. 399). Some 
scholars used different labels, such as “reflective integration” (Kosicki & McLeod, 1990), “active 
reflection” (Eveland, McLeod, & Horowitz, 1998), or the “amount of invested mental effort” 
(Salomon, 1981), to explain the notion of elaboration. Today, there is a general consensus about 
the essential role of elaboration in information processing.  
The cognitive mediation model has some weaknesses. First, many studies based on this 
model focused only on one type of personality variable (surveillance motivation). There has been 
little consideration of other types of predispositions of individuals. For example, the need for 
cognition, which means “a need to structure relevant situations in meaningful, integrated ways,” 
(Cohen, Stotland, & Wolfe, 1955, p. 291), can affect the way people consume information. The 
need for cognition has been found to have a positive relation with exposure to news (Bizer, 
Krosnick, Petty, Rucker, & Wheeler, 2000). The need to evaluate, which is defined as ‘‘an 
individual difference variable that measures the extent to which people spontaneously evaluate 
objects or experiences as either good or bad’’ (Bizer et al., 2004, p. 997), may be another 
important factor that can influence cognitive and behavioral behaviors of news consumers. 
Individuals with a high level of need to evaluate are more attracted to political information in the 
media because they like to hold attitudes on political figures and affairs. In a similar vein, those 
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who have more extreme political orientations tend to be more active in accessing likeminded 
viewpoints than those with less extreme political orientations (Tsfati & Cappella, 2003). 
Second, the cognitive mediation model does not incorporate the role of interpersonal 
discussion. News media and political discussion largely channel the effects of individuals’ 
dispositions and orientations on learning and participation (McLeod et al., 2001; Sotirovic & 
McLeod, 2001). Attention to news stimulates the information-seeking behavior via the media, 
which in turn leads to increased exchanges of ideas about politics (Cho et al., 2009). In other 
words, discussing political issues helps individuals to gain mobilizing information from the mass 
media, thereby increasing individuals’ willingness to engage in political affairs (Hardy & 
Scheufele, 2005). The exchange of views with fellow citizens tends to provide a better 
understanding of the political process.  
Another weakness in the cognitive mediation model is its assumption that political 
knowledge is a final outcome of news consumption. Political knowledge may not be the final 
outcome of cognitive processing of news. Much research has been conducted to investigate the 
relationship between political knowledge and participation. Numerous works in political 
communication demonstrate a positive association between the level of political knowledge and 
political engagement (Jennings, 1996; Kaid et al., 2007; Klingemann, 1979; Neuman, 1986; 
Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Sotirovic & McLeod, 2001; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995).  
2.2.2 The Communication Mediation Model 
In explaining the connection between media use and political participation, some scholars 
paid considerable attention to the role of interpersonal communication (Gil de Zúñiga, 2002). 
The function of interpersonal discussion is particularly important in this new media environment 
where diverse interactive communication tools exist, such as e-mails, instant messenger services, 
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blogs, and social networking services. The communication mediation model focuses on the role 
of interpersonal conversation in political communication. The model posits that informational 
uses of the media and political discussion largely channel the effects of individual orientations on 
citizen learning and participatory behaviors (McLeod et al., 2001; Sotirovic & McLeod, 2001). 
Its basic idea is that communication among users mediates the effects of news consumption and 
news reflection on political engagement. Several empirical studies proved that citizen 
communication largely mediates the effects of news consumption on citizen engagement in the 
public process (McLeod et al., 2001; Sotirovic & McLeod, 2001).  
Since Lazarsfeld (1954) proposed the two-step flow thesis, the importance of interpersonal 
discussion has been repeatedly examined and supported. Contemporary political life relies much 
upon vibrant exchanges of political ideas and evaluations (Beaumont, 2011). Talking about 
politics not only fosters the increase of political knowledge and communication skills, but also 
encourages people to see politics as relevant to their own lives and concerns. Individuals who 
discuss politics frequently tend to expose themselves to a wider range of political views, and this 
exposure often helps boost their levels of political interest, opinion quality, and social tolerance 
(Mutz, 2002a). Discussing current affairs with others exerts an significant influence on the 
political socialization process (Niemi & Junn, 1998; Torney-Purta, 2002). Huckfeldt and Sprague 
(1995) found that engaging in political talks with family and friends is a key variable in a chain 
of communication effects on civic engagement. 
A number of studies found that news consumption and interpersonal political discussion 
work together in motivating media users to get involved in various forms of participation 
(McLeod et al., 2001; McLeod et al., 1996). News media provide a resource for political 
discussion and create opportunities to encounter diverse viewpoints that might not otherwise take 
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place (Mutz, 2002a; Mutz & Martin, 2001). In turn, political discussion raises awareness about 
collective problems, highlights the importance of civic issues, and finally helps promote civic 
participation (Kwak, Williams, Wang, & Lee, 2005; McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, 1999). 
Therefore, news consumption and interpersonal discussion are factors that complement each 
other in provoking citizen involvement in public issues (Chaffee, 1972; Chaffee & Mutz, 1988). 
The mediation effect of interpersonal communication was documented across a variety of media 
types, such as television, newspapers, and the Internet. Mutz and Martin (2001) argued that 
consumption of public affairs content results in vibrant interpersonal discussion and such 
increased discussion, in turn, leads to involvement in political processes. 
Notably, the communication mediation model treats both news consumption and 
interpersonal communication as important stimuli (S), and focuses on how they jointly mediate 
the effects of individual dispositions and news consumption on political outcomes. The citizen 
communication model is an effort to develop prior information processing models in political 
communication. It theorizes that the mass media’s influence on participation is both strong and 
indirect (Shah et al., 2005). It finds evidence that the same mediation mechanism works for the 
information processing via the Internet. The citizen communication model sophisticates the 
relationship between information seeking and participation in two ways: (1) it places citizen 
communication as a critical mediator between news consumption and political engagement; (2) it 
asserts that online pathways to political participation complement existing offline pathways of 
information and conversation (Cho et al., 2009).  
In the digital age, real-time discussions are likely to encourage people to be more exposed 
to numerous political issues and a variety of political ideas (Beaumont, 2011). The Internet paves 
a way to share political opinions through interactive messaging technologies, such as emails, 
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instant messaging, electronic bulletin boards, and online chats (Price & Cappella, 2002; Shah et 
al., 2005). It allows people to ‘‘post, at minimal cost, messages and images that can be viewed 
instantly by global audiences’’ (Lupia & Sin, 2003, p. 316). Discussion in cyberspace takes on 
the nature of textual expression rather than verbal expression, and thereby helps to have a clear 
grasp of political information (Pennebaker, 1997; Pennebaker & Beall, 1986).  
Both the communication mediation model and the citizen communication model integrate 
mass and interpersonal communication into the pathways to political participation. But unlike the 
cognitive mediation model, they pay less attention to possible cognitive mediators that can be 
incorporated into them. For instance, components such as attention to news and reflection on 
media content are missing in the communication mediation model and the citizen communication 
model. Omitting cognitive variables may oversimplify the processes that connect news 
consumption with citizen participation, as Lazarsfeld et al. (1955) oversimplified the process the 
media effect as a two-step flow.  
Another drawback in the communication mediation and the citizen communication models 
is that they failed to specify nuanced relationships between interpersonal discussion and political 
engagement. While some scholars who depended on the communication mediation model 
claimed that political discussion mediates the impact of news consumption on participatory 
behaviors, other scholars argued that political talk functions as a moderator between news 
consumption and civic or political engagement (Hardy & Scheufele, 2005). Such mixed 
outcomes may be due to the oversimplification of possible processes. For instance, proponents of 
the communication mediation model and the citizen communication model hardly considered 
possible cognitive mediators. Thus, the two models fail to provide a holistic picture of the 
information processing process in political communication. The influence of offline discussion 
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and online messaging on political participation may be not only a function of the exchange of 
information with others but also a product of the intrapersonal reflection on media content 
(Pingree, 2007). 
2.2.3 Attempts to Synthesize Mediation Models 
Following the cognitive and communication mediation models, scholars made efforts to 
clarify the processes by which media effects occur. One recent attempt is the O – S – R – O – R 
model. Cho and his colleagues (2009) proposed the O – S – R – O – R (Orientations – Stimulus – 
Reasoning – Orientations – Response) model of communication effects in prediction of political 
engagement. They introduced an additional mediating step, “reasoning,” between media content 
consumption (S) and second cognitive orientations (second O). The reasoning process, which 
refers to mental elaboration and collective consideration of a topic, is a critical condition for 
news consumption to produce political outcomes (Eveland, 2004; Eveland & Thomson, 2006).  
The O – S – R – O – R model starts from the observation that previous mediation models 
paid less attention to examining an additional mediating step between message processing and 
outcome orientations. The S – O portion of the O – S – O – R model (e.g., the cognitive 
mediation, the communication mediation, and the citizen communication models) includes news 
consumption, interpersonal discussion, and cognitions and attitudes that are triggered in this 
process. Interpersonal conversation and reflection on media content are particularly difficult to 
situate within this set of framework. Discussion and reflection about news have often been 
regarded as the consequence of surveillance motivation or as mediators between news 
consumption and political participation (Eveland et al., 2003; Shah et al., 2005). But they are not 
stimuli in a strict sense because they are typically placed at the position of the outcomes of 
 ２６ 
 
information consumption. Neither are they conventional outcomes, such as learning because 
reasoning also relates to participatory behaviors.  
Shah et al. (2007) argued for the need to add a step for reasoning between media content 
(S) and subsequent responses (O – R): Reasoning behaviors should be placed “between stimuli 
and outcome orientations, indicative of efforts to form an understanding and reason through ideas 
encountered in message stimuli” (Shah et al., 2007, p. 698). Reasoning refers to mental 
elaboration on information (Cho et al., 2009). Reasoning may take diverse forms: reflection on 
media content (Eveland, 2001; Mutz, 2006), anticipation of conversation (Eveland, Hayes, Shah, 
& Kwak, 2005), composition of ideas for expression (Pingree, 2007), and integration and 
understanding (McLeod et al., 2001).  
In addition to intrapersonal processes, Cho et al. (2009) also argue that interpersonal 
discussion plays a pivotal role in the reasoning process. Stressing the deliberative nature of 
interpersonal communication, Benhabib (1996) said, “When presenting their point of view and 
position to others, individuals must support them by articulating good reasons in a public context 
to their codeliberators. This process of articulating good reasons in public forces the individual to 
think of what would count as a good reason for all others involved” (pp. 71–72). Southwell and 
Yzer (2007) also suggest that political conversation is a reasoned and consequential behavior 
through which information is reconsidered, elaborated, and clarified. Interpersonal discussion 
increases not only factual knowledge but also cognitive ability to make connections among 
concepts (McLeod et al., 2001). Discussion also tends to improve the quality of opinion 
(Cappella, Price, & Nir, 2002; Kim, Wyatt, & Katz, 1999). The O – S – R – O – R model posits 
that political discussion is a crucial construct through which reasoning materializes. 
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Taken together, the O – S – R – O – R model contends that the effects of news media use 
(S) on political engagement (second R) are mediated by reasoning behaviors (first R), which 
include both interpersonal political discussion and intrapersonal reflection on media content. 
However, studies that depend on this model do not test the mediating role of the second O, 
political-psychological variables suggested by Cho et al. (2009). Thus, the O – S – R – O – R 
model looks very similar to the communication mediation model, except that it adds political 
participation to the dependent variable block.   
Recently, Jung et al. (2011) attempted to develop the O – S – R – O – R model by 
investigating the mediating role of political knowledge and political efficacy between news 
consumption and political participation. They found that political knowledge and efficacy are 
important variables that mediate news consumption and citizen engagement in political activities. 
They also found that interpersonal discussion and online political messaging (second R) largely 
mediate the effects of news consumption on political outcomes.  
Jung et al.’s model, however, does not divide the news consumption variable into more 
segmented elements. News consumption via traditional media is not the same as that via online 
media or social media. For instance, old generations are more likely to depend on traditional 
news while young people are more likely to access political news via online newspapers or news 
feed in social media. Also, the nature of political news is not the same across different media 
types. News stories from the current affairs podcasts shows in South Korea tend to focus more on 
parody and satire than on factual reporting. The current study expects that the information 
processing of political news will vary depending on the medium from which an audience 
consumes news.  
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Another controversy regarding the Jung et al.’s model is about the position of political 
knowledge in the suggested framework. Theoretically, political knowledge can be regarded as 
both a mediating variable and an outcome variable. It is logical to speculate that those who 
consume more political news and talk more frequently about politics are more likely to have a 
higher level of political knowledge, which in turn may encourage them to get involved in 
political affairs. But at the same time it is also reasonable to assume that political knowledge 
leads people to pay more attention to news and to engage in political discussion with others. 
Because Jung et al.’s study is based on a one-time cross-sectional survey, it needs more pieces of 
evidence before it claims clear causal relationships among variables, including political 
knowledge.  
 
2.3 The Importance of Political Efficacy in Political Communication 
Although a sizable body of research attempted to examine detailed processes by which the 
media impact political engagement, many questions still remain unanswered. One of the concerns 
is the lack of consideration for political efficacy. Even though some scholars (e.g., Jung & Gil de 
Zúñiga, 2011) paid attention to the role of political efficacy, they did not consider it a key 
component that connects the impact of information consumption on democratic engagement. 
This study argues that the sense of political efficacy plays a decisive role in the mediating 
processes of political communication.  
A considerable amount of research has been devoted to answering the question of why 
some citizens participate while others do not. Regarding this question, some scholars paid 
attention to the effects of political efficacy on political participation, such as voting, campaign 
involvement (Abramson, 1983; Bennett, 1986; Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Hetherington, 1998; 
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Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Uslaner, 2002; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). The logic 
underlying these impacts is that individuals feel empowered and motivated when they believe 
that their involvement in politics will bring about meaningful impacts on their government.  
What exactly does political efficacy refer to? According to Bandura (1977), self-efficacy is 
the belief that what one can make positive changes about his/her surrounding environments. In a 
similar vein, political efficacy can be understood as the belief in one’s competence in politics. In 
other words, it is the feeling that an individual citizen can play a significant role in making 
political and social changes possible. The concept of political efficacy was first proposed by 
Campbell, Gurin, and Miller in 1954. They said, “Political efficacy is the feeling that individual 
political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process” (p. 187). Later, 
Finkel sophisticated the concept as “the sense of being capable of acting effectively in the 
political realm” (1985, p. 892). 
One underlying assumption of political efficacy is that individuals tend to make a decision 
based on rationality. For example, people will vote if they believe that their vote is likely to make 
a difference (Becker, 2004). When voters are not sure of the outcome of their participation in 
voting, they may end up not going to the polls, even though they are motivated to obtain 
information about elections and possess some amount of knowledge about candidates. Bandura 
(1977) explained the role of efficacy using a coping mechanism. According to Bandura, people 
are likely to escape a threatening situation that is beyond their coping ability. On the contrary, 
people tend to confront a situation if they think they can manage the situation according to their 
will. Bandura stresses that the stronger the perceived self-efficacy, the more active people 
become in their efforts. Likewise, perceived political efficacy can be thought as a crucial 
determinant of people’s choice of political behaviors.  
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In support of the above rationale, prior literature suggests that political efficacy is closely 
tied to political activity and strongly associated with participatory behaviors (Abramson, 1983; 
Bennett, 1986; Rudolph, Gangl, & Stevens, 2000; Verba, Burns, & Schlozman, 1997; Verba et 
al., 1995; Zimmerman & Rapport, 1988). Political efficacy has been widely used to account for 
various types of political behaviors, such as voting, volunteering for a campaign, signing 
petitions, attending rallies, discussing politics, and so forth (Abramson & Aldrich, 1982; Finkel, 
1985; Hirlinger, 1992; Sharp, 1984; Stewart, Kornberg, Clarke, & Acock, 1992; Verba & Nie, 
1972). Political efficacy is also believed to enable self-confident citizens to become citizens who 
show a certain level of commitment to democracy (Almond & Verba, 1963). 
The importance of political efficacy in the political process needs to be highlighted in 
South Korea, which has a unique political culture. The level of political competence among 
South Koreans is relatively low compared with their levels of political trust and interest (Kim, 
2010). As discussed in the following Chapter 3, a low level of political efficacy mainly stems 
from the accumulated experience of governmental control of democratic public sphere. The 
present study posits that the situation of South Korea makes political efficacy as an important 
factor that should be considered in political communication.  
Most past studies on political efficacy have treated it as a given and fixed concept, without 
considering its diverse nature. They postulate that a sense of political efficacy is largely 
independent of political environments where one is placed (Weissberg, 1975). Some argue that 
people shape their political efficacy attitude around the age of eight (Easton & Dennis, 1967). 
Weissberg (1975) said that feelings of political efficacy functions “as a method of mass 
satisfaction and quiescence and as an individual predisposition to action” (p. 487). If these 
arguments are correct, political efficacy always should be treated as an independent variable in 
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political communication. Similarly, Buehler (1975) points out that the sense of political efficacy 
is shaped by cultural and structural factors. The cultural determinism perspective explains that 
the process of socialization plays a crucial role in the formation of political efficacy. For 
example, a person can be socialized into either a group of higher political efficacy or a group of 
lower political efficacy. The structural determinism perspective views the socio-economic status 
(SES) as a decisive factor of political efficacy formation. A person with a low SES tends to have 
weak political efficacy, while a person with a high SES is likely to have strong political efficacy.  
If the sense of political efficacy is stable, it cannot be tapped as a mediator between media 
content consumption and citizen engagement in the political process. If political efficacy is a 
fixed characteristic of an individual, it should be treated at the same level as individual political 
predispositions, such as partisanship and political interest. Yet, to date it is not certain where 
political efficacy originally stems from and what factors contribute to the formation of political 
efficacy. Here, Beaumont’s argument deserves attention. Beaumont (2011) suggests an 
interesting explanation about the nature of political efficacy. Her point is that the sense of 
political efficacy is both a fixed and a changeable cognition. She argues that political efficacy can 
be developed by sociopolitical learning mechanism.  
Beaumont (2011) examines four plausible factors that can account for the formation and 
change of political efficacy, based on the sociopolitical learning theory. According to this theory, 
we are most likely to develop political confidence when our environments and relationships help 
us to care about political affairs, to get connected with others, and to obtain necessary political 
resources and skills. Beaumont notes that sharing political experiences with others may be a good 
nurturer of political efficacy. The acquisition of skills necessary for political actions can also help 
shape political efficacy. Furthermore, discussing current affairs with others encourages people to 
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be more attentive to political issues. Lastly, interracial and other pluralist contexts can contribute 
to developing political efficacy. Based on a survey of about 1,000 undergraduate students, 
Beaumont finds that even though SES, race, and gender play a role in shaping the initial 
foundation of political efficacy, they do not exert additional influence on political efficacy 
change. Instead, experiences in a politically active community, acquiring skills for political 
actions, involvement in political discussion, and inclusion in collaborative pluralist contexts 
heighten the level of political efficacy. 
Beaumont’s findings provide a new rationale to incorporate political efficacy into a 
mediation model in political communication. The presence of various digital media may provide 
more persuasive political messages than in the past when traditional media dominated. For 
example, only if one has a modicum of interest in politics, one can access immense political 
information because of the great availability of information in the Internet world. Digital media 
lead even those with little interest in politics to encounter political messages inadvertently 
(Brundidge, 2010). Such increased possibility of meeting diverse political messages can help 
heighten people’s level of political efficacy. Increased political efficacy in turn may result in 
actual involvement in civic and political activities.  
 
2.4. Two-Step Mediation: Deliberation and Political Efficacy as Joint Mediators between 
News Consumption and Political Engagement  
Drawing on the review of prior studies on the information processing of political news, 
this study proposes a new mediation model which delineates the process of political 
communication: attention to news  deliberation  political efficacy  political outcomes. In 
the model, news attention serves as stimuli (the exogenous variable); political talk and news 
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elaboration function as deliberation behaviors (the first mediator); political efficacy serves as a 
political-psychological response to deliberation behaviors (the second mediator); political 
participation represents a set of political outcomes (the endogenous variable). Demographics and 
political orientation variables are included as control variables in the hypothesized model.  
Findings from prior studies can be put together to make the hypothesized model plausible 
and solid. For instance, news media use tends to stimulates people’ political interest so that they 
are cognizant of political affairs, and heightened interest tends to encourage efficacious feelings 
about politics (Delli Carpini, 2004; Hoffman & Thompson, 2009; Kenski & Stroud, 2006; 
McLeod et al., 1999). Semetko and Valkenburg (1998) empirically proved the presence of a 
causal flow from news consumption to political efficacy. To the previous proved relations, the 
hypothesized model of the current study adds three types of news sources as exogenous 
variables: traditional, online, and social media.
1
 And then the hypothesized model examines how 
news attention via each medium is related to political participation through the mediating role of 
political efficacy.  
The present study also regards deliberation as an important mediator in political 
communication. Here deliberation is defined as behaviors that include both interpersonal political 
                                            
1
 A medium usually refers to an instrument of communication. Traditional media, such as newspaper, television, or 
radio, are easily conceptualized because of their physical forms of vehicles. Online media generally indicate a type of 
media that include photos, video and music, distributed over the Internet freely or for a fee (Business 
Dictionary.com). This study operationalizes online news media as a media type that deal mainly with news content. 
Social media is defined as “a group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological 
foundations of Web 2.0 and that allow the creation and exchange of user-generated content” (Kaplan & Haenlein, 
2010, p. 61). Social media technologies take on diverse forms, such as social blogs, microblogging, wikis, social 
networking services, and podcasts. Social media differ from traditional and online news media in many ways, 
including content quality, content producers, and delivery methods. More than anything else, social media are based 
on a two-way communication in which content creation and delivery are controlled mainly by the public. On the 
other hand, traditional media are based on a one-way communication. Online new media are more open to the public, 
yet their content is mostly occupied by professionals such as journalists. This study operationalizes social media as a 
type of media whose content creation and delivery are mostly handled by ordinary people. 
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discussion and reflection on news. Deliberation in this study is similar to what Cho and his 
colleagues (2009) named as “reasoning.” Research consistently shows that interpersonal political 
discussion is a deliberative behavior because exchanging opinions inherently entails mental 
elaboration (Cho et al., 2009; Shah et al., 2007). Literature also shows that political discussion 
positively relates to political efficacy. Citizens’ discussion about politics facilitates rational 
political decisions while forming orientations and attitudes that support citizen engagement in 
political issues (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Morrell, 2005). In addition, as noted earlier, 
elaboration on media content tends to increase political efficacy (Fishkin, 1999; Min, 2007). 
Empirical support for the positive effect of political discussion and news elaboration on 
increased political efficacy is solid. 
Unlike previous studies, this study’s model investigates simultaneous impact of 
deliberation and political efficacy on civic participation in political affairs. To this end, the 
current study, based on two-wave panel survey data, employs three different approaches that 
utilize structural equation modeling as the analysis method. Findings supportive of the 
hypothesized two-step mediation model can make a significant contribution to the literature on 
the relationship between news consumption and political engagement.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEDIA SYSTEM AND 
PARTICIPATORY CULTURE IN SOUTH KOREA 
 
3.1 History of Media Development in South Korea 
The contextual background of this study is South Korea. Thus, it is necessary to look at 
the overall media system of this country as well as the participatory culture of South Koreans. 
This subsection reviews the history of South Koran media by breaking down it into three periods. 
The review mainly focuses on how the political power exercised control over the media and how 
the media landscape has changed in contemporary South Korea. 
3.1.1 Authoritarian Period: Strict Control of the Media 
Since the birth of South Korea in 1948, the media have been subject to constant 
suppression up until the mid-1980s. From the First Republic of Rhee Syng-man to the military 
regimes of Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, the authoritarian governments exercised direct 
control over the media (Lee, 1997; Kim & Johnson, 2009). In 1961, President Park Chung-hee 
prohibited news stories critical of his government and stationed intelligence agents in newsrooms 
(MacIntyre, 2001). Under Park’s dictatorship, all journalistic activities including news products 
were placed either under the close scrutiny of government censors or voluntary self-censors 
within the news organizations (Kwak, 2012). Some journalists, who challenged the system, were 
either fired or prosecuted. According to Kang (2005), the press lost its autonomy and came to be 
subsumed in the “ideological state apparatus” of dictatorship. Most journalists faithfully fulfilled 
their role as de facto propaganda bureaucrats by supporting the authoritarian rulers (Kim 1994). 
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After President Park was assassinated by his close aide in 1979, the South Korean media 
gained their independence and enjoyed a brief respite. However, when General Chun Doo-hwan 
took the power in 1980 via a military coup, a gag on the media quickly reverted to its previous 
position. Under the pretext of overhauling the media industry in 1980, the Chun regime made the 
public-owned Korea Broadcasting System (KBS) merge two of the four privately owned stations 
– TBC and Donga. Operations of the two remaining stations, the pro-government Munhwa 
Broadcasting Company (MBC) and the Christian Broadcasting Station (CBS), were also placed 
under strong restriction so as not to pose a threat to the regime. The print media was forced into 
political submission, too. Shin-A Daily was absorbed by the pro-government Kyunghyang Daily 
and at least six provincial newspapers were forced to close their doors permanently. The 
surviving newspapers were subjected to a high degree of governmental control and restriction via 
the Basic Press Law enacted in 1980 (Billet, 1990). Relying on this law the Minister of Culture 
and Information was able to revoke or suspend registration of any publications only depending 
on arbitrary assessment for any violations (Lee, 1997). During the Chun regime, journalists were 
often taken away, beaten, and even tortured (Youm, 1986). In this process of forceful merger by 
the government, more than 800 journalists were dismissed from their jobs (Lee, 1997; Yang, 
1999). In the broadcasting industry alone, 246 journalists (KBS 135, MBC 111) had to leave their 
jobs (Kim, 2001c). 
Lee (1993) identified three devices for the dictatorial authorities to monitor and control 
daily media activities. One is the political appointment of key media elites. President Chun 
appointed his own hand-picked personnel as presidents of two major television networks – KBS, 
MBC – and the two government-owned newspapers – Seoul Daily and Kyunghyang Daily. These 
political appointees, in turn, filled important editorial positions with those who showed high 
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loyalty to the government (Lee, 1997). The second control method was the regular surveillance of 
the media by national security agencies. The National Police, the Defense Security Command, 
and the National Security Planning competitively watched newsrooms around the country. The 
last control mechanism was the enforcement of ‘press guidelines’ by the Ministry of Culture and 
Information on how events should be reported. The guidelines were so itemized that they even 
specified pages, headlines, and relative weight of stories. By strenuously maintaining this 
practice, the regime continued to take a strong grasp on the media.  
In short, during the authoritarian period, the South Korean media had to suffer from harsh 
control from the governments. As a result, most media outlets could not play their journalism 
role as a provider of accurate and fair information and as a watchdog of government. Rather, 
strict control by the regimes forced major media organizations to play the mouthpiece role of the 
political power.     
3.1.2 Transitional Period 
In South Korea, 1987 was a momentous year (Han, 1988). Around the nation massive 
demonstrations occurred by the general public who asked for democracy. Demonstrations lasted 
unusually long, being supported by people from all walks of life, from intellectuals to factory 
workers. After the protests, the government relaxed somewhat the control of the media. Prior 
constraints on press freedom were eliminated. The Ministry of Culture and Information no longer 
issued formal press guidelines and allowed publication of once-banned content. The Basic Law 
of the Press was abolished. Restraints on media establishment were also lifted, allowing a good 
number of small media companies to appear. As a result, media organizations were given the 
opportunity to enjoy freedom and autonomy (Heuvel & Dennis, 1993; Youm, 1994).  
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Although the changed political environment contributed to the expansion of media 
freedom, political authorities still maintained indirect control over the media. Lee (1997) pointed 
out that behind-the-scene threats from the government and ruling elites did not completely 
vanish. There remained a complicated interplay between politicians and senior journalists who 
controlled newsroom gatekeeping. Frequently specific news items were intentionally selected, 
positioned, and weighed, based upon intricate clandestine deals between government officials 
and senior editors. The presidential Blue House exerted considerable influence on the angle and 
placement of specific news items. In a survey, broadcast journalists noted that government 
influence was still the most influential factor that restricted media freedom (Korea Press 
Foundation, 1999).  
The growing concentration of a few media outlets appeared as another problem that 
threatened media development at this period. Despite the increase of media outlets after the 1987 
democratization, only three conservative daily newspapers – Chosun, Joongang, and Donga 
Daily – thrived in the newspaper market thanks mainly to their dominant market power while 
other mid- to smaller-sized newspapers including newly opened progressive media outlets 
struggled to occupy a small piece of the market. The three newspapers still control about 64% of 
the newspaper market of South Korea (Lee, 2013).  
The high concentration of a few conservative presses is a legacy of more than three 
decades of military control. In order to strengthen the control over the press, military regimes 
restricted the number of newspapers in major cities. Moreover, access to the market was reserved 
for loyal newspaper companies (Peters, 2004). As a result, the three conservative newspapers 
came to hold a strong domination over the media market, maintaining a close relationship with 
the political power. After the amalgamation of the press in 1980, the ruling power guaranteed the 
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press diverse privileges, such as tax benefits, and the press in return started functioning as a 
mouthpiece of the ruling bloc (Kang, 2005). In other words, the press served not as a watchdog 
of power but as a propaganda organ of the political power (Yim, 2001; Youn, 2002).  
During this period, the market power of the few major newspapers was accelerated via 
unjust tactics such as distributing their newspapers at no cost, or offering subscriptions with free 
gifts (Kim & Hamilton, 2006). Such strategies in turn resulted in the suffocation of small media 
outlets, harming the overall media diversity of South Korea. Small media organizations were not 
able to secure even a minimal market power through which they could play their roles as new 
media. The monopolization of the media market by a few major newspapers was strong enough 
to make them independent political power agencies. For instance, during the ten years of liberal 
presidents from 1998 to 2006, the big three newspapers persistently attacked the government as 
equal political counterparts (Chang, 2005a; Choi, 2005; Kang, 2005).  
 
Table 1 Changes in the Social Characteristics of South Korean Media  
Period Relationship with Politics Nature of Journalism 
1945 ~ 1960 
Collaborator in the formation of 
a modern nation-state 
Formation of modern, 
postcolonial journalism 
1960 ~ 1972 Mouthpiece of modernization 
Development journalism, 
Educator of modernization 
1972 ~ 1986 Mouthpiece of dictatorship Propaganda journalism 
1987 ~ 1992 Mouthpiece of dictatorship Propaganda journalism 
1993 ~ 1997 
Collusion of the state and major 
media organizations 
Populist mobilization of public 
opinion 
1998 ~ 2006 Little association 
Profit-making, Populist 
mobilization of public opinion  
2007 ~ present 
Collusion of the state and major 
media organizations 
Profit-making, Populist 
mobilization of public opinion  
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3.1.3 New Media Period: Penetration of Online Media and Continuity of Control 
The advent of new information technology in the late 1990s was a turning point in the 
media system of South Korea. The public for the first time started to have confidence that it 
could be one of the main agents in the media sector of South Korea. New media technologies 
have been effectively used in promoting participatory democracy by allowing people to 
vigorously express their opinions (Chang, 2005; Park, 2013). The spread of digital technology 
not only changed the one-way, unilateral relationship between the media and the audience, but 
also challenged the solid oligopoly by several mainstream media outlets. But, at the same time it 
should also be noted that traces of governmental control of media and citizen expression are still 
found even in the digital age although the magnitude of control has diminished compared with 
the past. And the mainstream media manage to maintain its market power in part via the 
collusion with the conservative ruling bloc. 
The rapid diffusion of Internet broadband technology toward the end of the 1990s has been 
particularly important in reshuffling the existing media system. In 1998, the Kim Dae-jung 
government added the establishment of a highly efficient broadband infrastructure to the top of 
its agenda. As a result, today the rate of broadband penetration in South Korea belongs to the top 
10 in the world. In case of wireless broadband, South Korea lies above the 100% penetration 
threshold as of the first half of 2013 (Shankland, 2014). Broadband technology has two features. 
First, compared with conventional printing or broadcasting technologies, it dramatically reduces 
the costs of access to the public sphere. It does not take much money, manpower, or physical 
resources to operate Internet-based media such as blogs and community websites. Second, the 
bilateral communication features of broadband Internet technology are not only superior to the 
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unilateral features of the conventional mass media but also correspond with the participative 
ideals of citizen journalism (Sawhney & Lee, 2005). 
The availability of digital technology contributed to the development new types of media 
which can represent ordinary citizens’ voices, challenging mainstream media. The focus of these 
changes has been on interpersonal exchange, social mobilization, and political debate. For 
example, in 1999, young researchers opened a blog Urimodu mainly to distribute agendas that 
resist the mainstream media, especially the conservative Chosun Daily. Internet newspapers 
closely related to labor unions or other civic organizations also appeared, mainly representing the 
voices of masses: NGOtimes, Newsnjoy, Chamsesang, and Jinbonet. Internet newspapers with a 
strong community character are another type of alternative media. They usually offered spaces 
for parodies, comments, and discussions, and relied on the contribution of citizen reporters. For 
example, in July 1998, a parody newspaper Ddanzi-Ilbo emerged as the first commercially 
successful Internet newspaper. Ohmynews, whose content is created mainly by hundreds of 
citizen reporters, showed a new model in which citizen journalism and professional journalism 
are effectively combined. Internet newspapers established by professional journalists also 
appeared. Pressian is one of them. 
The newly-emerged online media have exerted an enormous influence on the media 
landscape of South Korea. Internet media have established themselves as opinion leaders and 
powerful actors regarding public issues. The agenda-setting power mainly held by the 
mainstream media weakened, and Internet media started establishing themselves as another 
important media sector. This change was revolutionary considering the long history where 
several conservative media outlets monopolized the public opinion market. The advent of online 
media also brought a sea change in participatory culture of South Korea. The public was given an 
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opportunity to get involved in the political process, without depending on the mainstream media. 
Frequent use of online media also boosted citizens’ competence toward public and political 
issues (Joyce, 2007). For instance, in the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2002 and 
2004, Internet media made a significant contribution to fostering citizen engagement in politics. 
However, on the other side of the wide expansion of the new media sector, governmental 
control still persisted. Also, a few mainstream media exercised all efforts to maintain their vested 
rights, mainly taking advantage of the collusion with the political power. During the ten years 
when two liberal presidents held the power (1998 ~2007), governmental interference diminished 
significantly compared with the previous authoritarian governments. As a result, most media 
organizations were free from restraints or regulations. However, since Lee Myung-bak took over 
the presidency in 2007, the South Korean public media organizations have again encountered 
hardship. Under the Lee’s government, the oppression of the public media was carried out very 
systematically in varied directions.  
First, under the Lee’s government, former presidential aides and advisers were appointed at 
key positions in a number of major media companies, doing a serious harm to media 
independence. The CEOs of two major terrestrial television networks, KBS and MBC were 
chosen from the pool of Lee’s close associates. The CEOs of the Yonhap News Agency and Seoul 
Daily were also replaced by associates of president Lee. The hand-picked CEOs then gave their 
personal favorites important positions. President Lee even forced the some major private media, 
such as a satellite broadcasting SkyLife, a 24-hour news channel YTN, and an English 
broadcasting company Arirang TV, to fill the CEO positions with pro-government people. 
Although the previous two governments also appointed pro-government people as the presidents 
of public media organizations, they scarcely attempted to intervene in the editorial directions of 
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those media. But, the Lee administration officials plainly gave pressure even to detailed editorial 
directions. Accordingly the media with pro-government CEOs directly and indirectly supported 
the regime in power by remaining silent at times and serving willingly as the advocate of the 
government at other times. In other words, major media outlets toed the line in accordance with 
the government’s agenda, controlling the public opinion. The International Federation of 
Journalists has condemned such actions of the Lee government as an attempt to manipulate 
media to suit the President (Park, 2010). 
Second, suppression for journalists, which is an old legacy of the military regimes, 
resurrected under the Lee’s government. Approximately 160 journalists have been penalized for 
writing critical reports about government policies, as well as for their roles in advocating for the 
freedom of press since 2008. As of June 2012, eight journalists remained dismissed from their 
positions at the YTN station and MBC for their participation in similar acts. The Seoul District 
Court ruled in November 2009 that the dismissals were an abuse of management’s disciplinary 
discretion. The court ordered YTN to reinstate six of its employees, but the station is still resistant 
to comply with it. In June 2009, four producers and a writer for the program “PD Notebook” of 
MBC were indicted on defamation charges for a report on U.S. beef imports that sparked weeks 
of massive protests and demonstrations in 2008, as paranoia of potential “mad cow disease” 
overwhelmed the country. The government claimed that the show deliberately distorted the 
government policy on beef import. The prosecution demanded five-year prison sentences for the 
journalists, but they were exonerated by the court in January 2010.  
Third, President Lee not only controlled the public media sector but also exerted influence 
on online content and its users. An increasing number of online comments were removed only 
for the reason that they contained anti-governmental views. Since 2008, the government 
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requested all website operators to monitor the content that is critical toward the government or 
social customs. By such a strict censorship drive, in 2009, a blogger, Park Dae-sung, who went 
by the alias “Minerva,” was arrested on the charges of spreading online rumors that the 
prosecution claimed led to dollar hoarding, prompting the government to inject $2 billion to 
stabilize the currency market. The prosecution sought an 18-month prison term, but Park was 
acquitted by the Seoul Central District Court in 2011 (Freedom House, 2011). On May 12, 2011, 
the Korea Communications Commission (KCC) blocked a Twitter account, “2MB18nomA,” 
which contains derogatory meaning toward president Lee. On August 5, 2011, the Seoul 
Executive Court made a plea to the KCC to unblock the Twitter account based on the ground of 
freedom of expression. In addition, several laws (i.e., the Electronic Communication Business 
Law and the Korean Communication Decency Act) were revised to insert additional articles that 
cover Internet media.  
Due to such harsh control over both public media and Internet media, media freedom in 
South Korea during the Lee’s administration slipped to its lowest ranking ever. Freedom House’s 
annual Freedom of the Press survey downgraded Korea’s media freedom rating from “free” to 
“partly free” for the first time since it started publishing worldwide press freedom ranking 
(Freedom House, 2013). The organization pointed out “an increase in official censorship” and 
“government attempts to influence news and information” (Freedom House, 2013). Reporters 
without Borders (RSF) placed South Korea at 69th out of 157 nations according to its Press 
Freedom Index (RSF, 2013). In 2008 RSF index score for South Korea was 47.  
On the other hand, the collusion of mainstream press and the ruling bloc became 
considerably restored under the Lee government. The Lee administration provided considerable 
privileges only to the pro-government conservative media. A good example was the revision of a 
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media law so that it can allow the cross-ownership between newspapers and broadcasters. In 
2011, the Korea Communications Commission (KCC) awarded new broadcast licenses to five 
pro-government news corporations – Chosun Daily, Joongang Daily, Donga Daily, Maekyung 
Daily, Yonhap News Agency. Since then, people’s concern for the erosion of media diversity has 
been growing in South Korea. 
Park Geun-hye, the daughter of the former dictator Park Jung-hee, succeeded Present Lee 
in 2013. So far, the media policy under the present President Park is almost similar to that of 
former president Lee. All CEOs of public media organizations are people who have close 
connection with President Park or the ruling Saenuri Party. The government provides unfair 
support to the five new broadcasters, while it often regulates anti-government media and citizen 
media.   
 
3.2 Today’s Media Landscape in South Korea 
The main features of media landscape in South Korea are broadcast, print and Internet in 
the form of both public and private ownership. The major stations are KBS and MBC (public 
service broadcasters). There are also approximately 120 private television stations among which 
SBS is the biggest. South Korea has about 200 public and private radio stations. In 2002, a digital 
satellite broadcasting system, SkyLife, began its operation, offering seventy-four channels. It is 
heavily financed with public-sector investment. The government has the sole authority to give 
permits for broadcast business in South Korea. In particular, the public service providers are 
directly or indirectly influenced by the government in their business decisions as well as 
executive level manpower matters. The government has the official authority to appoint the 
CEOs of the public broadcasters and by doing so it can easily control broadcasters. If the 
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journalists protest these decisions, they are subject to be punished by the law. The political tone 
of the public broadcasters tends to fluctuate according to the change of the government.  
There are 12 national newspapers in South Korea. Chosun Daily, Joongang Daily, and 
Dong-a Daily are the leading papers among them. They boast circulation of more than one 
million copies each. They are all family-owned. These papers are mammoth media 
conglomerates, producing not only nation-wide papers but also weekly/monthly newsmagazines, 
women’s magazines, children’s dailies, sports dailies, and cable TV channels. They even own art 
galleries and tourist hotels. They also sponsor a variety of promotional programs, such as an 
annual literary debut award, arts and cultural presentations, sports events, and special lecture 
series on salient social issues. The three major newspapers particularly have a clear inclination 
toward conservatism. Only two national newspapers, Hankyoreh Daily and Kyunghyang Daily, 
speak for the left-wing sector. Additionally, there are more than 100 hundred local or specialized 
newspapers across the nation. The readership of the local newspapers is very low compared with 
that of national newspapers (Kim & Chung, 2013). 
As stated earlier, the South Korean news media, especially the conservative major 
newspapers, became a dominant power agent as the society underwent democratization (Chang, 
2009; Lee, 1997; Yang, 1999). There is even an argument that the press has developed into a 
“state institution” that can take a partial role of the state (Park & Jang, 2001). In that point, 
“Political parallelism” may be an appropriate concept to portray the main characteristic of the 
press of South Korea. Originally, party-press parallelism refers to the degree of ideological 
correspondence between the press and political parties. The correspondence is composed of (1) 
the ideology of content, (2) connections between the press and the political parties on individual 
and organizational levels, (3) the overlap of the readers and political party supporters, and (4) the 
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conformity of the journalists to the causes of the political parties they support (Hallin & Mancini, 
2004). The Korean press tends to be highly politically-oriented not only in editorials but also in 
straight news. Therefore, the degree of political parallelism in Korea must be high (Nam 2006). 
Under the condition that conservative newspapers dominate the public opinion market, the 
initiative of them could be even stronger. A multitude of studies suggested the notion of 
“political empowerment of the press” when discussing the characteristics of South Korean news 
media (Cho, 2003; Park & Jang, 2000). 
There is only one supplier of foreign news in South Korea, the Yonhap News Agency. In 
the 1980 restructuring of media systems, the government forcefully consolidated several existing 
wire services into this one and put it under ownership by two leading broadcasting networks – 
KBS and MBC. Since these two broadcasting networks are state-controlled, the Yonhap News 
Agency is in effect under government control. Its top management is usually occupied by 
government-related people. Because of this governmental intervention, Yonhap’s news coverage 
is often blamed for its pro-governmental orientation and lack of fairness (National Union of 
Mediaworkers, 2010).  
South Korea is one of the most connected nations in the world with high broadband 
penetration rates and a tech savvy population. It is a trailblazer for high-speed and wireless 
internet. This country boasts the fastest Internet connection speed in the world (Han, 2007). The 
country is also a pioneer of mobile TV and Internet TV (IPTV). The adoption and use of the 
Internet in the traditional media are extensive in South Korea. Most of the nation’s media provide 
their news and content via online platforms. Most of them are accessible free of charge.  
Online-only news sites are also increasing in number and drawing public’s attention for 
their occasional scoops in publishing important news. They emerge as alternative media, 
 ４８ 
 
fostering their own specialty and followers. One of the news sites is OhmyNews 
(www.ohmynews.co.kr). Founded by a former journalist, this news site relies on as many as 
1,300 volunteer reporters who practice the site’s catchphrase, “All citizens are reporters.” In one 
poll, this site was rated as one of the nation’s top ten news media of influence. Surveys 
consistently show that the online press is being taken as the third most important news medium 
after television and newspapers. 
South Koreans use a variety of social media to meet their needs and demands. Recent 
figures reveal that Twitter users in South Korea exceeded 3 million, two times higher than the 
world average (Kim & Shin, 2013). Since January 19, 2011, Twitter has been offering Korean 
language service, making Korean the seventh language available in Twitter. According to Korea 
Information Society Development Institute, Kakatostory is most widely used in South Korea, 
recording 55.4% penetration rate of the whole Korean population. Facebook is used by 23.4% 
(approximately 11 million) of the population. Twitter occupies the third place as a penetration 
rate of 13.1% (KISDI, 2013). Podcast shows are also popular among South Korean. According a 
podcast portal, about 150~200 new podcast shows start airing in South Korea, and more than 
6,000 podcast shows are consumed across the country (Podbbang, 2014). Average hours spent on 
social media every day was 72.8 minutes as of as of 2013. Most social media users in South 
Korea access them using their mobile devices (Shim & Kim, 2013). South Korea is the home to 
one of the largest blogging communities in the world, second only to China. Popular blog hosting 
sites include: Naver Blogs, Daum Blogs, Egloos, Blogin, Tistory. 
Overall, the media landscape of South Korea can be described as having three features. 
First, traditional mass media still have dominant power in the market. Second, several major 
media organizations maintain close connections with the political power, often disrupting the 
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health and diversity in media industry. Lastly, alternative media based on the Internet are 
expanding their influence by providing people with new public forums of civic engagement. 
 
3.3 Citizen Participation and Media 
This subsection reviews the relationship between media use and political participation in 
South Korea. The ways in which the media report social facts, mediate social conflicts, and build 
social consensus has significant consequences for the outlook of democracy, especially in the 
process of democratization. Then, what kind of role did and do the South Korean media play in 
motivating citizens to get involved in the democratic process?  
Under the authoritarian regimes, South Koreans had to remain passive and muted because 
the dictatorial regimes prevented people from expressing their voices, using physical and legal 
measures. Likewise, the media were not able to function as public-sphere providers that help 
citizens to exchange ideas and motivate them to engage in public and political processes. 
Political participation or resistance against the government was mainly the work of determined 
civic activists. Activists-driven actions often failed to be shared by the general public. After the 
massive protests in 1987, the opportunities for masses to engage in public and political issues 
increased drastically. Newly-appeared media outlets since 1987 not only provided people with 
different perspectives hitherto unattainable in established media outlets, but also helped shape 
new public sphere where citizens freely express their voices. Such roles by young minor media 
outlets provoked citizens’ interest in politics and encouraged them to engage in political affairs.    
The participatory culture of South Koreans has developed into a new stage with the 
penetration of Internet-based digital media (Kim, 2006). Since the late 1990s, citizens have 
started relying on newly-established online media instead of the existing media in order to obtain 
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more balanced, accurate, and unfiltered information on social and political issues. At the same 
time, people began to take advantage of new media technologies to produce their own content, 
discuss public issues freely, and mobilize other citizens in democratic activities. With regard to 
this change in participatory culture, two things should be considered – the diversification of 
social agenda and the advent of new generations.  
Under the military dictatorship, the main goal of civic groups was obtaining political 
democratization. The objective was a simple one and there was a general consensus about the 
goal among different social groups. After the 1987 reform, the goal moved from the political 
democratization to social democratization. Many citizens thought that even though the society 
achieved a certain level of “procedural democracy,” an actual democracy was not yet reached 
(Kang, 2005). In the 1990s, citizens showed interest in a much greater diversity of issues, such as 
environment, consumerism, gender, equality, and welfare. Also, the number of civic groups 
increased considerably during the 1990s. These organizations, composed of professionals, white-
collars, religious leaders, and intellectuals as well as ordinary citizens, deemphasized direct 
politics-oriented activism. Instead, they stressed a new form of civic mobilization, mainly 
directed to the achievement of legal reforms, accountability, and the promotion of social welfare 
(Kim, 2007). The diversification of interest expanded the opportunity for individuals to voice 
their opinions and participate in social and political processes. 
In addition, the younger generation has played a significant role in fostering political 
expression and participation of citizens. Many South Korean scholars note a new type of 
participatory culture conducted by so-called “2030 Generation.” This generation refers to young 
people in their twenties and early thirties whose political memories were forged after the military 
dictatorship. This generation grew up with democracy in an affluent environment. Before 2002, 
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the 2030 Generation was oriented toward individualism (Han, 2007) and indifferent in politics 
(Gallup Korea, 2003; Lee, 2006; Roh, 2002; Song, 2005; Watts, 2003). This generational 
consciousness and the political inclinations of the 2030 Generation have changed along with the 
explosion of the Internet (Kim & Hamilton, 2006). 
The embryonic form of young people’s participation in social or political issues can be 
found in the vigorous use of online Bulletin Board System (BBS) in the early 1990s. BBS was an 
early form of the online discussion forum where individual citizens meet and exchange opinions. 
Students and intellectuals regarded the new communication system as a space of liberation. As a 
result, Internet media enjoyed much more freedom than already established traditional media. In 
the mid-1990s, the now democratic but still authoritarian state became increasingly aware of the 
impact of online media and online public spaces. As a result, the government started pressing 
online expression, and this provoked strong resistance among digital generations.  
The 2002 World Cup provided the 2030 Generation with an opportunity to use the Internet 
for large-scale collective gatherings. The “Red Devils,” an Internet-based fan club for the South 
Korean national soccer team, played a pivotal role in mobilizing collective actions to cheer the 
team. Throughout the World Cup games, the Red Devils mobilized 22 million people and 
organized cheers and celebrations both online and offline. Young people relied on the Internet to 
share the information about the time and place of gatherings, clothes to be worn, and slogans or 
songs to be chanted at the spot. Through the 2002 World Cup Game, young generations, which 
had been regarded as an individualistic cohort group, emerged as a new agent of collective action, 
gaining confidence in their ability to express their voices and to share information through the 
Internet (Cho et al., 2004).  
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Massive candlelight demonstrations in 2002 are another example that shows how young 
people increasingly engage in voluntary activism using digital technologies. On June 13, 2002, 
two middle-school girls were crushed to death by a U.S. armored vehicle driven by two U.S. 
soldiers in South Korea. However, a U.S. military tribunal in South Korea acquitted the two 
soldiers of negligent homicide, allowing the soldiers to leave South Korea. While mainstream 
media paid little attention to this incident, a citizen reporter of an online newspaper, OhmyNews, 
triggered the start of nationwide demonstrations against the U.S. juridical decision. Following the 
citizen reporter’s suggestion to hold candlelight vigils, a number of citizens began to gather each 
weekend at the Kwanghwamoon square in downtown Seoul, demanding a public apology from 
the U.S. A total of 422 candlelight demonstrations were held for twenty months.  
The 2002 presidential election showed how young people’s digital activities can influence 
even the decision of a president. During the campaign, Roh Moo-hyun, a high school graduate 
without a college degree appeared suddenly as an icon of change among young people who 
traditionally were considered to be indifferent in political affairs (Park & Joo, 2004). Roh was a 
new type of politician, who managed to become a human rights lawyer and advocate for laborers 
and activists. Roh’s supporters voluntarily gathered online under the name of “Nosamo,” a 
Korean acronym for “People who love Roh Moo-hyun.” Nosamo started with only seven 
founding members, but its membership rapidly grew more than 40,000 by May, 2002 (Park & 
Joo, 2004). Nosamo rallied support and spread the word using messenger services, mobile 
phones, and urgent messages posted on Internet boards. At last, Roh beat Lee Hoi-chang, a 
former Supreme Court justice and the leader of the conservative ruling party, which represented 
the vested interests of South Korea. Kim and Johnson (2006) described the election as “‘a victory 
of the Internet.” Internet users, particularly young supporters who were distrustful about the news 
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coverage of conservative and right-wing media, viewed the Internet as “a cyber Acropolis” where 
they could post their opinions and create a counter-agenda forum for their political debates. 
 From 2005, citizens’ online activism started moving to social media. Social media such 
as Facebook, Twitter, and Cyworld have become increasingly the hub of political mobilization by 
individual citizens. As mentioned the 3.1.3 section, social media, mainly due to their great 
potential as a provider of open, horizontal, networked, and real-time exchange of information, 
have been widely used as tools of public expression and participation. Especially, social media 
have shown their political power in almost every election since the late 2000s. The 2011 Seoul 
mayoral election demonstrates well how social media can be an effective tool to trigger citizen 
engagement in election processes. The mayor of Seoul is one of the nation’s high-profile political 
posts. The Seoul mayor seat had been held by conservatives for the last decade. But, in 2011, 
Park Won-soon, a political neophyte, who was supported by a majority of masses, clinched the 
mayoral race. Surprisingly, he beat his ruling-party-backed competitor who worked as a former 
judge. A number of political pundits paid attention to the explosive use of social media, 
especially Twitter, as a new political mobilizer. Most new media described the election as a 
“Twitter election.”  
In summary, the participatory culture has developed significantly in South Korea with the 
penetration of online news media and social media during the last 10 some years (Joyce, 2007). 
Under the authoritarian regimes, citizen participation was strictly limited mainly because of the 
governmental control of public sphere where citizens get unfiltered and accurate information 
about public issues and get together to initiate social actions. But, in the digital age, citizens can 
find enough alternative media channels to form a public sphere and voice their opinions to the 
political power. In other words, digital media have started providing a new pathway for the 
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public to get involved in public issues without depending on mainstream media. Although it is 
hard to say that new media directly influence citizens’ interest in public and political agendas, it 
is evident that they offer a greater opportunity for people to engage in the democratic process. 
Frequent use of new media seems to affect even politically-inattentive or highly cynical people. 
The present study investigates whether and how the use of new media technologies can influence 
citizens’ perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors toward political processes.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
 
4.1 Control Variables 
In the O – S – R – O –R model, the first O ‘‘represents the set of structural, cultural, 
cognitive, and motivational characteristics the audience brings to the reception situation that 
affect the impact of the messages’’ (McLeod et al., 2002, p. 238). Political interest and political 
orientation may fall into the first O. For instance, political interest has been reported to have a 
positive impact on attention to and recall of political information (Ainley, Hidi, & Berndorff, 
2002; Renninger & Wozniak, 1985). In the hypothesized model of the current study, variables 
related to the first O were controlled in order to examine accurate impacts of major constructs on 
political participation. In addition, basic demographic variables, such as age, gender, education, 
and income were controlled, to remove their impacts on major constructs.  
 
4.2 Direct Relations 
4.2.1 News Attention – Political Talk 
News consumption, in the deliberative democracy model, can play a vital role in 
encouraging political talk among people (Kim, Wyatt, & Katz, 1999). Gabriel Tarde (1899) 
emphasized the role of the press as the necessary condition for political conversation. He argued 
that news media function as an important trigger of discussion by providing people with topics to 
be used in daily conversations. Page (1996) also pointed out that mass media motivate public 
discussion. As Anderson, Dardenne, and Killenberg (1994) appropriately said, “News is what 
people talk about, and news makes people talk” (p. 37). Habermas (1989) argued that historically 
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the press created the “reading public” who started talking about public affairs. Research shows a 
positive link between newspaper reading and political talk. In Koch’s experimental study (1994), 
those who read The New York Times on a daily basis showed a significant increase in 
engagement in political discussion.  
Based on the prior literature, the present study hypothesizes: 
H1-1: Attention to traditional media news will have a significant and positive relationship 
with offline political talk. 
H1-2: Attention to traditional media news will have a significant and positive relationship 
with online political talk. 
News consumption alone might not be a sufficient condition for information gain or 
mobilization effects (Scheufele, 2001, 2002). The impact of mediated information on a person’s 
understanding of political affairs should be highest if this person exposes him or herself to 
relevant information in the media and also talks about it with other people. By engaging in 
interpersonal discussion, people obtain other viewpoints about an issue and develop a better 
knowledge of it (Nisbet & Scheufele, 2004). That is, people who engage in interpersonal 
discussion with others about what they read or heard in news are likely to have a higher level of 
understanding.  
The Internet has long been regarded as a medium that is amenable to interpersonal 
connection and social activities (Hampton & Wellman, 2003; Harasim, 1993). For example, 
social media allow users to easily connect themselves to people and share information (Fernando, 
2007). Most social media are originally designed for this purpose (Valkenburg, Peter & 
Schouten, 2006). Using social media help people engage in a conversation with others because of 
their functionality of constant contact with others and incessant updates for current issues. Online 
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information seeking tends to be linked to the increase in online interactive messaging (Shah et 
al., 2005). Online news consumption often results in the increase in face-to-face conversation 
(Shah et al., 2005). Some studies highlight Internet’s potential to foster political talk among those 
who have a high level of information-seeking motivation (van Dijk, 2000). Thus, it is posed: 
H2-1: Attention to news via online news outlets will have a significant and positive 
relationship with offline political talk. 
H2-2: Attention to news via online news outlets will have a significant and positive 
relationship with online political talk. 
H3-1: Attention to news via social media will have a significant and positive relationship 
with offline political talk. 
H3-2: Attention to news via social media will have a significant and positive relationship 
with online political talk. 
4.2.2 News Attention – News Elaboration 
Human beings have a desire to learn from news to monitor the environment surrounding 
them (Shoemaker, 1996). In general, people with strong surveillance motives tend to seek news 
to gratify their information needs (Graber, 1993; Shah, 1998; Zillman & Bryant, 1985). Attention 
to news in turn may lead to engagement in a high level of elaboration on the news obtained. 
Elaboration refers to “the use of news information to make cognitive connections to past 
experience and prior knowledge and to drive new implications from news content” (Eveland et 
al., 2003, p. 363). The cognitive mediation model posits that a surveillance motive tends to 
promote information processing behaviors, including elaboration on news content. Other studies 
also suggest that news elaboration is more likely to take place among those who profess strong 
surveillance motivations for using news media (Kim & Rubin, 1997; Perse, 1990b; Rubin & 
 ５８ 
 
Perse, 1987). In short, when motivated to gain information from media exposure, people are 
more likely to engage in effortful forms of processing to achieve their goals. Thus it is posed: 
H4-1: Attention to news via traditional media will be positively and significantly related to 
elaboration on news content.  
H4-2: Attention to news via online media will be positively and significantly related to 
elaboration on news content. 
H4-3: Attention to news via social media will be positively and significantly related to 
elaboration on news content. 
4.2.3 News Attention – Political Efficacy 
Some studies lend support to the association of news consumption and political efficacy. 
News media use stimulates people’s perception that they are knowledgeable of political affairs. 
Consumption of news also has positive influence on efficacious feeling about politics (Delli 
Carpini, 2004; Hoffman & Thompson, 2009; Kenski & Stroud, 2006; McLeod et al., 1999). Delli 
Carpini and Keeter (1996) suggest that the media provide the requisite knowledge for political 
efficacy which encourages participation. In a longitudinal study by Semetko and Valkenburg 
(1998), “thematic” portrayal of news was found to encourage people to reason with political 
issues or about the role of government, and, as a result, increased political efficacy (Iyengar, 
1991). Pinkleton, Austin, and Fortman (1998) argue that the effects of media use on political 
efficacy are generally positive.  
On the other hand, Scheufele and Nisbet (2002) negate such a positive link between news 
consumption and political efficacy. Their study found information seeking to be unrelated to 
political efficacy. The availability of information did not directly result in boosting people’s 
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willingness to get involved in democratic citizenship. Considering mixed results about the 
relationship between news attention and political efficacy, this study poses a research question: 
RQ1: In what ways is attention to news related to political efficacy? 
4.2.4 News Attention – Political Participation 
There is much research on the effects of mass media on citizens’ involvement in the 
political process. Some scholars focus more on detrimental effects of media on participation. For 
example, Putnam (2000) blamed television as a culprit of citizens’ disengagement from the 
democratic life. Nie (2001) and Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) argued that Internet and 
political advertising, respectively, eroded political engagement. On the other hand, some studies 
found a positive role of news media in the political process. For instance, newspapers have been 
viewed as having a beneficial relationship with political engagement (Newton, 1999; Norris, 
2000; Gil de Zúñiga, 2007).  
Such contradictory findings may be due to imprecise measurement. For example, some 
studies relied on crude questionnaires, such as hours or frequency of consumption of a medium 
(Freedman & Goldstein, 1999). Studies of media effect based on cultivation theory (Gerbner et 
al., 1994) and the “time displacement thesis” (Putnam, 1996) drew a conclusion that the time 
spent on media takes away the required time for socializing and resolving community problems. 
Conclusions about media effects on participation often have been based on imprecise and 
monolithic measures of media consumption, with little regard for specific patterns of media use 
(Kraut et al., 1998; Nie, 2001; Putnam, 2000).  
This research argues that such confusion stems mainly from the failure to segment 
different usage patterns of media. Therefore, this study focuses on informational uses of media 
rather than media use in general. In this regard, a multitude of studies shown that informational 
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use of media in general had a beneficial impact on civic attitude and participatory behaviors 
(Holbert, 2005; Jennings & Zeitner, 2003). Consumption of public affairs content in newspapers 
and television was found to increase citizen participation (Chaffee & Kanihan, 1997; McLeod, 
Scheufele, & Moy, 1999; Sotirovic & McLeod, 2001). News consumers not only identify 
important social issues or problems (Stamm, Emig, & Hesse, 1997) but also acquire mobilizing 
information about political activities (Lemert, Mitzman, Seither, Cook, & Hacket, 1997). Prior 
(2003b) found that people who took advantage of abundant political information were more 
likely to cast their ballots in elections.  
The positive association between informational use of media and participation has been 
witnessed in both traditional and new media. For instance, Xenos and Moy (2007) found a 
positive link between consumption of online political information and political engagement. 
Internet hard-news use had a positive relationship with political participation (Hardy & 
Scheufele, 2005). Research also shows that informational uses of the Internet are positively 
related to citizen participation because advanced tools, such as search engines and chat 
interfaces, allow people to use the Internet more effectively for political purposes (Park & Joo, 
2004). Following the literature, this study expects: 
H5-1: Attention to news via traditional media will be significantly and positively 
associated with offline political participation. 
H5-2: Attention to news via traditional media will be significantly and positively 
associated with online political participation. 
H5-3: Attention to news via online media will be significantly and positively associated 
with offline political participation. 
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H5-4: Attention to news via online media will be significantly and positively associated 
with online political participation. 
H5-5: Attention to news via social media will be significantly and positively associated 
with offline political participation. 
H5-6: Attention to news via social media will be significantly and positively associated 
with online political participation. 
4.2.5 Political Talk – Political Efficacy 
Talking through vague political ideas helps citizens understand political processes. 
Discussion of media content has been linked to increases in individuals’ understanding of it 
(Robinson & Levy, 1986). People who talk frequently about what they have read and seen in the 
media are more likely to make sense of them. This is consistent with the Habermasian (1962) 
deliberative democracy model, which posits that citizens come to optimal decisions through 
deliberative discussion. 
Political talk even helps people to reconcile potentially inconsistent points of view 
(Eliashoph, 1998). People who discuss politics frequently with others expect their opinions to be 
challenged. As a result, discussion allows citizens to weigh different viewpoints and integrate 
them into their final decision, thereby increasing citizens’ understanding of issues beyond what 
they have learned from the media (Fishkin, 1995, 1996). People who talk to other people about 
information gained from the media may obtain other ways of thinking about the information, and 
ultimately develop a better understanding about it (Scheufele, 2001).  
 Scores of scholars noted that the more people talk about the information they obtain from 
the media, the more likely the mediated information is to influence people’s political attitudes 
(Chaffee, 1972; Eveland, 2004; Sotirovic & McLeod, 2001). Furthermore, some studies have 
 ６２ 
 
shown that political discussion is positively related to political efficacy (Fishkin, 1999; Min, 
2007). Lin found that “citizens who engage in interpersonal discussion about politics with a 
greater number of fellow citizens are more likely to have confidence in their ability to make 
sense of and to get involved in the political process” (2003, p. 9). Discussion about politics 
facilitates rational political decisions while forming orientations and attitudes that motivate 
participation (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Morrell, 2005). No matter what a political 
conversation occurs in offline or online situation, the conversation tends to facilitate the flow of 
media information and to help citizens interpret media messages and construct meaning on their 
own (Kim & Kim, 2008; Southwell & Yzer, 2007). In short, discussions on political issues help 
individuals to gain mobilizing information from the media, thereby increasing their willingness 
to get involved in the political process (Hardy & Scheufele, 2005).  
H6-1: Offline political talk will be positively and significantly related to political efficacy. 
H6-2: Online political talk will be positively and significantly related to political efficacy. 
4.2.6 News Elaboration – Political Efficacy 
Unlike news attention through which people intentionally select news they prefer to read 
or to view, news elaboration concerns more in-depth and effortful mental efforts to make sense 
of what people obtain from news (Eveland, 2002). Through elaboration, people sort and 
reorganize information in personally meaningful ways (Graber, 1988). Elaboration can take place 
in two ways. First, people may perceive a connection between themselves and media content 
through an elaboration process. Second, people may interact psychologically with a medium’s 
messages in the elaboration process (Levy & Windahl, 1985). Therefore, elaboration goes 
beyond mere attention to media content. Elaboration contains news consumers’ intentional 
efforts to cope with obtained news.  
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According to the cognitive mediation model, greater elaboration should lead to a higher 
level of learning from news because elaboration propels the connection between news content, 
past experiences, and existing knowledge (Eveland et al., 2003). By linking the new information 
with previously stored knowledge, the news content will be more easily recalled. Research shows 
that elaboration is also positively associated with increased political interest and involvement in 
public events (Eveland, 2001, 2002; Kosicki & McLeod, 1989). 
Little research has examined the direct relationship between elaboration and the sense of 
political efficacy. While elaboration refers to the tendency of making links what one obtained 
from information with one’s prior experiences or knowledge, political efficacy means the belief 
that one can make a significant change about the political process. Unlike elaboration, which is a 
kind of attitudinal orientation, political efficacy much relates to a behavioral attitude toward the 
politics. Despite their differences, it is presumed that the more one elaborates on the media 
content, the more efficacious one feels about the political process, because as one exercises 
enough mental efforts about political information, one is more likely to have higher confidence in 
handling political situations that otherwise would be complex or intimidating (Bandura, 1977). In 
other words, active reflection on media content may help construct and understand the political 
world more easily. Thus, it is posed: 
H6-3: Elaboration on news content will be positively and significantly related to political 
efficacy.   
4.2.7 Political Talk – Political Participation 
Political talk is “a public-spirited way of talking whereby citizens make connections from 
their individual and personal experiences, issues and so forth to society” (Graham & Hajru, 2011, 
p. 22). Political discussion has consistently been a central element to theories of democracy. The 
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influence of communication on levels of democratic engagement has been well documented. 
Scores of studies found that discussion about public affairs had a positive effect on engagement 
in the political process (Eveland, 2004; Kim et al., 1999; La Due Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998; Mutz, 
2006; Rojas, 2008; Shah et al., 2005). Scheufele (2002) said, “Interpersonal discussion plays a 
role in the reception and processing of political news when it comes to translating mass-mediated 
messages into meaningful individual action” (pp. 57-58). Political debate and discussion function 
as a baseline or an antecedent for political engagement (Jankowski & van Selm, 2000; McLeod et 
al., 1996). Information sharing among citizens through interpersonal communication sufficiently 
accounts for political participation (McLeod et al., 1999; Verba et al., 1995). Interpersonal 
communication can allow citizens to exchange information, elaborate on public issues, and learn 
about opportunities to participate in political activities (Gastil & Dillard, 1999; Gil de Zúñiga, 
2009; Klofstad, 2007; Rojas et al., 2005).  
Online political talk can also play a crucial role in encouraging political participation. 
Price and Cappella (2002) found that participation in online discussion forums increased political 
engagement. Shah et al. (2005) reported a positive link between discussion about community 
affairs over emails and the like and engagement in community activities. Thus, it is hypothesized: 
H7-1: Offline political talk will be positively and significantly associated with offline 
political participation. 
H7-2: Offline political talk will be positively and significantly associated with online 
political participation. 
H7-3: Online political talk will be positively and significantly associated with offline 
political participation. 
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H7-4: Online political talk will be positively and significantly associated with online 
political participation. 
4.2.8 Political Efficacy – Political Participation 
Political efficacy could prove to be an important mechanism by which the media effect 
occurs. Political efficacy is the belief in one’s own competency and the feeling that political and 
social change is possible (Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954). Political efficacy determines a 
myriad of political behaviors because it provides incentive to participate in politics (Abramson & 
Aldrich, 1982). Political efficacy has been considered one of the most important psychological 
constructs closely related to political participation (Cohen et al., 2001; Delli Carpini, 2004; Gans, 
1967; Kenski & Stroud, 2006). Scores of empirical studies showed that political efficacy 
increased citizen participation in the political process (Abramson & Aldrich, 1982; Finkel, 1985; 
Gastil & Xenos, 2010; Stenner-Day & Fischle, 1992). Thus, it is posed: 
H8-1: Political efficacy will have a significantly positive association with offline political 
participation. 
H8-2: Political efficacy will have a significantly positive association with online political 
participation. 
 
4.3 Indirect Relations 
4.3.1 News Attention  Political Efficacy  Participation 
It is questionable whether two different persons who consume the same media content 
show the same level of participation in political activities. After exposure to news, one of them 
may feel increased self-competence to engage in real activities due to increased political efficacy, 
while the other may feel heightened frustration or apathy in relation to society or politics. The 
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extent of political efficacy varies depending on each individual. For instance, Capella and 
Jamieson (1997) questioned whether certain patterns of television reporting lead more to the 
increase of political cynicism and withdrawal from public engagement rather than to the increase 
of political efficacy and engagement. Nisbet and Scheufele (2004) found that news consumption 
had an indirect impact on participation as mediated by political efficacy. Drawing on the above 
reasoning, the current study expects: 
H9: Political efficacy will mediate the relationship between news attention and political 
participation. 
4.3.2 Deliberation  Political Efficacy  Participation 
Research on deliberative democratic theories suggests that citizens’ discussion about 
politics facilitates rational political decisions while forming orientations and attitudes that are 
supportive of political participation (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Morrell, 2005). In addition, 
as noted earlier, elaboration that takes place during interpersonal communication may lead to 
strong political outcomes, such as strengthened political efficacy. Several studies documented 
evidence to support the positive impact of political discussion and deliberation on political 
efficacy (Fishkin, 1999; Min, 2007). Taken together, this study hypothesizes that political 
efficacy is a function of interpersonal political discussion and intrapersonal news elaboration. It 
also expects a positive relationship between political efficacy and political participation. 
H10-1: Political efficacy will mediate the impact of interpersonal political talk on political 
participation. 
H10-2: Political efficacy will mediate the impact of news elaboration on political 
participation. 
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4.3.3 News Attention  Deliberation  Participation 
According to the traditional “two-step flow” model of communication, interpersonal 
discussions can mediate the effects of mass media on the audience (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955). In 
other words, the impact of mass media on audience behavior functions through interpersonal 
political discussion. This mediation process helps audiences to make sense of the political 
information they gain from the media. Tarde contended that the public emerged as a result of the 
rapid diffusion of newspapers that provoked political conversation in salons and coffee houses. 
Katz (1992) summarizes Tarde’s argument in three bullet points: (1) the newspaper fuels 
conversation, (2) conversation shapes opinion, and (3) opinion triggers action. 
Bryce (1888) succinctly described the public opinion formation process in four stages: (1) 
reading newspapers, (2) political conversation, (3) opinion formation, and (4) participatory 
activities. Bryce clearly shows the relationship between news media use, political conversation, 
and political participation within the context of an individual’s behavior. Kim, Wyatt, and Katz 
(1999) found that news media use and political conversation are closely associated with 
participatory activities.  
Scheufele (2001) argues that talking about certain issues with others is an essential 
condition for an individual to understand those issues more clearly, to tie them to preexisting 
knowledge, and to meaningfully participate in political life. To put it differently, interpersonal 
discussion on politics plays a significant role in translating mediated messages into meaningful 
engagement in the political process. Citizens will be able to participate in political events when 
they talk about politics with other people. Therefore, this study tests the variable of interpersonal 
political discussion as a deliberation process through which individuals make sense of and 
evaluate political information gained through different types of media.  
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Online political talk is another important type of interpersonal discussion in the current 
study. A number of researchers suggest that online political talk has a similar deliberative nature 
like face-to-face discussion (Price& Cappella, 2002; Shah et al., 2005; Shah et al., 2007). Cho et 
al. (2009) argue that online political discussion can result in an even stronger degree of 
elaboration because of its emphasis on texts. Indeed, in many ways, online talk excels offline 
talk. For instance, online messages can be widely distributed and shared without temporal or 
geographical limitations. Online discussion also takes advantage of diverse formats: e-mails, 
discussion boards, or instant messaging, microblogging, and podcasts (Evans, 2008; Mayfield, 
2004). Thus, it is posed: 
H11: Political talk both offline and online will mediate the impact of news attention on 
political participation. 
4.3.4 News Attention  Deliberation  Political Efficacy 
As stated earlier, news attention tends to increase political efficacy of those who consume 
news. However, political conversation and news elaboration are prerequisites for the 
understanding of political information (McLeod, 1996; Scheufele, 2001). Political talk and 
reflection on political information are crucial in translating the influence of news consumption on 
civic engagement in political affairs. Also, those who talk frequently about politics and reflect on 
political information are more likely to feel competent about their ability to make sense of 
politics. Taken together, this study hypothesizes: 
H12-1: Political talk both offline and online will mediate the impact of news attention on 
political efficacy. 
H12-2: News elaboration will mediate the impact of news attention on political efficacy. 
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4.3.5 News Attention  Deliberation  Political Efficacy  Political Participation 
As hypothesized in the research model, this study expects that deliberation and political 
efficacy jointly mediate the relationship between news attention and political participation. 
However, since there is little research on this relationship, the current study suggests a research 
question:  
RQ2: In what ways do offline and online political talk and political efficacy jointly 
influence the relationship between news attention and political participation? 
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CHAPTER 5 
METHODS 
 
5.1 Research Design 
In order to test the proposed hypotheses, a panel survey was employed as a major research 
design because this study was particularly interested in the analysis of change in political 
attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors – especially change in political efficacy, trust, and engagement. 
In other words, because this study aimed to describe patterns of change and then explain how and 
why such change occurs, a panel survey was chosen.  
Inferences about change can be obtained by several analytical strategies. First, in a cross-
sectional analysis, data are gathered from a representative sample at only one point in time, and 
the effects of change are inferred from “variations between units” (Kessler & Greenberg, 1981, p. 
2). This approach does not meet one of the critical conditions for causality. Three conditions 
should be met in order for a certain result to prove a causal relationship (Lazarsfeld & Morris, 
1955): time order, correlation, and the absence of spuriousness. When we are satisfied with 
simply figuring out by how much a single variable has changed in a population, we can conduct a 
trend study (Kessler & Greenberg, 1981). This study offers information about “net changes” at a 
collective level. Yet, when data collection of each wave is done from qualitatively different types 
of subjects, false trends may come up. Cohort analysis is another method to obtain inferences of 
change. A cohort means “any group of individuals who are linked in some way or who have 
experienced the same significant life event within a given period” (Wimmer & Dominick, 2011, 
p. 221). A cohort study has some disadvantages, such as subject maturation or sample mortality. 
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The current study intends to draw samples from the whole population of South Korea; thus, a 
cohort study is not appropriate. 
Another study design that can examine the inferential causality of samples between two 
different points in time is a panel study. A panel study tracks the same sample of respondents at 
different points in time, and thus, provides information about both “net change” and “gross 
change” in the target variable (Wimmer & Dominick, 2011). For example, a panel study can be 
particularly useful in getting answers for a question that asks the roles of a certain medium in 
changing political attitudes. This design is powerful in that it “provides information about cross-
sectional as well as longitudinal variation” (Kessler & Greenberg, 1981, p. 3). In addition, it 
allows us to produce data suitable for advanced statistical techniques. For example, structural 
equation modeling predicts reliable cause-and-effect relationships that occur between different 
time points. A panel design is also fairly advantageous in measuring reciprocal effects within the 
same model (Kessler & Greenberg, 1981; Eveland et al., 2003). In other words, a panel study 
allows us to make a conclusion of a reciprocal causal claim as well as of a simple causal claim. 
As mentioned above, this study aims to examine a possible linear relationship of variables 
at one point in time: news media use – deliberation behaviors – political efficacy – political 
engagement. The current research is interested in simultaneously investigating associations of the 
causality of variables between two points in time, e.g., to what extent an individual’s attention to 
a certain medium influences her/his level of political engagement over time. In other words, this 
research seeks to understand causality between variables which is representative of a whole 
population both at one single point and at two different points in time. Therefore, a panel study 
was employed as a necessary and desirable research design. 
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There are several ways to carry out a panel survey, such as face-to-face interviews, 
telephone surveys, and computer-aided surveys. Among the various techniques of survey, the 
current study relies on an online panel survey. An online survey allows us to recruit a large 
number of samples at a low cost compared with other techniques (Wimmer & Dominick, 2011). 
In addition, collecting data over the Internet is swift. Of course a web-based survey may reveal 
some problems, such as mortality and representativeness. Such problems can be reduced by 
taking some cautionary measures in the data collection process. 
 
5.2 Data Collection 
The study conducted a two-wave panel survey during the 2012 presidential campaign in 
South Korea. In order to assure the representativeness of the sample, data were collected via a 
stratified sampling method. Before doing stratification, this study constructed a sampling frame 
based on 2012 voter registration data of the Korea Election Management Commission. A 
sampling frame is the list of units composing a population from which a sample is selected. In 
order to generalize research results, all elements should have equal chance to be selected from the 
defined sampling frame. Then, a target sample was stratified according to four criteria, including 
age, gender, education, and household income. Stratification refers to the grouping of the units 
composing a population into homogeneous strata before sampling is conducted. This procedure 
“improves the representativeness of a sample, at least in terms of the stratification variables by 
reducing the degree of sampling error” (Babbie, 2007, p. 205). After stratification, a total of 
1,200 target respondents were chosen using a four-way cross-classification system (age x gender 
x education x income) among the defined frame.  
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Finally, the target participants were provided the present survey’s URL via e-mail. The 
first invitation (Wave 1) was sent to selected individuals on September 16, 2012. A total of 800 
participated in the first survey (response rate = 66.7%). All respondents who completed the first 
wave were invited to a subsequent survey (December 10, 2012) with an explanation of 
compensatory incentive of $2, which would reduce a possible dropout rate. A total of 413 
participated in the second survey. The final response rate was 34.4%.  
The decision of two time points of two surveys was made under the consideration of the 
election campaign system of South Korea. According to an election law in South Korea, a 
presidential campaign officially starts three months before the election (December 19, 2012). 
Thus, the first survey was conducted three months prior to the election and the second survey 
was conducted nine days before it. Since South Korea first adopted a direct presidential election 
system in 1987, in every election, the competition between two major political parties (one 
conservative and one liberal) has been as fierce as a campaign in the United States. Therefore, 
this study assumed that voters’ attitudes or behaviors during the three months would be greatly 
influenced by campaign messages and media coverage on them. 
 
5.3 Measurement 
5.3.1 Media Use & News Attention 
For measurement of media use on a 4-point scale (1 = never; 4 = regularly), respondents 
were asked during the last three months before the date of each survey how often they had read or 
watched news in the following media: web-only news sites, portal news boxes, social networking 
sites, current affairs podcast shows, local newspapers, national newspapers, news magazines, 
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network TV evening news, network TV news magazine programs, local network TV news, radio 
news or news magazine programs, and cable TV news.  
For measurement of news attention, respondents were asked during the last three months 
before the date of each survey how much attention they had paid to the media outlets mentioned 
above on a 5-point scale (1 = not at all; 5 = very much). Based on the result of scale validation of 
factor loadings, network TV, national newspapers, and radios were condensed into an index of 
traditional news attention: Wave 1 - α = .71, M = 2.10, SD = .85; Wave 2 - α = .64, M = 1.84, SD 
= .81. Portal sites and Web-only newspapers were averaged to create an index of online news 
attention: Wave 1 - r = .75, M = 2.63, SD = .73; Wave 2 - r = .73, M = 2.65, SD = .74. Current 
affairs podcast shows and social networking sites were averaged to create an index of social 
media news attention: Wave 1 - r = .72, M = 1.70, SD = .75; Wave 2 - r = .68, M = 1.79, SD 
= .80. 
 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of Traditional Media Use 
 Network TV news National newspapers Radio news 
Wave 1 
Mean 2.682 2.393 2.079 
SD .538 .706 .688 
Wave 2 
Mean 2.293 1.999 1.934 
SD .513 .742 .719 
 
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics of Online and Social Media Use 
 Portal news 
Web-only 
newspapers 
Social 
networking sites 
Current affairs 
podcast shows 
Wave 1 
Mean 2.770 2.030 2.240 1.820 
SD .473 .742 .745 .747 
Wave 2 
Mean 2.794 2.366 2.498 2.105 
SD .731 .482 .708 .791 
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Table 4 Descriptive Statistics of News Attention via Traditional Media 
 Network TV news National newspapers Radio news 
Wave 1 
Mean 2.435 1.905 1.968 
SD 1.242 1.167 1.108 
Wave 2 
Mean 1.613 1.966 1.954 
SD .960 1.159 1.077 
 
Table 5 Descriptive Statistics of News Attention via Online and Social Media 
 
Portal news 
Web-only 
newspapers 
Social 
networking sites 
Current affairs 
podcast shows 
Wave 
1 
Mean 3.051 2.200 1.945 1.458 
SD .887 .979 1.007 .900 
Wave 
2 
Mean 3.000 2.298 2.019 1.569 
SD .898 .963 1.014 .989 
 
5.3.2 Political Efficacy 
Despite the importance of political efficacy in political communication, measurement has 
been in controversy. Originally, political efficacy was considered a one-dimensional construct. 
Later, via repeated theoretical and empirical trials, scholars reached a general consensus that 
efficacy has two dimensions: internal efficacy and external efficacy (Balch, 1974; Craig et al., 
1990). Many studies have relied on their own operationalization and failed to distinguish 
between internal and external efficacy (Morrell, 2003). Internal efficacy means a sense of one’s 
own ability to participate effectively in the political process. External efficacy is defined as the 
perception of how much the government and political institutions respond to citizens’ demands 
(Morrell, 2003). Usually, internal efficacy is believed to have a positive relationship with 
political engagement, while external efficacy does not exhibit a consistent association with 
political activity (Kahne & Westheimer, 2002; Shingles, 1981). The controversy about the impact 
of internal and external efficacy on people’s perception and attitude is an on-going issue.  
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The current study focused only on internal political efficacy because of two reasons. First, 
this study assumed that internal political efficacy is more closely related to news consumption 
and political discussion than external efficacy is. Shah et al. (2007) also pointed out the same 
logic. Second, internal political efficacy was more relevant than external efficacy to the items of 
political participation in this study. Most items of political participation dealt with how people 
engage in election processes, such as contacting political officials. 
This study relied on the measurement established by the American National Election 
Studies (ANES), which started using a new set of efficacy items in 1988. To assess internal 
efficacy, three items were used: (1) “I consider myself to be well qualified to participate in 
politics,” (2) “I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues 
facing our country,” and (3) “I think that I am as much as informed about politics and 
government as most people.” Responses were coded on a 5-point agree-disagree scale. In each 
wave, an index was constructed by averaging the responses: Wave 1 – α = .71, M = 3.28, SD 
= .66; Wave 2 - α = .75, M = 3.41, SD = .67. 
 
Table 6 Descriptive Statistics of Internal Political Efficacy 
 Internal Efficacy 1 Internal Efficacy 2 Internal Efficacy 3 
Wave 
1 
Mean 3.556 3.223 3.074 
SD .847 .807 .836 
Wave 
2 
Mean 3.608 3.417 3.201 
SD .837 .837 .810 
 
5.3.3 Political Trust 
Many previous studies employed single item to measure political trust, which may 
undermine the reliability of research. Items to measure political trust also have been developed 
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by the ANES since the 1950s. Among them, this study drew three items and revised them to fit 
into the South Korean context: (1) “you can generally trust public officials who run our 
government to do what is right,” (2) “The people in government do not waste the money we pay 
in taxes,” and (3) “When the government leaders make statements to the South Korean people on 
the media, they are usually telling the truth.” Responses were coded on a on a 5-point agree-
disagree scale. In each wave, an index was constructed by averaging the responses: Wave 1 – α 
= .73, M = 2.13, SD = .73; Wave 2 - α = .71, M = 2.19, SD = .73. 
 
Table 7 Descriptive Statistics of Political Trust 
 Political Trust 1 Political Trust 2 Political Trust 3 
Wave 1 
Mean 2.213 1.876 2.304 
SD .874 .879 .729 
Wave 2 
Mean 2.283 1.910 2.375 
SD .903 .900 .954 
 
5.3.4 Political Participation 
Traditional political participation often includes activities, such as voting, working for 
political campaigns, donating money to candidates, and displaying political bumper stickers 
(Verba et al., 1995; Conway, 1985). It also includes conventional behaviors, such as protesting, 
boycotting, and buying products for political reasons. With the influence of digital media, the 
forms of political participation are changing. However, many studies still stick to the traditional 
forms of participation, neglecting newly-emerged participatory behaviors (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 
2007). Gennaro and Dutton (2006) said, “the context provided by the Internet means that the 
activities take on new dimensions and forms that are at once more visual, immediate, self-
selected and impersonal” (p. 566).  
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 Therefore, this study takes into account both traditional and emerging forms of political 
participation. The current research distinguishes traditional offline participation from online 
participation under the assumption that heavy digital media users are more likely to show 
engaging behaviors in cyberspace because digital media provide users with various benefits, such 
as low participation cost and easy accessibility. On the other hand, the study expects that people 
who are heavily dependent on traditional media are more accustomed to traditional ways of 
participation. The study used nine items to measure online participation: (1) sending an e-mail to 
an editor of a newspaper or magazine, (2) contacting a politician using e-mails, (3) signing an 
online petition, (4) commenting on news online, (5) participating in online discussion forums, (6) 
posting political opinion on social networking sites, (7) forwarding a link with a political video 
or news to others, (8) meeting members of an online political group, and (9) engagement in a 
collective action online. Seven items were used to measure offline participation: (1) writing a 
letter to an editor of a newspaper or magazine, (2) displaying a campaign sticker or button, (3) 
writing a letter to a politician, (4) attending a political meeting, rally, or speech, (5) working for a 
political party or a candidate, (6) contributing money to political campaign or candidates, and (7) 
volunteering for political projects.  
Responses were coded on a 4-point scale ranging from 1 (never) to 4 (regularly). In each 
wave, an index was constructed by averaging respondents’ answers: offline political participation 
in Wave 1 – α = .93, M = 1.32, SD = .51; offline political participation in Wave 2 - α = .93, M = 
1.35, SD = .55; online political participation in Wave 1 – α = .91, M = 1.66, SD = .59; online 
political participation in Wave 2 - α = .87, M = 1.78, SD = .56. 
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Table 8 Descriptive Statistics of Offline Political Participation 
 Offline 
Participa
-tion 1 
Offline 
Particip
ation 2  
Offline 
Participa
-tion 3  
Offline 
Participa
-tion 4 
Offline 
Participa
-tion 5 
Offline 
Participa-
tion 6 
Offline 
Participa
-tion 7 
Wave 
1 
Mean 1.266 1.265 1.243 1.371 1.371 1.414 1.340 
SD .523 .546 .538 .649 .651 .704 .632 
Wave 
2 
Mean 1.315 1.315 1.281 1.421 1.361 1.453 1.320 
SD .602 .625 .594 .715 .648 .741 .627 
 
Table 9 Descriptive Statistics of Online Political Participation 
 Online 
Partici
pation 
1 
Online 
Partici
pation 
2 
Online 
Partici
pation 
3 
Online 
Partici
pation 
4 
Online 
Partici
pation 
5 
Online 
Partici
pation 
6 
Online 
Partici
pation 
7 
Online 
Partici
pation 
8 
Online 
Partici
pation 
9 
Wave 
1 
Mea
n 
1.420 1.450 1.853 2.086 2.086 1.693 1.715 1.359 1.318 
SD .651 .704 .883 .911 .910 .787 .815 .613 .602 
Wave 
2 
Mea
n 
1.414 1.547 1.954 2.165 2.591 1.760 1.787 1.409 1.366 
SD .650 .761 .892 .920 .830 .823 .869 .661 .642 
 
5.3.5 Political Talk 
This study measured two types of political discussion: offline political talk and online 
political talk. To measure offline political discussion, respondents were asked during the last one 
month how often they had talked about politics or current issues face-to-face with (1) friends, (2) 
colleagues, and (3) acquaintances. To measure online political talk, respondents were asked 
during the last one month how often they had talked about politics or current issues via e-mails, 
social networking sites, or online discussion forums with (1) friends, (2) colleagues, and (3) 
acquaintances. Responses were coded on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very 
much). In each wave, an index was constructed by averaging respondents’ answers: offline 
political talk in Wave 1 – α = .65, M = 1.86, SD = .79; offline political talk in Wave 2 - α = .70, M 
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= 2.14, SD = .93; online political talk in Wave 1 – α = .91, M = 1.84, SD = .85; online political 
talk in Wave 2 - α = .72, M = 1.80, SD = .84. 
 
Table 10 Descriptive Statistics of Offline and Online Political Talk 
 Offline 
Talk 1 
Offline 
Talk 2 
Offline 
Talk 3 
Online 
Talk 1 
Online 
Talk 2 
Online 
Talk 3 
Wave 
1 
Mean 1.951 1.721 1.910 1.971 1.698 1.836 
SD 1.151 1.056 1.183 1.114 1.038 1.174 
Wave 
2 
Mean 2.148 2.000 2.259 2.000 1.763 1.630 
SD 1.217 1.213 1.316 1.153 1.109 1.077 
 
5.3.6 News Elaboration 
The indicators of news elaboration were borrowed from prior studies (Eveland, 2002; 
Eveland & Dunwood, 2002; Kosicki & McLeod, 1990). Elaboration was measured with two 5-
point Likert-type items: (1) “I often find myself thinking about what I’ve encountered in the 
news” and (2) “I often try to relate what I encounter in the news to my own personal experience.” 
The indicators were averaged to create an index, r = .63, M = 3.59, SD = .66. 
 
Table 11 Descriptive Statistics of News Elaboration 
 Reflect on the news I read Connect the news to my experience 
Wave 
1 
Mean 3.548 3.626 
SD .732 .724 
 
5.3.7 Control Variables 
Political interest was assessed with a two-item index. Respondents were asked how much 
they were interested in local politics and national politics on a 5-point scale. Political ideology 
was measured on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (very liberal) 5 (very conservative). Gender, age, 
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education, and annual household income were also included in the measurement.
2
  
 
Table 12 Descriptive Statistics of Control Variables 
 
Age Gender Education 
Annual 
Income 
Political 
Interest 
Political 
Ideology 
Wave 
1 
Mean 39.18 
Male  
 408 (51%) 
2.794 2.758 3.046 2.950 
SD 10.71 
Female 
 392 (49%) 
.663 1.169 1.029 .805 
Wave 
2 
Mean 39.62 
Male 
221 (53.5%) 
2.804 2.751 3.090 2.927 
SD 10.45 
Female 
192 (46.5%) 
.633 1.131 .789 .803 
 
5.4 Analytic Procedure 
5.4.1 Major Characteristics of the Partial Least Squares (PLS) Approach  
In estimating structural equation models, either the covariance-based SEM method or the 
variance-based PLS (Partial Least Squares) approach can be used. PLS is a type of modeling to 
test causal relationships. It was developed as an alternative to covariance-based SEMs, such as 
LISREL, EQS, or AMOS. PLS simultaneously tests the “measurement model” (relationships 
between indicators and their corresponding constructs) and the “structural model” (relationships 
between constructs) (Barclay, Thompson & Higgins, 1995; Hulland, 1999). PLS calculates 
loadings from reflective constructs to their indicators, standardized regression coefficients 
between constructs, and coefficients of multiple determination (R-squared) for endogenous 
constructs (Gefen, Straub & Boudreau, 2000). Both covariance-based SEM and PLS are useful in 
testing complex models that have latent variable relationships. Many communication theories 
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 Refer to Appendix for specifics of the demographic questions. 
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rely on latent variables, which cannot be directly measured but must be analyzed through indirect 
means. Both PLS and covariance-based SEM rely on manifest variables, such as people’s 
responses on a topic, in order to estimate a given latent variable.  
However, compared with covariance-based SEMs, the PLS approach offers several 
advantages. First, PLS allows for relatively small sample sizes and makes less strict assumptions 
about the distribution of the data (Hair, Anderson, Tatham et al., 1998). Small samples do not 
always meet normality and homogeneity assumptions. Similarly, categorical variables also may 
not satisfy the distributional assumptions of the covariance-based SEM. It is believed that PLS 
provides more accurate coefficient results with smaller sample sizes than covariance-based SEMs 
(Chin, 1998; Mayfield et al., 2012). 
Second, PLS can test a complex model that contains multiple independent and dependent 
variables. Thus, it is useful in testing relationships that cannot be easily analyzed by standard 
regression methods. Although no statistical method can perfectly examine causation between 
variables, PLS allows for the examination of complex relationships, such as a mediating 
relationship, which is embedded within a larger theoretical framework. As such, tests of a PLS 
model can provide greater and more nuanced evidence for relationships between variables 
(Howson & Urbach, 2005). Garson (2004) said, “PLS is a predictive technique which can handle 
many independent variables, even when these display multi-collinearity. One very important 
distributional condition indicates when PLS can be a more appropriate technique: data come 
from non-normal or unknown distributions” (Falk & Miller, 1992, p. 6). In summary, PLS could 
be a more reliable alternative to other statistical techniques.  
Following the aforementioned arguments, this study decided to use the PLS approach 
because PLS is beneficial in setting up a complex model like the case in this study (Klarner, 
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Sarstedt, Hoeck & Ringle, 2013). In addition, the PLS methodology allows for the simultaneous 
testing of multiple paths (correlations). This study examines multiple paths among variables that 
relate to political efficacy, which is expected to mediate the relationship between news attention 
and political outcomes. The goal of this study is to explain the complex role of political efficacy 
in the political process, thus the variance-based PLS approach seems to be more suitable than 
other techniques.  
5.4.2 Test of Model Adequacy in PLS 
As with covariance-based SEM, PLS lacks general consensus about overall model 
adequacy. Instead, there are multiple methods that should be tested to determine model adequacy. 
Once model adequacy has been judged, the significance of the links between latent variables can 
be tested. Latent variables cannot be directly assessed; It must be estimated through statistical 
methods. A test should be conducted on how well manifest variables reflect the latent variables. 
Manifest variables can be directly measured and be used to estimate the latent variables.  
A PLS model adequacy measure provides two types of scale reliability: Cronbach’s alpha 
measure and composite reliability. The composite reliability measure is useful because it is free 
from the Cronbach’s alpha assumption that all scale items have the same relationship with the 
attendant latent variable. The composite reliability measure, instead, uses a manifest variable’s 
relationship with its associated latent variable in determining reliability. Such a method produces 
a score that is equivalent to Cronbach’s alpha. To satisfy composite reliability adequacy, these 
metrics should be higher than .70 (Chin, 1998; Churchill, 1979; Lohmöller, 1989). 
Average variance extracted (AVE) is another model adequacy measure in PLS. The AVE 
provides a piece of evidence to model adequacy if a set of manifest variables from a given 
measure correctly reflect an underlying latent construct (Hair et al., 2012). As the PLS approach 
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draws more variance, we can be more certain that the manifest variables are measuring a 
common latent variable. When the AVE score is greater than 0.50 (on a 0 ~1 scale), it can be said 
that the manifest variables are doing a good job in measuring the latent variable (Hair et al., 
2012). 
In addition to examining the AVE, item cross-loadings must be calculated. Cross-loadings 
are similar to the factor scores in a factor analysis. The cross-loading scores give information on 
how a given manifest variable relates to all latent constructs. Items that are empirically distinct 
will have their highest loadings on their associated latent construct, and will have low loadings 
on all other constructs. In order to have appropriate cross-loadings, an item should load at least 
0.707 on the intended construct (Chin, 1998; Lohmöller, 1989; J. Mayfield & Mayfield, 2010). 
5.4.3 Test of Relationships in PLS 
Once model adequacy has been established, the next step is to assess the structural model 
results. This process involves investigating whether the hypothesized model has enough 
capability of result prediction and how the constructs are interconnected. To this end, this study 
examines the strengths of the relationships between latent variables. It also tests whether the 
paths between the latent variables are significant and whether the coefficient signs move toward 
hypothesized directions. In PLS, the significance of paths is calculated through a bootstrapping 
procedure because parametric significance determination is not possible with PLS algorithms. In 
addition to the tests of path coefficients and their significance, PLS also provides information on 
how much variance a set of exogenous variables explains for its corresponding endogenous 
variables. This information is provided through measures for the latent variables. An 
exogenous variable is usually called an independent variable because no other variable in the 
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model is expected to cause changes in it. An endogenous variable, equivalent to a dependent 
variable, has at least one other variable that influences it. Some constructs may be an independent 
variable in one relationship and a dependent variable in another relationship. For example, 
political efficacy can function as an independent variable when it is assessed together with 
political participation. But when political efficacy is included in a model that deals with news 
consumption and deliberation behaviors, it becomes a dependent variable. Therefore, in PLS, the 
terminology exogenous and endogenous variables are preferred rather than independent and 
dependent variables. 
5.4.4 Application of PLS to the Current Study 
This study used the smartPLS 2.0 M3 software developed by Christian Ringle and his 
colleagues in 2005. To examine the simultaneous effects of news attention and deliberation 
behaviors on political participation, the current research employed two different analytic 
strategies using smartPLS: (1) two cross-sectional models that relate individual differences in 
indicators based on the Wave 1 and Wave 2 data and (2) an auto-regressive model that relates 
aggregate change estimates generated by lagging Wave 1 variables on their Wave 2 counterparts.  
     Both approaches have strengths and drawbacks that are counterbalanced by the other 
model (Finkel, 1995). A cross-sectional model examines contemporaneous relations at the first 
and second wave of data collection. Although this analytic strategy does not take advantage of a 
panel design, this study adopts that method for three reasons. First, a cross-sectional model 
retains a larger and more representative sample. Secondly, it serves as a baseline to be compared 
with the auto-regressive model. Lastly, it allows this research to be connected to previous studies 
that have employed cross-sectional analyses.   
The current study also employs an auto-regressive model in which each Wave 2 measure is 
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regressed on its corresponding Wave 1 measure. The study controls for demographic variables 
and political orientation variables by residualizing them. The auto-regressive model counts on 
change scores estimated at the aggregated level. The paths between Wave 1 and Wave 2 measures 
indicate temporal stability and effectively control for prior levels of the variable. By doing so, 
this method helps to interpret other paths in a synchronous model. This approach explains clearly 
the unexplained variance among endogenous Wave 2 variables while accounting for stability in 
these variables over time. Estimates of change are derived across the sample rather than within 
each individual. As a result, error variances are generally reduced, and an analysis can produce 
more stable estimates of gains or losses (Shah et al., 2005). 
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CHAPTER 6 
RESULTS 
 
6.1 Wave 1 Results 
6.1.1 Scale Validation in the Measurement Model 
For reflective indicators in the PLS approach, there are two important aspects of the 
measurement model that should be evaluated: convergent and discriminant validity (Gefen et al., 
2000). Convergent validity can be assessed using three criteria – indicator reliability, composite 
reliability, and average variance extracted (AVE). As shown in Table 13, standardized loadings 
for all scale items were significant at p < .001 and exceeded the minimum loading criterion 
of .707 except a few cases. Although the indicator reliability score should be at least .707, a 
reliability score of at least 0.50 might be acceptable if some other items measuring the same 
construct had high reliability scores (Chin, 1998). Table 15 shows that all loadings except one 
were above the .60 for their respective construct, suggesting good indicator reliability (Fornell & 
Larcker, 1981). The variable that showed the lowest indicator reliability score in the 1st wave 
data was ‘attention to portal site news’ (λ = .582). According to the criteria mentioned earlier, 
three items from traditional news use (local newspapers, local network TV news, and current 
affairs magazines), one item from offline participation (displaying campaign buttons or stickers) 
were dropped from subsequent analyses since their loadings were lower than .50. 
The composite reliabilities of all factors ranged from .73 to .95, which exceeded the 
recommended the threshold value of .70 (Table 13). In addition, all latent variables indicated 
good AVE scores as shown in Table 13. The AVE scores ranged from .50 to .82, consistent with 
the guidelines of Fornell and Larcker (1981). Hence, all three conditions of convergent validity 
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were met.  
For the discriminant validity, cross-loadings and intercorrelations were calculated 
following Fornell and Larcker’s (1981) recommendation. The square root of AVE for each 
construct should exceed all correlations between that construct and other constructs. This test is 
supposedly stronger than pairwise comparison of χ² values of unconstrained and constrained 
confirmatory factory analysis (CFA) models (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). As shown in Table 15, all 
AVE scores in the matrix diagonals were larger than the off-diagonal correlations, suggesting 
good discriminant validity. In the case of cross-loadings, the magnitude of the factor loading of 
an item on its corresponding construct should exceed the magnitude of its cross-factor loadings. 
Following the way suggested by Chin (1998), the current study calculated cross-loadings. All 
indicators showed higher loadings with their respective construct than with any other reflective 
construct (Table 15) except two items – “meeting members of an online political group” and 
“engagement a collective action online.” The two items were removed from the final analysis. 
Hence, the discriminant validity criteria were met for the 1st
 
wave, giving further confidence in 
the adequacy of measurement scales.   
 
Table13 Assessment of the Convergent Validity (Wave 1) 
 AVE Composite Reliability 
Traditional News .563 .793 
Online News .591 .733 
Social Media News .622 .766 
Offline Political Talk .501 .738 
Online Political Talk .585 .808 
News Elaboration .816 .899 
Political Efficacy .639 .840 
Offline Political Participation .721 .948 
Online Political Participation .589 .928 
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Table 14 Construct Correlations and Square Root of AVE (Wave 1) 
 
1.Tradi-
tional 
News 
2.On-
line 
News 
3.So-
cial 
Media 
News 
4.Off-
line 
Talk 
5.On-
line 
Talk 
6.News 
Elabora-
tion 
7.Politi
-cal 
Effica-
cy 
8.Offline 
Participa 
-tion 
9.On-
line 
Partici-
pation 
1 .751         
2 .238 .769        
3 .175 .382 .789       
4 .247 .162 .139 .708      
5 .184 .183 .267 .414 .765     
6 .258 .177 .201 .231 .203 .903    
7 .292 .140 .229 .265 .248 .464 .800   
8 .098 .069 .109 .214 .691 .086 .159 .849  
9 .178 .183 .293 .293 .374 .254 .326 .691 0.767 
 
Note: Diagonal elements (shaded) are the square root of the variance shared between the 
constructs and their measures. Off diagonal elements are the correlations among constructs. For 
discriminant validity, diagonal elements should be larger than off-diagonal elements.  
 
Table 15 Factor Loadings (bolded) and Cross-Loadings (Wave 1) 
 
Tradi-
tional 
News 
On-
line 
News 
Social 
Media 
News 
Off-
line 
Talk 
On-
line 
Talk 
News 
Elabo
ration 
Politi-
cal 
Effica-
cy 
Offline 
Partici-
pation 
Online 
Partici
-pation 
TV News .823 .236 .152 .189 .156 .214 .275 .058 .179 
Newspapers .642 .129 .043 .206 .079 .130 .159 .103 .109 
Radio News .775 .158 .181 .169 .168 .227 .208 .070 .106 
Internet 
Newspapers 
.254 .918 .363 .148 .166 .172 .137 .089 .188 
Portal News .066 .582 .196 .098 .109 .084 .064 -.013 .065 
Social 
Networking 
Sites 
Newsfeed 
.077 .337 .738 .097 .250 .107 .107 .052 .224 
Current 
Affairs 
Podcast  
.188 .275 .837 .122 .180 .202 .242 .115 .239 
Off-Talk 1 .135 .086 .060 .644 .279 .138 .105 .137 .174 
Off-Talk 2 .231 .135 .105 .778 .253 .199 .250 .171 .240 
Off-Talk 3 .130 .111 .122 .662 .358 .135 .172 .136 .189 
On-Talk 1 .122 .146 .191 .302 .777 .142 .192 .226 .330 
On-Talk 2 .165 .130 .150 .371 .712 .135 .191 .144 .216 
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Table 15 (Continued) 
 
Tradi-
tional 
News 
On-
line 
News 
Social 
Media 
News 
Off-
line 
Talk 
On-
line 
Talk 
News 
Elabo
ration 
Politi-
cal 
Effica-
cy 
Offline 
Partici-
pation 
Online 
Partici
-pation 
On-Talk 3 .142 .142 .262 .292 .802 .185 .175 .191 .300 
Elaboration 1 .220 .159 .180 .205 .202 .919 .443 .133 .279 
Elaboration 2 .249 .161 .185 .214 .161 .888 .392 .013 .173 
Efficacy 1 .281 .099 .183 .280 .212 .406 .848 .187 .291 
Efficacy 2 .119 .102 .174 .115 .127 .344 .664 .052 .173 
Efficacy 3 .270 .136 .197 .214 .227 .365 .871 .118 .298 
Off-
Participation 
1 
.099 .082 .120 .165 .200 .090 .152 .789 .558 
Off-
Participation 
2 
.022 .009 .067 .121 .136 .041 .122 .852 .598 
Off-
Participation 
3 
.086 .081 .157 .204 .271 .088 .170 .854 .609 
Off-
Participation 
4 
.079 .033 .052 .157 .198 .033 .102 .868 .572 
Off-
Participation 
5 
.104 .077 .080 .207 .212 .091 .122 .898 .577 
Off-
Participation 
6 
.101 .047 .058 .187 .206 .068 .127 .865 .538 
On-
Participation 
1 
.174 .186 .256 .258 .303 .271 .290 .399 .824 
On-
Participation 
2 
.144 .169 .307 .232 .335 .212 .285 .520 .813 
On-
Participation 
3 
.181 .181 .232 .269 .317 .247 .308 .528 .841 
On- 
Participation 
4 
.174 .186 .256 .258 .303 .271 .290 .399 .824 
On-
Participation 
5 
.109 .125 .252 .209 .311 .162 .202 .627 .762 
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Table 15 (Continued) 
 
Tradi-
tional 
News 
On-
line 
News 
Social 
Media 
News 
Off-
line 
Talk 
On-
line 
Talk 
News 
Elabo
ration 
Politi-
cal 
Effica-
cy 
Offline 
Partici-
pation 
Online 
Partici
-pation 
On-
Participation 
6 
.118 .047 .117 .191 .250 .124 .193 .648 .713 
On-
Participation 
7 
.147 .145 .249 .190 .267 .228 .300 .404 .697 
 
6.1.2 Structural Model Testing 
The structural model represents the relationships between constructs that were 
hypothesized in the research model (see Figure 1). PLS does not have well-established overall fit 
measures. Paths and coefficients of determination (R-squares) are two typical indicators that 
show overall model goodness of fit. Path coefficients are equivalent to standardized regression 
coefficients. A one-unit increase in an independent variable causes an increase in the dependent 
variable equal to the path coefficient. R-squares demonstrate how much the variance in 
endogenous variables constructs is explained by other constructs that were hypothesized to have 
an effect on them in a model. 
6.1.2.1 Direct Effects 
As shown in Figure 1, all three variables in the Media block (attention to news via 
traditional, online, and social media) had significant effects on offline political discussion. They 
jointly explained 7.7% of offline political talk, 9.6% of news elaboration, and 9.3% of online 
political discussion. It was found that in general attention to media news had a positive 
association with deliberation behaviors. Attention to traditional news was found to be a 
significant predictor of offline political talk (β = .21, p < .001), news elaboration (β = .22, p 
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< .001), and online political talk (β = .13, p < .01). Attention to news via Internet portals or 
online newspapers was a significantly positive predictor of offline political talk (β = .10, p < .05) 
and online political talk (β = .07, p < .05). Attention to news via social media had a positive 
influence on offline political talk (β = .07, p < .05), news elaboration (β = .14, p < .001), and 
online political talk (β = .22, p < .001). 
News attention was also found to have a significant relationship with political efficacy: 
traditional news attention, β = .15, p < .001; social media news attention, β = .11, p = .002. 
Overall, news attention failed to achieve a significantly positive relationship with political 
participation. Traditional news attention was not significantly related to offline and online 
political participation (β = .01, p = .73; β = .02, p = .64, respectively). Online news attention also 
failed to predict offline and online political participation. News attention via social media had a 
significant association with online political participation (β = .18, p < .001) but not with offline 
participation.    
     All three variables in the Deliberation block were significantly linked to political efficacy: 
offline political talk, β = .10, p < .01; news elaboration, β = .37, p < .001; and online political talk, 
β = .07, p < .05. The three variables in the Deliberation block and the same number of variables 
in the Media block explained 28.1% of political efficacy. The deliberation variables had 
significant relationships with political participation. Political talk was significantly associated 
with participatory behaviors. Offline political talk had a significant influence on offline 
participation (β = .12, p < .001) and online participation (β = .14, p < .001). Similarly, online 
political talk had a significant relationship with offline and online political participation (β = .17, 
p < .001; β = .22, p < .001, respectively). News elaboration had a positive link to online 
participation (β = .09, p < .05), but not to offline participation. These results imply that the 
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interpersonal deliberation behavior (political talk) is more powerful than the intrapersonal 
deliberation behavior (news elaboration) in motivating news consumers to engage in political 
activities. Lastly, political efficacy successfully predicted a significant portion of offline and 
online political participation (β = .09, p < .05; β = .13, p < .01, respectively).  
Overall, the results of path coefficients indicate that the hypothesized model is solid and 
well-supported. Figure 1 shows the explained variance for each construct in the model. 
Approximately, 60.3% of the variance in political participation is explained by the model (offline 
participation, 25.4%; online participation, 34.9%). Thus, the hypothesized model presented in 
Figure 1 represents the best theoretical predictions of the relationships between the variables of 
interest to this study.  
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Figure 1 Direct Relations in the Hypothesized Model (Wave 1) 
 
6.1.2.2 Indirect Effects 
A commonly used approach for testing mediating effects is the Sobel (1982) test. This test 
hypothesizes that the relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable is 
indirect owing to the influence of a third variable (a mediator). As a result, when the mediator is 
included in a model with the independent variable, the effect of the independent variable is 
diminished while that of the mediator remains significant (Helm, Eggert, & Garnefeld, 2010). 
However, this test relies on distributional assumptions, which usually do not hold for the indirect 
effect. Furthermore, the Sobel test requires unstandardized path coefficients as input for the test 
statistics. In addition, it lacks statistical power, when it deals with small sample sizes.  
     When testing mediation effects, it looks better to follow the bootstrapping method 
proposed by Preacher and Hayes (2004, 2008). Bootstrapping works well in both simple and 
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multiple mediation models. Bootstrapping makes no assumptions about the shape of the 
variables’ distribution or the sampling distribution of the statistics. As a result, this technique can 
be applied to the analysis of small sample sizes. This approach is therefore suitable to PLS. In 
addition, bootstrapping shows higher statistical power compared with the Sobel test. 
     Many studies about mediation have relied on the assumption that the direct effect should 
be significant if the mediator is not included in the model. For instance, Baron and Kenny (1986) 
suggested that a variable functions as a mediator when it meets three conditions: (1) the 
independent variable is significantly related to the dependent variable, (2) the mediator has a 
significant association with the dependent variable, and (3) when the mediator is included in the 
model, the previous significant relation between the independent variable and dependent variable 
should change significantly.  
     Recently, Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, and Petty (2011) raised a question to such an 
approach. After testing various simulations, they found that additional significant indirect effects 
can exist even if the initial direct effect is not significant. They argued that mediation analyses 
should be based on theories rather than on the requirement for a significant relationship between 
the exogenous variable and the endogenous variable. If there is a theoretical rationale to predict 
the presence of an indirect effect or multiple indirect effects, studies need to examine these 
effects regardless of the significance of the total or direct effect. Rucker et al. (2011) concluded 
that an examination of the significance of indirect effects and effect sizes accompanying those 
effects is crucial in judging the mediation effect. 
When the mediator is included in an analysis, the indirect effect must be significant to 
prove a mediating effect. If so, the mediator absorbs some of the direct effect. For instance, in a 
PLS path model without the mediator variable, a positive direct effect would become smaller or 
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insignificant after the inclusion of the mediator variable. The question is how much the mediator 
variable absorbs. The variance accounted for (VAF) determines the size of the indirect effect in 
relation to the total effect (indirect effect + direct effect). VAF is calculated by the following 
formula: 
VAF = ( * )/(  *  + ). 
Where, is the standardized SEM coefficient between variable i and variable j.  
VAF indicates how the variance of the dependent variable is directly explained by the 
independent variable and how much of the target construct’s variance is explained by indirect 
relationship via the mediator. If the indirect effect is significant without absorbing any of the 
exogenous latent variable’s effect on the endogenous variable, the VAF is low. This occurs when 
the direct effect is large and declines only very slightly after a mediator variable with a significant 
but very small indirect effect is included. If the VAF is less than 20%, one can say that no 
mediation exists. In contrast, when the VAF is over 80%, one can assume a full mediation. A 
situation in which the VAF is larger than 20% and less than 80% is usually called as a partial 
mediation (Hair et al., 2012).  
Generally, the confidence interval generated by bootstrapping is used as a criterion to 
check whether the indirect effect significantly differs from zero. If zero is not in the confidence 
intervals, the mediating effect is significant. This study calculated 95% percentile confidence 
intervals. As shown in Table 16, zero is not contained in any confidence interval that tests the 
mediation. These results lend support to the claim that political efficacy mediates the impact of 
news attention on political outcomes.  
To test mediating effects between variables, a series of bootstrapping for each model 
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(number of bootstrap samples is 200) was performed. To begin with, the indirect effect of 
political efficacy between three news channels and two types of political participation was 
examined. It was found that political efficacy did not mediate the relationship between attention 
to traditional news and political participation. The indirect effect between online news attention 
and online participation through political efficacy (t = 3.00, p = .003) was positive and significant. 
The VAF was 21.9%, indicating a partial mediation. Political efficacy also partially mediated the 
relationships between attention to social media news and offline participation (t = 3.27, p = .001, 
VAF = 26.5%) and between attention to social media news and online participation (t = 3.81, p 
< .001, VAF = 26.1%).  
Political efficacy was found to mediate the association between the deliberation and 
participation behavior. The indirect impact of political efficacy between offline political talk and 
offline participation was significantly positive (t = 3.49, p = .003, VAF = 25.0%). Political 
efficacy mediated the relationship between offline political talk and online political participation 
(t = 3.05, p = .003, VAF = 25.8%). The mediating effects of political efficacy between online 
political talk and political participation both offline and online were found to be significant (t = 
3.05, p = .003, VAF = 20.6%; t = 2.87, p = .005, VAF = 22.8% respectively). Political efficacy 
also mediated the effect of news elaboration on offline participation (t = 3.77, p < .001, VAF = 
83.0%) and online participation (t = 3.84, p < .001, VAF = 42.8%). It is noteworthy that political 
efficacy fully mediated the relationship between news elaboration and offline political 
participation. This result suggests that without political efficacy there would be little significant 
association between news elaboration and offline participation. Political efficacy did not mediate 
the relationships between online political talk and political participation.  
The mediation analyses found that the deliberation variables mediated the relationships 
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between the media variables and political efficacy. Online talk (t = 5.69, p < .001, VAF = 21.1%) 
and news elaboration (t = 6.27, p < .001, VAF = 37.1%) significantly mediated the impact of 
traditional news attention on political efficacy. Similarly, offline political talk (t = 2.96, p = .003, 
VAF = 23.8%), news elaboration (t = 6.00, p < .001, VAF = 37.6%), and online political talk (t = 
3.33, p = .001, VAF = 22.8%) mediated the relationship between news attention via social media 
and political efficacy. All three deliberation variables were found to mediate the impact of online 
news attention on political efficacy: offline political talk, t = 3.33, p = .001, VAF = 44.8%; news 
elaboration, t = 4.49, p < .001, VAF = 58.3%; online political talk t = 3.69, p < .001, VAF = 
44.3%. 
This study also investigated whether deliberation behaviors and political efficacy jointly 
mediate the relationships between the Media variables and political participation (a multi-step 
mediation). When the dependent variable was offline participation, deliberation behaviors and 
political efficacy did not function as mediators. In contrast, three deliberation behaviors and 
political efficacy significantly mediated the relationship between attention to online news and 
online participation. As shown in Table 17, the indirect effect of offline talk and political efficacy 
between online news and online participation was significant and positive, t = 2.91, p = .004. 
News elaboration and efficacy (t = 3.19, p = .002) and offline talk and efficacy (t = 3.24, p 
= .001) also played a significant mediating role between the above two variables.  
In addition, three deliberation behaviors and political efficacy significantly mediated the 
relationship between attention to social media news and online participation: offline talk + 
efficacy, t = 2.89, p = .004; news elaboration + efficacy, t = 3.25, p = .001, online talk + efficacy, 
t = 3.15, p = .002, respectively. These outcomes suggest that the dataset of Wave 1, to a 
considerable extent, fits into the S – R – O – R mediation framework. 
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The current study also examined whether political efficacy played a mediating role in the 
model in which all variables in the same block are aggregated. To this end, the three variables in 
the Media block (traditional news, online news, social media news) were consolidated into one 
variable. The same procedure was applied to the three variables in the Deliberation block (offline 
political talk, news elaboration, online political talk) and two variables in the Participation block 
(offline and online participation). In the ‘aggregated Media – political efficacy – aggregated 
Participation’ model, political efficacy was found to mediate the relationship between the Media 
and the Participation, t = 2.17, p = .032, VAF = 30.2%. In the ‘aggregated Deliberation – political 
efficacy – aggregated Participation’ model, political efficacy was found to significantly mediate 
the relationship between the two variables, t = 2.04, p = .043, VAF = 20.8%. Furthermore, the 
aggregated Deliberation and political efficacy jointly mediated the effect of the aggregated Media 
on the aggregated Participation, t = 3.17, p = .002. Thus, the hypothesized two-step mediation 
model was well supported by the Wave 1 dataset.  
Additionally, this study also tested whether the hypothesized model in this study holds in 
different media environments because the direct and mediation effects of political 
communication might vary depending on each specific type of medium (McLeod et al., 1999). To 
this end, except the three variables in the Media block, all the variables in the same block were 
collapsed into one. The bootstrapping results revealed that the hypothesized mediation model 
worked well in online news and social media news environments. In other words, deliberation 
behaviors and political efficacy jointly mediated the relationship between online news and 
political participation (t = 2.47, p = .014) and the relationship between social media news and 
participation (t = 3.45, p < .001). However, the hypothesized model did not turn out to be true in 
the traditional news situation, t = 1.96, p = .051. 
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Table 16 Results of Single Mediation (Wave 1) 
H IV 
Media-
tor 
DV 
Indirect 
effect 
t 
value 
p 
value 
Percentile 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
VAF 
H9 
News Efficacy Participa-
tion 
     
 
Online 
News 
Efficacy 
Online 
Participa-
tion 
.025 3.001 .003 [.009; .042] 21.94 
 
Social 
Media 
News 
Efficacy 
Offline 
Participa-
tion 
.031 3.272 .001 [.013; .050] 26.54 
 
Social 
Media 
News 
Efficacy 
Online 
Participa-
tion 
.028 3.809 .000 [.014; .046] 26.10 
H10 
Delibera
-tion 
Efficacy 
Participa-
tion 
     
H10-
1 
Offline 
Talk 
Efficacy 
Offline 
Participa-
tion 
.032 3.491 
.000 [.014; .051] 25.03 
H10-
1 
Offline 
Talk 
Efficacy 
Online 
Participa-
tion 
.036 3.054 
.003 [.013; .058] 25.80 
H10-
1 
Online 
Talk 
Efficacy 
Offline 
Participa-
tion 
.026 3.046 .003 [.010; .044] 20.64 
H10-
1 
Online 
Talk 
Efficacy 
Online 
Participa-
tion 
.032 2.867 .005 [.011; .053] 22.80 
H10-
2 
Elaborati
on 
Efficacy 
Offline 
Participa-
tion 
.072 3.769 
.000 [.034; .109] 82.96 
H10-
2 
Elaborati
on 
Efficacy 
Online 
Participa-
tion 
.085 3.835 
.000 [.047; .129] 42.82 
H11 News Talk 
Participa-
tion 
     
 
Online 
News 
Offline 
Talk 
Online 
Participa-
tion 
.021 2.461 .015 [.004; .040] 38.75 
 
Online 
News 
Online 
Talk 
Online 
Participa-
tion 
.048 4.110 .000 [.023; .070] 35.63 
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Table 16 (Continued) 
H IV 
Media-
tor 
DV 
Indirect 
effect 
t 
value 
p 
value 
Percentile 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
VAF 
 
Social 
Media 
News 
Offline 
Talk 
Offline 
Participa-
tion 
.018 2.628 .009 [.005; .032] 36.74 
 
Social 
Media 
News 
Offline 
Talk 
Online 
Participa-
tion 
.030 2.838 .005 [.010; .050] 11.86 
 
Social 
Media 
News 
Online 
Talk 
Offline 
Participa-
tion 
.062 4.748 .000 [.036; .087] 76.05 
 
Social 
Media 
News 
Online 
Talk 
Online 
Participa-
tion 
.062 4.692 .000 [.034; .088] 28.70 
H12 News 
Delibe-
ration 
Efficacy      
 
Tradition
al News 
Elabora-
tion 
Efficacy .108 6.270 .000 [.074; .141] 37.13 
 
Tradition
al News 
Online 
Talk 
Efficacy .051 5.694 .000 [.034 .069] 21.12 
 
Online 
News 
Offline 
Talk 
Efficacy .029 3.331 .001 [.012; .046] 44.78 
 
Online 
News 
Elabora-
tion 
Efficacy .082 4.494 .000 [.046; .117] 58.27 
 
Online 
News 
Online 
Talk 
Efficacy .037 3.694 .000 [.017; .056] 44.34 
 
Social 
Media 
News 
Offline 
Talk 
Efficacy .022 2.962 .003 [.007; .037] 23.84 
 
Social 
Media 
News 
Elabora-
tion 
Efficacy .092 5.995 .000 [.062; .122] 37.57 
 
Social 
Media 
News 
Online 
Talk 
Efficacy .033 3.326 .001 [.014; .053] 22.84 
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Table 17 Results of Two-Step Mediation (Wave 1) 
RQ2 IV Mediator 1 
Mediator 
2 
DV 
Indire
-ct 
Effect 
t 
value 
p 
value 
Percentile 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
 Online 
News 
Offline 
Talk 
Efficacy 
Online 
Participation 
.006 2.911 .004 [.002; .011] 
 Online 
News 
Elaboration Efficacy 
Online 
Participation 
.010 3.186 .002 [.004; .019] 
 Online 
News 
Online 
Talk 
Efficacy 
Online 
Participation 
.006 3.245 .001 [.002; .010] 
 Social 
Media 
Offline 
Talk 
Efficacy 
Online 
Participation 
.008 2.890 .004 [.004; .016] 
 Social 
Media 
Elaboration Efficacy 
Online 
Participation 
.019 3.250 .001 [.007; .032] 
 Social 
Media 
Online 
Talk 
Efficacy 
Online 
Participation 
.014 3.146 .002 [.005; .024] 
 
Table 18 Results of Aggregated Model Mediation (Wave 1) 
H IV 
Mediator 
1 
Mediator 
2 
DV 
Indi-
rect 
Effe-
ct 
t 
value 
p 
value 
Percentile 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
H9 Media Efficacy  
Partici-
pation 
.031 2.040 .043 [.001; .060] 
H10 
Delibera-
tion 
Efficacy  
Partici-
pation 
.045 2.166 .032 [.004; .086] 
H13 Media 
Delibera-
tion 
Efficacy 
Partici-
pation 
.032 3.168 .002 [.012; .052] 
H13 
Traditional 
News 
Group 
Delibera-
tion 
Efficacy 
Partici-
pation 
.006 1.962 .051 [.000; .012] 
H13 
Online 
News 
Group 
Delibera-
tion 
Efficacy 
Partici-
pation 
.015 2.466 .014 [.001; .009] 
H13 
Social 
News 
Group 
Delibera-
tion 
Efficacy 
Partici-
pation 
.023 3.446 .000 [.010; .035] 
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6.2 Wave 2 Results 
6.2.1 Scale Validation in the Measurement Model 
This section indicates the results of factor loadings, cross-loadings, composite reliability, 
correlation of constructs, and AVE for constructs for the second wave model. Table 19 provides 
the composite scale reliability for all multi-item constructs used in the second model. They all 
exceeded the recommended threshold of .7. As indicated in Table 21, the magnitude of the factor 
loadings of any item on its corresponding construct exceeded the magnitude of its cross-factor 
loadings. Table 20 shows correlation matrixes between constructs for the second model. The 
scores in the diagonal of each matrix were the square roots of the AVE, and they exceeded the 
values in each of the respective columns. The current study also calculated cross-loadings. All 
indicators showed higher loadings with their respective construct than with any other reflective 
construct (Table 21) except two items – “meeting members of an online political group” and 
engagement a collective action online. The two items were removed from the final analysis. 
Taken together, these results prove that the constructs have adequate convergent and discriminant 
validity for the hypothesized model in the 2nd wave. 
 
Table 19 Assessment of the Convergent Validity (Wave 2) 
 AVE Composite Reliability 
Traditional News .587 .810 
Online News .608 .748 
Social Media .642 .782 
Offline Talk .549 .785 
Online Talk .564 .794 
News Elaboration .797 .887 
Political Efficacy .660 .852 
Offline Participation .722 .948 
Online Participation .519 .904 
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Table 20 Construct Correlations and Square Root of AVE (Wave 2) 
 
1.Traditi
-onal 
News 
2.On-
line 
News 
3.Soci-
al 
Media 
4.Off-
line 
Talk 
5.On
-line 
Talk 
6.News 
Elabora
-tion 
7.Politi
-cal 
Effica-
cy 
8.Off-
line 
Partici-
pation 
9.Online 
Participa
-tion 
1 .766         
2 .349 .780        
3 .240 .458 .801       
4 .212 .216 .249 .741      
5 .213 .245 .312 .456 .751     
6 .273 .216 .140 .158 .110 .893    
7 .231 .134 .268 .301 .204 .279 .813   
8 .019 .069 .076 .179 .198 .002 .160 .850  
9 .149 .203 .274 .292 .376 .134 .328 .709 .721 
 
Note: Diagonal elements (shaded) are the square root of the variance shared between the 
constructs and their measures. Off diagonal elements are the correlations among constructs. For 
discriminant validity, diagonal elements should be larger than off-diagonal elements. 
 
Table 21 Factor Loadings (bolded) and Cross-Loadings (Wave 2) 
 
Tradi-
tional 
News 
On-
line 
News 
Social 
Media 
Off-
line 
Talk 
On-
line 
Talk 
News 
Elabo
ration 
Politi-
cal 
Effi-
cacy 
Off-
line 
Parti-
cipati
-on 
Online 
Partici
-pation 
TV News .804 .270 .222 .132 .155 .174 .213 .032 .152 
Newspapers .741 .183 .102 .165 .143 .214 .178 .013 .090 
Radio News .753 .343 .225 .188 .190 .237 .143 .000 .101 
Internet 
Newspapers 
.300 .927 .470 .203 .229 .201 .137 .125 .220 
Portal News .258 .598 .176 .124 .143 .126 .053 -.089 .053 
Social 
Networking 
Sites Newsfeed 
.175 .363 .767 .145 .279 .086 .130 .042 .261 
Current Affairs 
Podcast Shows 
.208 .371 .835 .248 .227 .135 .289 .078 .185 
Off-Talk 1 .163 .170 .172 .773 .371 .142 .213 .195 .277 
Off-Talk 2 .202 .185 .184 .763 .289 .102 .271 .091 .198 
Off-Talk 3 .095 .119 .206 .684 .363 .103 .180 .103 .161 
On-Talk 1 .124 .149 .205 .330 .758 .036 .122 .208 .340 
On-Talk 2 .161 .191 .243 .357 .668 .060 .111 .054 .185 
On-Talk 3 .197 .217 .262 .353 .820 .141 .213 .163 .303 
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Table 21 Continued 
 
Tradi-
tional 
News 
On-
line 
News 
Social 
Media 
Off-
line 
Talk 
On-
line 
Talk 
News 
Elabo
ration 
Politi-
cal 
Effi-
cacy 
Off-
line 
Parti-
cipati
-on 
Online 
Partici
-pation 
Elaboration 1 .234 .198 .133 .141 .102 .910 .271 .070 .169 
Elaboration 2 .255 .186 .116 .141 .093 .876 .225 -.076 .063 
Efficacy 1 .190 .115 .268 .293 .218 .299 .883 .175 .327 
Efficacy 2 .143 .101 .184 .125 .110 .143 .685 .080 .205 
Efficacy 3 .228 .112 .190 .280 .146 .206 .856 .115 .248 
Off-
Participation 1 
.020 .065 .076 .170 .199 .032 .212 .818 .562 
Off-
Participation 2 
-.053 .031 .056 .128 .150 .001 .126 .885 .633 
Off-
Participation 3 
.065 .127 .109 .157 .234 .028 .144 .823 .604 
Off-
Participation 4 
-.024 .014 .061 .120 .126 .004 .073 .858 .625 
Off-
Participation 5 
.018 .064 .030 .195 .193 .002 .119 .896 .620 
Off-
Participation 6 
.043 .031 .033 .131 .128 .008 .099 .853 .538 
On-
Participation 1 
.164 .156 .223 .276 .304 .136 .292 .527 .837 
On-
Participation 2 
.134 .175 .156 .150 .208 .139 .276 .136 .871 
On-
Participation 3 
.159 .234 .267 .270 .384 .118 .282 .523 .838 
On-Part 
icipation4 
.092 .152 .225 .272 .320 .195 .272 .380 .755 
On-
Participation 5 
.078 .123 .227 .198 .258 .090 .216 .621 .785 
On-
Participation 6 
.067 .092 .070 .118 .150 .024 .151 .663 .711 
On-
Participation 7 
.072 .080 .184 .172 .268 .079 .243 .393 .658 
 
6.2.2 Structural Model Testing 
6.2.2.1 Direct Effects 
As shown in Figure 2, the three variables in the Media block jointly explained 9.3% of 
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offline political talk, 9.1% of news elaboration, and 12.3% of online political talk. It was found 
that attention to news had a positive association with deliberation behaviors. Attention to 
traditional news was a significant predictor of offline political talk (β = .14, p < .01), news 
elaboration (β = .22, p < .001), and online political talk (β = .12, p < .05). Attention to news via 
online media had a significantly positive relationship only with news elaboration, β = .13, p < .05. 
Considering that attention to online news in Wave 1 had a positive association with offline 
political talk (β = .10, p < .05) and online political talk (β = .07, p < .05), the impact of online 
news a little diminished in Wave 2. Attention to news via social media had a positive influence 
on offline political talk (β = .18, p < .001; β = .07, p < .05 in Wave 1) and online political talk (β 
= .24, p < .001; β = .21, p < .001 in Wave 1). The influence of social media news attention on 
political talk has increased considerably compared with that in the first survey.  
Social media news attention (β = .19, p < .001), online news attention (β = .09, p < .05), 
and traditional news attention (β = .11, p < .05) were found to have significant relationships with 
political efficacy. Overall, the news attention variable had not a significantly positive relationship 
with political participation. Among the Media block, only news attention via social media was 
significantly associated with online participation (β = .11, p < .01). No significant associations 
were found between traditional news attention and participation and between online news 
attention and participation. 
All three variables in the Deliberation block were significantly linked to perceived political 
efficacy: offline political talk, β = .20, p < .001; news elaboration, β = .21, p < .001; online 
political talk, β = .07, p < .05. The three variables in the Deliberation block and the same number 
of variables in the Media block explained 19.0% of political efficacy. Offline political talk had 
significant influence on political participation (offline participation, β = .17, p < .001; online 
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participation, β = .12, p < .01, respectively). Likewise, online political talk was found to have a 
significant association with offline political participation (β = .12, p < .01) and online political 
participation (β = .22, p < .001). Lastly, political efficacy successfully predicted a significant 
portion of offline and online political participation (β = .28, p < .001; β = .30, p < .001, 
respectively).  
Overall, the results of direct path coefficients show that the hypothesized model receives 
substantial support. Figure 2 shows the explained variance for each of the constructs in the model. 
Approximately 54.6% of the variance in political participation is explained by the model (offline 
participation, 21.8%; online participation, 32.8%).  
 
 
Figure 2 Direct Relations in the Hypothesized Model (Wave 2) 
 
6.2.2.2 Indirect Effects 
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In order to test mediating effects between variables, a series of bootstrapping (number of 
bootstrap samples is 200) was run. First, the indirect effect of political efficacy between three 
news consumption types and two types of political participation was examined. Political efficacy 
did not mediate the relationship between attention to traditional news and participation. This 
result is similar to what was found in the first survey analysis. The indirect effects between online 
news attention and offline and online participation through political efficacy were positive and 
significant (t = 2.56, p = .014, VAF = 20.5%; t = 2.43, p = .016, VAF = 24.5%, respectively). 
Political efficacy also partially mediated the relationship between attention to social media news 
and offline and online participation (t = 2.47, p = .015, VAF = 30.5%; t = 3.64, p < .001, VAF = 
23.0%, respectively).  
In most cases, political efficacy was found to mediate the associations between deliberation 
behaviors and participatory behaviors. The indirect effects of political efficacy between offline 
political talk and offline and online participation were significantly positive (t = 2.53, p = .014, 
VAF = 31.4%; t = 3.24, p = .001, VAF = 63.5%, respectively). Political efficacy also mediated 
the effects of online talk on offline participation (t = 3.07, p = .002, VAF = 21.6%) and online 
participation (t = 2.87, p = .006, VAF = 20.5%). Political efficacy did not mediate the impacts of 
news elaboration on offline and online political participation.  
The results demonstrate that Deliberation variables mediated the relationships between the 
Media variables and political efficacy. Offline talk (t = 3.33, p = .001, VAF = 24.3%) and news 
elaboration (t = 4.04, p < .001, VAF = 27.4%) successfully mediated the relationship between 
traditional news and political efficacy. Offline talk (t = 3.61, p < .001, VAF = 23.4%), online talk 
(t = 2.19, p = .030, VAF = 21.1%), and news elaboration (t = 2.74, p = .007, VAF = 22.3%) 
turned out to mediate the relationship between social media news attention and political efficacy. 
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Any of the three variables in the Deliberation block did not mediate the impact of online news 
attention on political efficacy. 
The mediation analyses also tested whether deliberation behaviors and political efficacy 
jointly mediate the relationships between the Media block variables and political participation. 
When the dependent variable was offline participation, deliberation behaviors and political 
efficacy did not play the mediation role, which is the same as in the first survey analyses. But the 
three deliberation behaviors and political efficacy significantly mediated the relationship between 
attention to online news and online participation. As shown in Table 23, the indirect effect of 
offline talk and efficacy between online news and online participation was significant and 
positive, t = 2.74, p = .007. News elaboration and political efficacy (t = 2.57, p = .011) and 
offline political talk and political efficacy (t = 2.39, p = .017) also played a significant mediating 
role between the above two variables.  
In addition, the three deliberation behaviors and political efficacy significantly mediated 
the relationship between attention to social media news and online participation: offline talk + 
efficacy, t = 2.29, p = .023; news elaboration + efficacy, t = 2.09, p = .037, online talk + efficacy, 
t = 2.57, p = .011, respectively. This suggests that the dataset of the second survey fits well the 
hypothesized two-step mediation model of the current study. 
The present research also tested whether political efficacy plays a mediating role in the 
model in which all variables in the same block are aggregated. In the ‘aggregated Media – 
political efficacy – aggregated Participation’ model, efficacy was found to significantly mediate 
the relationship between the Media and the Participation, t = 2.97, p = .003, VAF = 20.8%. In the 
‘aggregated Deliberation – political efficacy – aggregated Participation’ model, efficacy was 
found to significantly mediate the relationship between the two variables, t = 2.79, p = .006, VAF 
 １１０ 
 
= 50.4%. Furthermore, the aggregated Deliberation and political efficacy jointly played a 
significant mediating role between the aggregated Media and the aggregated Participation. In the 
‘aggregated Media – aggregated Deliberation – political efficacy – aggregated Participation’ 
model, the aggregated Deliberation and political efficacy jointly mediated the relationship 
between the Media and the Participation, t = 3.48, p < .001. Thus, the hypothesized two-step 
mediation model was well supported by the second survey findings. 
Additionally, this study also tested whether the hypothesized model in this study holds in 
different media environment. To this end, except the three variables in the Media block, all other 
variables in the same block were collapsed into one. The bootstrapping results revealed that the 
hypothesized mediation model proved to be true in online news and social media news 
conditions. In other words, deliberation behaviors and political efficacy successfully mediated the 
relationships between online news and political participation (t = 3.36, p < .001) and between 
social media news and participation (t = 3.16, p = .002). But the hypothesized model did not 
receive support under the traditional news condition. 
 
Table 22 Results of Single Mediation (Wave 2) 
H IV Mediator DV 
Indir
-ect 
Effe-
ct 
t 
value 
p 
value 
Percentile 
95% 
Confidence 
Intervals 
VAF 
H9 News Efficacy Participation      
 
Online 
News 
Efficacy 
Offline 
Participation 
.028 2.557 .014 [.005; .041] 24.52 
 
Online 
News 
Efficacy 
Online 
Participation 
.024 2.435 .016 [.005; .044] 20.50 
 
Social 
Media 
News 
Efficacy 
Offline 
Participation 
.025 2.472 .015 [.004; .047] 30.54 
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Table 22 Continued 
H IV Mediator DV 
Indir
-ect 
Effe-
ct 
t 
value 
p 
value 
Percentile 
95% 
Confidence 
Intervals 
VAF 
H9 News Efficacy Participation      
 
Social 
Media 
News 
Efficacy 
Online 
Participation 
.038 3.641 .000 [.015; .059] 22.97 
H10 
Delibera
tion 
Efficacy Participation      
H10-
1 
Offline 
Talk 
Efficacy 
Offline 
Participation 
.029 2.530 .014 [.004; .044] 31.37 
H10-
1 
Offline 
Talk 
Efficacy 
Online 
Participation 
.041 3.243 .001 [.016; .067] 63.52 
H10-
1 
Online 
talk 
Efficacy 
Offline 
Participation 
.027 2.871 .010 [.001; .055] 20.46 
H10-
1 
Online 
talk 
Efficacy 
Online 
Participation 
.028 3.073 .002 [.012; .048] 21.60 
H11 News Talk Participation      
 
Online 
News 
Offline 
Talk 
Online 
Participation 
.023 2.463 .015 [.005; .042] 20.01 
 
Online 
News 
Online 
Talk 
Online 
Participation 
.045 3.005 .003 [.017; .073] 35.61 
 
Social 
Media 
Offline 
Talk 
Online 
Participation 
.020 2.161 .031 [.002; .039] 30.83 
 
Social 
Media 
Online 
Talk 
Online 
Participation 
.022 3.378 .000 [.009; .034] 26.35 
H12 News 
Delibera-
tion 
Efficacy      
 
Tradition
al News 
Offline 
Talk 
Efficacy .054 3.334 .001 [.022; .085] 24.31 
 
Tradition
al News 
Elabora-
tion 
Efficacy .064 4.040 .000 [.033; .095] 27.37 
 
Tradition
al News 
Online 
Talk 
Efficacy .036 2.368 .019 [.006; .066] 24.87 
 
Social 
Media 
Offline 
Talk 
Efficacy .067 3.608 .000 [.031; .104] 23.43 
 
Social 
Media 
Elabora-
tion 
Efficacy .036 2.744 .007 [.010; .063] 22.34 
 
Social 
Media 
Online 
Talk 
Efficacy .042 2.189 .030 [.004; .080] 21.13 
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Table 23 Results of Two-Step Mediation (Wave 2) 
RQ2 IV Mediator1 
Mediator 
2 
DV 
Indirect 
Effect 
t 
value 
p 
value 
Percentile 
95% 
Confidence 
Intervals 
 Online 
News 
Offline 
Talk 
Efficacy 
Online 
Participation 
.011 2.743 .007 [.004; .017] 
 Online 
News 
Elaboration Efficacy 
Online 
Participation 
.010 2.570 .011 [.003; .018] 
 Online 
News 
Online 
Talk 
Efficacy 
Online 
Participation 
.017 2.385 .017 [.003; .029] 
 Social 
Media 
Offline 
Talk 
Efficacy 
Online 
Participation 
.011 2.284 .023 [.002; .019] 
 Social 
Media 
Elaboration Efficacy 
Online 
Participation 
.005 2.093 .037 [.001; .009] 
 Social 
Media 
Online 
Talk 
Efficacy 
Online 
Participation 
.009 2.573 .011 [.002; .017] 
 
Table 24 Results of Aggregated Model Mediation (Wave 2) 
H IV Mediator 1 
Mediator 
2 
DV 
Indirect 
Effect 
t 
value 
p 
value 
Percentile 
95% 
Confidence 
Intervals 
H9 Media Efficacy  
Participa
-tion 
.057 2.787 .006 [.017 .098] 
H10 
Delibera-
tion 
Efficacy  
Participa
-tion 
.068 2.970 .003 [.023; .115] 
H13 Media 
Delibera-
tion 
Efficacy 
Participa
-tion 
.043 3.481 .000 [.019; .068] 
H13 
Online 
News 
Group 
Delibera-
tion 
Efficacy 
Participa
-tion 
.034 3.364 .000 [.014; .052] 
H13 
Social 
News 
Group 
Delibera-
tion 
Efficacy 
Participa
-tion 
.032 3.164 .002 [.012; .052] 
 
6.3 Auto-Regressive Model 
6.3.1 Direct Effects 
Figure 3 represents the results of the PLS estimates of the synchronous auto-regressive 
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model of the relationships among Wave 2 measures of news attention, deliberation, political 
efficacy, and political participation when accounting for the causal influence of each variable on 
itself over time. As stated earlier, an autoregressive term of each variable was put in as an 
exogenous variable. Thus, in each structural regression equation, the gamma coefficients (γ) 
indicate the stability of the variable over time, and beta coefficients (β) tell the influence of 
predictor variables on the outcome variable beyond the impact of prior levels of the outcome 
variable on itself (Shah et al., 2005). As shown in Figure 3, the gamma coefficients ranged 
from .27 to .97, indicating that past behavior in terms of news attention, deliberation, political 
efficacy, and political participation is a strong predictor of current behavior. Stability was highest 
for attention to online news (.97) and social media news (.97) and lowest for offline political talk 
(.27). 
     As for the endogenous relationships, results of this model are comparable to those of the 
previous two synchronous models. Wave 2 online news attention (β = .32, p <.001) and social 
media news attention (β = .27, p < .001) were significant predictors of Wave 2 offline political 
talk, even after controlling for prior levels of these variables (online news attention, γ = .97, p 
< .001; social media news attention, γ = .97, p < .001; offline political talk, γ = .27, p < .001). 
The estimates of change in online news attention (β = .26, p < .001) and social media news 
attention (β = .29, p < .001) were positively associated with online political talk, even when 
accounting for the lagged effect of online political talk (γ = .32, p < .001).  
  Unexplained variance in Wave 2 measures of traditional news attention and online news 
attention had no significant relationship with political efficacy. In contrast, unexplained variance 
in social media news attention had a significantly positive association with Wave 2 political 
efficacy (β = .26, p < .001), even when accounting for the strong effect of past political efficacy 
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(γ = .45, p < .001). Notably, no significant direct effects of news attention on offline and online 
political participation were found in this synchronous auto-regressive model. 
Unexplained variance in Wave 2 measure of offline political talk had a positive influence 
on Wave 2 political efficacy (β = .16, p < .001), even when accounting for the strong effect of 
past political efficacy (γ = .45, p < .001). Unexplained variance in Wave 2 measure of online 
political talk had a positive influence on Wave 2 political efficacy (β = .20, p < .001), even when 
accounting for the strong effect of past political efficacy (γ = .45, p < .001). Unexplained 
variance in Wave 2 measures of news elaboration also had a significant link to political efficacy 
(β = .14, p < .01).  
Unexplained variance in Wave 2 measures of offline political talk has a positive influence 
on Wave 2 offline political participation (β = .29, p < .001), even when accounting for the strong 
effect of past political participation (γ = .60, p < .001). However, unexplained variance in Wave 2 
measures of news elaboration and online political talk had no significant relationship with offline 
political participation. This model accounted for 47.2% of variance in offline political 
participation. 
The estimate of change in online political talk has a positive influence on Wave 2 online 
political participation (β = .25, p < .001), even when accounting for the strong effect of past 
political participation (γ = .58, p < .001). The estimates of change in offline political talk and 
news elaboration failed to predict online political participation. This model accounted for 57.7% 
of variance in online political participation. 
Unexplained variance in Wave 2 measures of political efficacy had a positive influence on 
Wave 2 offline political participation (β = .20, p < .001), even when accounting for the strong 
effect of past political participation (γ = .60, p < .001). Unexplained variance in Wave 2 measures 
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of political efficacy had a positive impact on Wave 2 online political participation (β = .33, p 
< .001), even when accounting for the strong effect of past political participation (γ = .58, p 
< .001). 
 
 
Figure 3 Direct Relations of the Hypothesized Model (Auto-regressive model) 
 
6.3.2 Indirect Effects 
To test mediating effects between variables in the autoregressive model, a series of 
bootstrapping for each model (number of bootstrap samples is 200) was run. Unlike in the cross-
sectional analyses, political efficacy mediated the impact of traditional news attention on offline 
and online participation (t = 1.97, p = .049, VAF = 51.0%; t = 3.48, p < .001, VAF = 72.3%, 
respectively). Political efficacy also mediated the relationships between online news attention 
and offline participation and between online news and online participation (t = 2.13, p = .042, 
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VAF = 53.2%; t = 3.34, p = .001, VAF = 67.3%, respectively). Political efficacy also partially 
mediated the effect of social media news attention on online participation (t = 3.56, p < .001, 
VAF = 67.5%).  
Political efficacy was found to mediate the associations between deliberation behaviors 
and participatory behaviors. The indirect effect between offline political talk and online 
participation through political efficacy was significantly positive (t = 3.20, p = .002, VAF = 
37.1%). Political efficacy mediated the effect of online talk on online participation (t = 2.58, p 
= .011, VAF = 27.0%). It also mediated the impact of news elaboration on offline political 
participation (t = 2.00, p = .046, VAF = 89.7%). 
The results show that Deliberation variables mediate the relationships between the Media 
variables and political participation. Offline political talk (t = 2.73, p = .007, VAF = 92.6%) and 
online political talk (t = 2.93, p = .004, VAF = 52.1%) significantly mediated the relationship 
between online news attention and online political participation. Offline political talk (t = 2.55, p 
= .012, VAF = 62.8%) and online political talk (t = 2.98, p = .003, VAF = 60.4%) also 
significantly mediated the relationship between social media news attention and online political 
participation. Additionally, offline political talk significantly mediated the impact of social media 
news attention on offline political participation, t = 2.07, p = .040, VAF = 61.2%. 
The results demonstrate that Deliberation variables mediate the relationships between the 
Media variables and political efficacy. Offline political talk (t = 3.87, p < .001, VAF = 43.8%), 
news elaboration (t = 2.66, p = .008, VAF = 49.26%), and online political talk (t = 4.89, p < .001, 
VAF = 49.4%) significantly mediated the relationship between traditional news attention and 
political efficacy. Offline talk (t = 3.53, p < .001, VAF = 45.5%) and online talk (t = 2.83, p 
= .005, VAF = 48.7%) significantly mediated the relationship between online news and efficacy. 
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Offline talk (t = 3.14, p = .002, VAF = 28.2%) and online talk (t = 2.89, p = .004, VAF = 27.4%) 
significantly mediated the relationship between social media news and political efficacy.  
The tests also investigated whether deliberation behaviors and political efficacy together 
mediate the relationships between the Media variables and two types of participation. As shown 
in Table 27, the indirect effect of news elaboration and political efficacy between traditional news 
attention and offline participation was significant and positive, t = 1.99, p = .048. All three 
Deliberation variables and political efficacy jointly mediated the relationship between traditional 
news attention and online political participation (offline talk + efficacy, t = 3.13, p = .002; news 
elaboration + efficacy, t = 3.12, p = .002; online talk + efficacy, t = 3.42, p < .001).   
The indirect effect of the three Deliberation variables plus political efficacy between online 
news attention and offline participation was not found. However, all three Deliberation variables 
and political efficacy jointly mediated the relationship between online news attention and online 
political participation (offline talk + efficacy, t = 2.98, p = .003; news elaboration + efficacy, t = 
2.89, p = .005; online talk + efficacy, t = 2.80, p = .006). 
The indirect effect of the three Deliberation variables plus political efficacy between online 
news attention and offline participation was not found. However, all three Deliberation variables 
and political efficacy jointly mediated the relationship between social media news attention and 
online political participation (offline talk + efficacy, t = 3.06, p = .003; news elaboration + 
efficacy, t = 3.10, p = .002; online talk + efficacy, t = 3.02, p = .003).  
These outcomes suggest that the dataset of the second survey, even after controlling for prior 
levels of the variables, supports the hypothesized two-step mediation model. 
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Table 25 Results of Single Mediation (Auto-Regressive Model) 
 IV Mediator DV 
Indire
-ct 
Effect 
t 
value 
p 
value 
Percentile 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
VAF 
H9 News Efficacy 
Participa-
tion 
     
 
Traditional 
News 
Efficacy 
Offline 
Participa-
tion 
.037 1.972 .049 [.000; .073] 50.98 
 
Traditional 
News 
Efficacy 
Online 
Participa-
tion 
.059 3.480 .000 [.026; .087] 72.27 
 
Online 
News 
Efficacy 
Offline 
Participa-
tion 
.072 2.132 .042 [.002; .141] 53.20 
 
Online 
News 
Efficacy 
Online 
Participa-
tion 
.085 3.335 .001 [.035; .134] 67.30 
 
Social 
Media 
News 
Efficacy 
Online 
Participa-
tion 
.085 3.556 .000 [.037; .129] 67.53 
H10 
Deliberati
on 
Efficacy 
Participa-
tion 
     
H10-
1 
Offline 
Talk 
Efficacy 
Online 
Participa-
tion 
.066 3.200 .002 [.026; .105] 37.07 
H10-
1 
Online 
Talk 
Efficacy 
Online 
Participa-
tion 
.056 2.579 .010 [.013; .092] 26.96 
H10-
2 
Elabora-
tion 
Efficacy 
Offline 
Participa-
tion 
.070 2.004 .046 [.002; .139] 89.71 
H11 News 
Delibe-
ration 
Participa-
tion 
     
 
Online 
News 
Offline 
Talk 
Online 
Participa-
tion 
.147 2.722 .007 [.043; .251] 62.58 
 
Online 
News 
Online 
Talk 
Online 
Participa-
tion 
.166 2.926 .004 [.055; .278] 52.06 
 
Social 
News 
Offline 
Talk 
Offline 
Participa-
tion 
.155 2.072 .040 [.008; .301] 62.21 
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Table 25 Continued 
 IV Mediator DV 
Indire
-ct 
Effect 
t 
value 
p 
value 
Percentile 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
VAF 
 
Social 
News 
Offline 
Talk 
Online 
Participa-
tion 
.112 2.547 .012 [.029; .194] 62.80 
 
Social 
News 
Online 
Talk 
Online 
Participa-
tion 
.135 2.979 .003 [.046; .224] 60.41 
H12 News 
Delibe-
ration 
Efficacy      
H12-
1 
Traditional 
News 
Offline 
Talk 
Efficacy .088 3.865 .000 [.044; .133] 43.78 
H12-
1 
Traditional 
News 
Online 
Talk 
Efficacy .102 4.885 .000 [.061; .143] 49.35 
H12-
1 
Online 
News 
Offline 
Talk 
Efficacy .152 3.534 .000 [.068; .236] 45.49 
H12-
1 
Online 
News 
Online 
Talk 
Efficacy .160 2.829 .005 [.049; .271] 48.65 
H12-
1 
Social 
Media 
News 
Offline 
Talk 
Efficacy .100 3.143 .002 [.038; .163] 28.15 
H12-
1 
Social 
Media 
News 
Online 
Talk 
Efficacy .097 2.890 .004 [.031; .163] 27.38 
H12-
2 
Traditional 
News 
Elabora-
tion 
Efficacy .168 2.660 .008 [.044; .291] 49.26 
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Table 26 Results of Two-Step Mediation (Auto-Regressive Model) 
RQ2 IV Mediator 1 
Mediator 
2 
DV 
Indirect 
Effect 
t 
value 
p 
value 
Percentile 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
 
Traditional 
News 
Elaboration Efficacy 
Offline 
Partici-
pation 
.045 1.990 .048 [.000; .089] 
 
Traditional 
News 
Offline Talk Efficacy 
Online 
Partici-
pation 
.023 3.125 .002 [.008; .040] 
 
Traditional 
News 
Elaboration Efficacy 
Online 
Partici-
pation 
.064 3.117 .002 [.024; .100] 
 
Traditional 
News 
Online Talk Efficacy 
Online 
Partici-
pation 
.026 3.420 .000 [.012; .040] 
 
Online 
News 
Offline Talk Efficacy 
Online 
Partici-
pation 
.048 2.976 .003 [.019; .075] 
 
Online 
News 
Elaboration Efficacy 
Online 
Partici-
pation 
.079 2.885 .005 [.026; .131] 
 
Online 
News 
Online Talk Efficacy 
Online 
Partici-
pation 
.053 2.803 .006 [.016; .089] 
 
Social 
News 
Offline Talk Efficacy 
Online 
Partici-
pation 
.040 3.057 .003 [.017; .060] 
 
Social 
News 
Elaboration Efficacy 
Online 
Partici-
pation 
.083 3.102 .002 [.031; .134] 
 
Social 
News 
Online Talk Efficacy 
Online 
Partici-
pation 
.044 3.015 .003 [.016; .069] 
  
 
6.4 Comparison of Path Coefficients 
The current study compared the strength of causal links between variables in order to 
examine the changing role of certain variables over time during the election. The hypotheses on 
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the impact of time on the research model were tested by statistically comparing corresponding 
path coefficients in both the Wave 1 and the Wave 2 models. The statistical comparison was 
carried out using the formula below, which was developed by Keil, Tan, Wei, Saarinen, 
Tuunainen, and Wassenaar (2000). Table 4 summarizes the comparison results.  
 
=  
T = (   )/  + 1/ ) 
where = pooled estimator for the variance; t = t-statistic with N1 + N2  2 degrees of 
freedom;  = sample size of dataset for model i; = standard error of path in structural 
model of model i;  = path coefficient in structural model of model i. 
 
The paths from news attention to deliberation behaviors yielded mixed results. The path 
coefficients from traditional news attention to two deliberation behaviors (offline and online 
political talk) were found to become statistically weaker during the election period, t = 28.86, p 
< .001; t = 2.25, p = .024, respectively. The path coefficient from traditional news attention to 
news elaboration was higher in the second wave, t = 2.16, p = .031. The path coefficients from 
online news attention to online political talk and news elaboration became statistically stronger 
over time, t = 8.14, p < .001; t = 21.34, p < .001, respectively. The path coefficient from online 
news attention to offline political talk was stronger in Wave 1 than in Wave 2, t = 8.54, p < .001. 
The path coefficients from social news attention to offline and online political talk were found to 
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become statistically stronger over time (t = 41.21, p < .001; t = 8.25, p < .001, respectively). But, 
the relationship between social news attention and news elaboration in the second survey was 
weaker than the corresponding coefficient in the first survey, t = 43.30, p < .001. 
The relationship between news attention and political efficacy was found to become 
significantly stronger over the two time points (online news attention, t = 20.58, p < .001; social 
news attention, t = 37.35, p < .001, respectively). The path coefficients from traditional and 
online news attention to political efficacy were stronger in the first survey than in the second 
survey, t = 14.80, p < .001. This indicates that there is a significant difference in political efficacy 
between news consumers via traditional media and those via online or social media. The 
relationship between offline political talk and political efficacy became stronger over time, t = 
37.86, p < .001. The path coefficient from news elaboration to political efficacy was higher in 
Wave 1 (β = .37) than in Wave 2 (β = .21), t = 66.70, p < .001. 
The relationship between news attention and political participation was found to be 
significantly stronger over the two time points only when the exogenous variable was online 
news attention: online news attention – offline participation, t = 13.60, p < .001; online news 
attention – online participation, t = 9.93, p < .001, respectively. The path coefficients from 
traditional and social news attention to political participation were stronger in the first survey 
than in the second survey: traditional news – offline participation, t = 34.34, p < .001; traditional 
news – online participation, t = 11.51, p < .001; social media news – offline participation, t = 
12.97, p < .001; social media news – online participation, t = 18.29, p < .001. 
The relationships between the Deliberation variables and political participation were 
stronger in the first survey than in the second survey in some cases: offline talk – online 
participation, t = 20.23, p < .001; online talk – offline participation, t = 15.26, p < .001; news 
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elaboration – online participation, t = 14.57, p < .001. In contrast, the strength of the relationships 
between offline talk and offline participation, between online political talk and online political 
participation, and between news elaboration and offline participation became stronger over time 
(t = 19.50, p < .001; t = 12.06, p < .001; t = 7.67, p < .001, respectively). 
As expected, over time political efficacy statistically significantly increased the level of 
political participation, supporting H1. The path coefficients from political efficacy and offline 
and online participation in the second wave were significantly higher than the corresponding 
coefficients in the first wave (t = 35.40, p < .001; t = 28.14, p < .001, respectively).  
 
Table 27 Path Comparisons between the Wave 1 and the Wave 2 Models 
Path 
Wave 1 
Model (β) 
Wave 2 
Model (β) 
t value p value Comparison 
Traditional News  Offline 
Talk 
.214 .139 28.859 p < .001 1
st
 > 2
nd
 
Traditional News  Online 
Talk 
.129 .123 2.255 0.024 1
st
 > 2
nd
 
Traditional News  
Elaboration 
.217 .222 2.164 0.031 1
st
 < 2
nd
 
Traditional News  
Efficacy 
.146 .111 14.795 p < .001 1
st
 > 2
nd
 
Traditional News  Offline 
Participation 
.014 -.085 34.340 p < .001 1
st
 > 2
nd
 
Traditional News  Online 
Participation 
.017 -.013 11.509 p < .001 1
st
 > 2
nd
 
Online News  Offline 
Talk 
.095 .065 8.544 P < .001 1
st
 > 2
nd
  
Online News  Online 
Talk 
.069 .092 8.135 p < .001 1
st
 < 2
nd
 
Online News  
Elaboration 
.054 .125 21.340 p < .001 1
st
 < 2
nd
 
Online News  Efficacy .032 .088 20.577 p < .001 1st < 2nd 
Online News  Offline 
Participation 
.005 .042 13.598 p < .001 1
st
 < 2
nd
 
Online News  Online 
Participation 
.028 .057 9.927 p < .001 1
st
 < 2
nd
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Table 27 Continued 
Path 
Wave 1 
Model (β) 
Wave 2 
Model (β) 
t value p value Comparison 
Social Media News  
Offline Talk 
.069 .176 41.212 p < .001 1
st
 < 2
nd
 
Social Media News  
Online Talk 
.214 .241 8.248 p < .001 1
st
 < 2
nd
 
Social Media News  
Elaboration 
.135 .029 43.302 p < .001 1
st
 > 2
nd
 
Social Media News  
Efficacy 
.107 .194 37.353 p < .001 1
st
 < 2
nd
 
Social Media News  
Offline Participation 
.031 .012 12.967 p < .001 1
st
 > 2
nd
 
Social Media News  
Online Participation 
.175 .107 18.293 p < .001 1
st
 > 2
nd
 
Offline Talk  Efficacy .103 .204 37.864 p < .001 1st < 2nd 
Offline Talk  Offline 
Participation 
.118 .168 19.495 p < .001 1
st
 < 2
nd
 
Offline Talk  Online 
Participation 
.135 .075 20.225 p < .001 1
st
 > 2
nd
 
Online Talk  Political 
Efficacy 
.074 .072 1.814 ns 1
st
 = 2
nd
 
Online Talk  Offline 
Participation 
.174 .123 15.258 p < .001 1
st
 > 2
nd
 
Online Talk  Online 
Participation 
.201 .223 12.058 p < .001 1
st
 < 2
nd
 
Elaboration  Efficacy .372 .206 66.696 p < .001 1st > 2nd 
Elaboration  Offline 
Participation 
.026 .051 7.671 p < .001 1
st
 < 2
nd
 
Elaboration  Online 
Participation 
.059 .016 14.573 p < .001 1
st
 > 2
nd
 
Efficacy  Offline 
Participation 
.087 .275 35.398 p < .001 1
st
 < 2
nd
 
Efficacy  Online 
Participation 
.133 .301 28.137 p < .001 1
st
 < 2
nd
 
 
 
6.5 Results of Importance-Performance Matrix Analysis (IPMA) 
An advantage of PLS is that it allows researchers to calculate latent variable scores. A basic 
PLS analysis identifies the relative importance of constructs in the structural model by extracting 
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estimates of the direct, indirect, and total relationships. Importance-Performance Matrix Analysis 
(IPMA) extends these PLS results with another dimension, which includes the actual 
performance of each construct. IPMA is particularly useful in obtaining the findings of a PLS 
analysis via latent variable scores (Slack, 1994; Volckner, Sattler, Hennig-Thurau, & Ringle, 
2010). IPMA adds an additional dimension to the analysis that considers average values of the 
latent variables. For an endogenous latent variable, IPMA finds the total effects (performance) in 
the structural model. In this process, IPMA determines which variable shows relatively high 
importance or performance.  
      The first step in an IPMA test is to identify a target construct and to calculate the total 
effects and the performance values. The importance of a latent variable is calculated from the 
variables’ total effect (Slack, 1994). The next step is to obtain the performance values of the 
latent variables in the PLS path model. To make the results comparable across different scales, a 
performance scale ranging from 0 to 100 is used: 0 represents the lowest and 100 the highest 
performance. Lastly, in order to acquire index values, rescaling the latent variables is required 
based on the following computations: Subtract the minimum possible value of the latent 
variable’s scale from an estimated data point and divide this data by the difference between the 
minimum and maximum data points of the latent variable’s scale (Anderson & Fornell, 2000; 
Hock et al., 2010; Tenenhaus et al., 2005): 
 = (  – Minscale [Y])/ (Maxscale [Y] – Minscale [Y])*100 
 represents the ith data point (i.e., i = 3 with respect to the latent variable score of the third 
observation in the data set) of a specific latent variable in the PLS path model. This procedure 
results in rescaled latent variable scores on a scale of 0 to 100. The mean value of these rescaled 
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scores of each latent variable produces the index value of their performance. A higher value 
means a latent variable’s better performance. 
     The IPMA results reveal that news elaboration is most important in explaining offline and 
online political participation (Table 28 and Table 29). However, its performance score is much 
lower than the average of the other constructs. Political efficacy and news elaboration are similar 
in terms of importance. But political efficacy shows considerably higher performance scores than 
news elaboration in both Wave 1 and Wave 2. Social media news attention, on the other hand, is 
of low importance even though it has relatively high performance. Consequently, we can say that 
efforts to improve offline political participation in both Wave 1 and Wave 2 should focus on how 
to heighten the performance ability of the news elaboration construct. The results also indicate 
that social media and political efficacy play a more significant role in motivating citizens to 
engage in political processes than other constructs that were considered in this study.  
  
Table 28 Total Effects and Index Values for the IPMA of Political Participation (Wave 1) 
 Offline Political Participation Online Political Participation 
 Importance 
 (Total Effects) 
Performance  
(Index Values) 
Importance 
 (Total Effects) 
Performance 
 (Index Values) 
Traditional 
News Attention 
37.341 .155 37.341 .157 
Online News 
Attention 
51.363 .046 51.363 .071 
Social Media 
News Attention 
22.180 .210 22.180 .297 
Offline Political 
Talk 
21.524 .200 21.524 .168 
News 
Elaboration 
64.657 .130 64.657 .185 
Online Political 
Talk 
20.850 .157 20.850 .218 
Political 
Efficacy 
56.526 .276 56.526 .265 
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Table 29 Total Effects and Index Values for the IPMA of Political Participation (Wave 2) 
 Offline Political Participation Online Political Participation 
 Importance  
(Total Effects) 
Performance 
 (Index Values) 
Importance  
(Total Effects) 
Performance  
(Index Values) 
Traditional 
News Attention 
27.512 .077 27.512 .114 
Online News 
Attention 
52.563 .073 52.563 .090 
Social Media 
News Attention 
22.368 .175 22.368 .265 
Offline Political 
Talk 
28.309 .222 28.309 .178 
News 
Elaboration 
66.345 .042 66.345 .090 
Online Political 
Talk 
20.110 .129 20.110 .240 
Political 
Efficacy 
59.784 .283 59.784 .299 
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CHAPTER 7 
DISCUSSION 
 
7.1 Discussion about Major Findings 
7.1.1 Direct Impacts of News Consumption on Political Attitudes 
Information is central to the formation of public opinion and in democratic processes. 
Information is at the heart of attitude formation (Lavine, 2002; McGraw, 2000, 2003). People 
tend to combine the evaluative implications of new information to their memory as they 
encounter the information. Newly added information helps people to make a rational judgment 
on a certain issue (Zaller, 1992; Zaller & Feldman, 1992). But many parts of the mechanisms that 
explain how new information works in people’s perceptions and attitudes are still uncertain.  
     The current study finds that news plays a pivotal role in shaping citizens’ political 
perceptions and behaviors. Attention to news stories via traditional, online, and social media was 
found to have a positive link to deliberative behaviors, such as interpersonal political discussion 
and reflection on news in all three models tested in this study. This result is consistent with 
previous studies. There is a consensus that the media constitute the most important source of 
political information and channel of communication. The number of people who experience 
politics directly is limited, and even those who are politically active gain most of their political 
information through either traditional mass media or new media, such as online news sites and 
social media. Mediated political information and experiences in turn permeate interpersonal 
discussions (Stromback & Shehata, 2010).  
As discussed earlier, news media are good sources of information that people use to engage 
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in political conversation. News provides people with conversational topics of the day and 
motivates people to get involved in talking with others. As Anderson, Dardenne, and Killenberg 
(1994) properly argued, “News is what people talk about, and news makes people talk” (p. 37). In 
other words, news consumption tends to lead people to more vibrant engagement in discussions 
with others.  
The present study also finds that attention to news in general is positively associated with 
political efficacy. In the Wave 1 model, traditional and social media news had a positive link to 
political efficacy and all three types of news attention were positively related to political efficacy 
in the Wave 2 model. In the auto-regressive model, social media news attention had a significant 
link to political efficacy although traditional and online news attention did not. Iyengar (1991) 
found that newspapers “thematic” presentation of news encouraged people to reason public 
issues and, as a result, increased the sense of whether they have a voice in politics. Norris (1998) 
also found that watching television news has a positive association with political efficacy. The 
current study confirms that there is also a positive link between information seeking through 
online or social media and political efficacy. 
However, information seeking via the media did not result in political participation in this 
study. Only news attention via social media in Wave 1 was found to have a positive association 
with online participation. The impact of news consumption via the Internet on political 
participation has been mixed in previous studies. Some studies reported a positive relationship 
between the two variables (i.e., Chadwick, 2006). For instance, consumption of public affairs 
content through television and newspapers was found to increase political participation (Chaffee 
& Kanihan, 1997; Lemert et al., 1977). In contrast, some studies showed pessimistic results (i.e., 
Bimber, 1998). The findings of the current study do not support the claim that there exists a 
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positive link between news consumption and political participation.  
     It should be noted that the absence of direct relationship between news attention and 
participation does not mean that the two constructs have no relation between each other. As 
Rucker et al. (2011) documented in their study, it is possible that the two variables have an 
indirect relationship. It other words, it is necessary to examine and to examine mediating 
variables that might intervene in the relationship between news attention and participation. In the 
current research, offline and online political talk, news elaboration, and political efficacy was 
regarded as possible mediators. The indirect influences of aforementioned three mediating 
variables are discussed in detail in the subsection 7.4. 
7.1.2 Direct Impacts of Deliberation on Political Attitudes 
  The findings reveal that deliberation variables significantly affect political efficacy. This 
result resonates with previous findings. People who talk with other people about information 
gained from the media tend to learn about other ways of thinking about the information, and 
eventually develop a better understanding about the information (Scheufele, 2001). Several 
studies have shown that political discussion is positively related to political efficacy (Fishkin, 
1999; Min, 2007). Lin (2003) said, “[C]itizens who engage in interpersonal discussion about 
politics with a greater number of fellow citizens are more likely to have confidence in their 
ability to make sense of and to get involved in the political process” (p. 9).  
Elaboration concerns more in-depth and effortful mental efforts to make sense of what 
people acquire from the media (Eveland, 2002). Through elaboration, news consumers sort and 
reorganize information in personally meaningful ways (Graber, 1988). Elaboration goes beyond 
mere attention to media content. It reflects people’s efforts to cope with the vast amount of news 
items according to their interests and needs. Research consistently shows that elaboration is 
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positively associated with political interest and involvement in public events (Eveland, 2001, 
2002; Kosicki & McLeod, 1989). In general, the more one elaborates on political news stories, 
the more efficacious one feels about the political process. This is in part because as one exercises 
enough mental efforts about political information, one is more likely to have higher confidence in 
handling political situations that otherwise would be complex or intimidating (Bandura, 1977). In 
other words, active reflection on media content may help audiences understand the political 
world in easier and simpler ways. 
7.1.3 Impacts of Political Efficacy on Participation 
     As a central concept of the current study, political efficacy was found to have a positive 
association with both offline and online political participation in all the three models. The result 
confirms that political efficacy is a determinant factor that directly influences citizens’ 
engagement in the political process.  
Political efficacy not only directly triggers political engagement, but also exercises a 
mediating role between news consumption and participation and between deliberation and 
participation. Theoretically, this study integrates one important concept in social psychology that 
has been overlooked in communication research – political efficacy – into the conceptual model 
structured as the O (Orientation) – S (Media Stimulus) – O (Orientation) – R (Response) 
framework. In other words, this study provides original insight for understanding political 
communication as a mediated process by political efficacy. It attempts to demonstrate the 
importance of understanding political communication as a continuous process involving 
political-psychological variables.  
The findings reveal that political efficacy mediates the effects of both mass and 
interpersonal communication on political participation. Political efficacy mediated the 
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relationships between traditional news attention and offline participation in the auto-regressive 
model and between social media news attention and offline participation in the Wave 1 model. In 
all three models, online and social media news attention had positive relationships with online 
political participation with political efficacy mediating the relationships.  
The results of this study illustrate how political efficacy plays a big role in political 
communication, as Nisbet and Scheufele (2004) appropriately documented in their study. 
Considering that all three types of news attention did not have significant direct relationships 
with political participation, the findings of the current study can make a contribution to the 
understanding of the mechanism of how news affects participation: news consumption influences 
citizens’ self-competence about politics (political efficacy) and the competence in turn motivates 
citizens to engage in the political process.  
Political efficacy was also found to play a mediating role between deliberation and political 
participation. In the Wave 1 model, the impacts of all three deliberation variables on political 
participation were found to be significant. In the Wave 2 model, political efficacy played a 
mediating role between online political talk and offline participation, between offline talk and 
online participation, and between online talk and online participation. In the auto-regressive 
model, three relationships (news elaboration – offline participation, offline talk – online 
participation, and online talk – online participation) were mediated by political efficacy.  
Additionally, this study tested an aggregated model where different dimensions comprising 
each major construct were combined into one; Traditional, online, and social media news 
attention were collapsed into one News Attention variable, offline and online political talk and 
news elaboration were collapsed into one Deliberation variable, and offline and online political 
participation were collapsed into one Participation variable. The results show that political 
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efficacy mediates the relationships between News Attention and Participation and between 
Deliberation and Participation.  
This study’s findings suggest that political efficacy should be considered important in 
measuring the impact of political talk on citizen engagement in the political process. Although 
many previous studies focused on the direct impact of political talk on political participation, the 
relationship between political talk and participation is more complex than scholars have thought. 
Frequent talk about politics tends to increase the level of understanding of political issues which 
have been raised in the interpersonal discussion. For example, during a political campaign, 
political discussion brings a better understanding about election issues. Such an improved 
understanding often leads to the increase in people’s feeling that they are able to process political 
information more effectively. As a result, they engage more willingly in the election process 
(Kaid et al., 2007). Therefore, it is logical to view that people who frequently talk about politics 
will be more likely to feel competent about their political beliefs or behaviors. Such increased 
competence in turn stimulates people to get involved in the political process. The findings of the 
current research showcase how political efficacy plays an indirect but pivotal role in encouraging 
citizens who consume news and talks about it to participate in political processes. 
7.1.4 Indirect Impacts of Deliberation and Political Efficacy on Political Participation 
     Findings reveal that news elaboration and political efficacy jointly mediate the relationship 
between news attention and political participation. In the Wave 1 model, the influence of online 
and social media news attention on political participation was mediated by political talk (both 
offline and online) and political efficacy. News elaboration also was found to mediate the 
relationships between online news attention and participation and between social media news 
attention and participation. The results in the Wave 2 model showed the same results as those in 
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the Wave 1 model. In the auto-regressive model, the effect of traditional news attention on 
political participation was mediated by news elaboration. Traditional, online, and social media 
news attention influenced online political participation through the combined effects of the three 
deliberation variables and political efficacy in the auto-regressive model. 
     Additionally, this study tested three models where offline talk, online talk, and news 
elaboration were collapsed into one Deliberation variable and offline and online political 
participation were collapsed into one Participation variable. The results demonstrate that online 
and social media news attention impacted political participation through the joint role of 
deliberation and political efficacy in both the Wave 1 and Wave 2 models. However, traditional 
news attention failed to support the hypothesized model. Lastly, the current study combined all 
three categories of news attention into one and then examined how the aggregated news attention 
variable relates to the three deliberation variables and two participation variables. The finding 
suggests that deliberation and political efficacy jointly mediate the relationship between news 
attention and political participation in both the Wave 1 and Wave 2 models. Thus, the 
hypothesized theoretical framework in the current study was fully supported. 
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Table 30 Comparison of Direct Relations among the Three Models 
 
 
Hypothesis 
Wave 1 
model 
Wave 2 
model 
Auto-Regressive 
model 
H News  Deliberation    
1-1 Traditional News  Offline Talk O O X 
1-2 Traditional News  Online Talk O O X 
2-1 Online News  Offline Talk O O O 
2-2 Online News  Online Talk O X O 
3-1 Social Media News  Offline Talk O O O 
3-2 Social Media News  Online Talk O O O 
4-1 Traditional News  Elaboration  O O O 
4-2 Online News  Elaboration X O O 
4-3 Social Media News  Elaboration O X O 
RQ1 News  Efficacy    
 Traditional News  Efficacy O O X 
 Online News  Efficacy X O X 
 Social Media News  Efficacy O O O 
H5 News  Participation    
5-1 Traditional News  Offline Participation X X X 
5-2 Traditional News  Online Participation X X X 
5-3 Online News  Offline Participation X X X 
5-4 Online News  Online Participation X X X 
5-5 Social Media News  Offline 
Participation 
X X X 
5-6 Social Media News  Online 
Participation 
O X X 
H6 Deliberation  Efficacy    
6-1 Offline Talk  Efficacy O O O 
6-2 Online Talk  Efficacy O X O 
6-3 Elaboration  Efficacy O O X 
H7 Deliberation  Participation    
7-1 Offline Talk  Offline Participation O X O 
7-2 Offline Talk  Online Participation O X X 
7-3 Online Talk  Offline Participation O O X 
7-4 Online Talk  Online Participation O O O 
H8 Efficacy  Participation    
8-1 Efficacy  Offline Participation O O O 
8-2 Efficacy  Online Participation O O O 
 
Note: “O” indicates the hypothesis was supported. “X” indicates that the hypothesis was not 
supported. 
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Table 31 Comparison of Indirect Relations among the Three Models 
 
 Hypothesis 
Wave 1 
model 
Wave 2 
model 
Auto-Regressive 
model 
H9 News  Efficacy Participation    
 
Traditional News  Efficacy  
Offline Participation 
X X O 
 
Online News  Efficacy  Offline 
Participation 
X O O 
 
Social Media News  Efficacy  
Offline Participation 
O O X 
 
Traditional News  Efficacy  
Online Participation 
X X O 
 
Online News  Efficacy  Online 
Participation 
O O O 
 
Social Media News  Efficacy  
Online Participation 
O O O 
H10 
Deliberation  Efficacy  
Participation 
   
10-1 
Offline Talk  Efficacy  Offline 
Participation 
O O X 
10-1 
Online Talk  Efficacy  Offline 
Participation 
O O X 
10-1 
Offline Talk  Efficacy  Online 
Participation 
O O O 
10-1 
Online Talk  Efficacy  Online 
Participation 
O O O 
10-2 
Elaboration  Efficacy  Offline 
Participation 
O X O 
10-2 
Elaboration  Efficacy  Online 
Participation 
O X X 
H11 
News  Deliberation  
Participation 
   
 
Traditional News  Offline Talk  
Offline Participation 
X X X 
 
Online News  Offline Talk  
Offline Participation 
X X X 
 
Social Media News  Offline Talk  
Offline Participation 
O X O 
 
Traditional News  Online Talk  
Offline Participation 
X X X 
 
Online News  Online Talk  
Offline Participation 
X X X 
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Table 31 Continued 
 
 Hypothesis 
Wave 1 
model 
Wave 2 
model 
Auto-Regressive 
model 
 
Social Media News  Online Talk  
Offline Participation 
O X X 
 
Traditional News  Offline Talk  
Online Participation 
X X X 
 
Online News  Offline Talk  
Online Participation 
O O O 
 
Social Media News  Offline Talk  
Online Participation 
O O O 
 
Traditional News  Online Talk  
Online Participation 
X X X 
 
Online News  Online Talk  Online 
Participation 
O O O 
 
Social Media News  Online Talk  
Online Participation 
O O O 
H12 News  Deliberation  Efficacy    
12-1 
Traditional News  Offline Talk  
Efficacy 
X O O 
12-1 
Online News  Offline Talk  
Efficacy 
O X O 
12-1 
Social Media News  Offline Talk  
Efficacy 
O O O 
12-1 
Traditional News  Online Talk  
Efficacy 
O O O 
12-1 
Online News  Online Talk  
Efficacy 
O X O 
12-1 
Social Media News  Online Talk  
Efficacy 
O O O 
12-2 
Traditional News  Elaboration  
Efficacy 
O O O 
12-2 
Online News  Elaboration  
Efficacy 
O X X 
12-2 
Social Media News  Elaboration  
Efficacy 
O O X 
RQ2 
News  Deliberation  Efficacy  
Participation 
   
 
Traditional News  Offline Talk  
Efficacy  Offline Participation 
X X X 
 
Online News  Offline Talk  
Efficacy  Offline Participation 
X X X 
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Table 31 Continued 
 
 Hypothesis 
Wave 1 
model 
Wave 2 
model 
Auto-Regressive 
model 
 
Social Media News  Offline Talk  
Efficacy  Offline Participation 
X X X 
 
Traditional News  Online Talk  
Efficacy  Offline Participation 
X X X 
 
Online News  Online Talk  
Efficacy  Offline Participation 
X X X 
 
Social Media News  Online Talk  
Efficacy  Offline Participation 
X X X 
 
Traditional News  Elaboration  
Efficacy  Offline Participation 
X X O 
 
Online News  Elaboration  
Efficacy  Offline Participation 
X X X 
 
Social Media News  Elaboration  
Efficacy  Offline Participation 
X X X 
 
Traditional News  Offline Talk  
Efficacy  Online Participation 
X X O 
 
Online News  Offline Talk  
Efficacy  Online Participation 
O O O 
 
Social Media News  Offline Talk  
Efficacy  Online Participation 
O O O 
 
Traditional News  Online Talk  
Efficacy  Online Participation 
X X O 
 
Online News  Online Talk  
Efficacy  Online Participation 
O O O 
 
Social Media News  Online Talk  
Efficacy  Online Participation 
O O O 
 
Traditional News  Elaboration  
Efficacy  Online Participation 
X X O 
 
Online News  Elaboration  
Efficacy  Online Participation 
O O O 
 
Social Media News  Elaboration  
Efficacy  Online Participation 
O O O 
 
Note: “O” indicates the hypothesis was supported. “X” indicates that the hypothesis was not 
supported. 
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Table 32 Comparison of Aggregated Models 
 
 Hypothesis Wave 1 
model 
Wave 2 
model 
H9 News  Efficacy Participation O O 
H10 Deliberation  Efficacy  Participation O O 
H13 News  Deliberation  Efficacy  Participation O O 
 Traditional News  Deliberation  Efficacy  
Participation 
X X 
 Online News  Deliberation  Efficacy  
Participation 
O O 
 Social Media News  Deliberation  Efficacy  
Participation 
O O 
 
Note: “O” indicates the hypothesis was supported. “X” indicates that the hypothesis was not 
supported. 
 
7.1.5 Path Comparisons  
The present research additionally investigated whether there was a significant difference in 
paths between the Wave 1 and Wave 2 models. Overall, the strength of paths from online and 
social media news attention to deliberation, political efficacy, and political participation were 
stronger in the Wave 2 model than in the Wave 1 model. In contrast, the strength of paths from 
traditional news attention to deliberation, political efficacy, and political participation were 
stronger in the Wave 1 model than in the Wave 2 model. The paths from deliberation variables to 
political efficacy and from deliberation variables to participation showed mixed results. The 
impact of political efficacy on offline and online political participation was found to be much 
stronger in the Wave 2 model than in the Wave 1 model. This finding shows additional support of 
the importance of political efficacy in political communication, especially during an election 
period. 
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7.2 Discussion about the Implications of the Study 
The implications of the current study are four-fold: (1) this study successfully establishes a 
two-step mediation model; (2) it proves the key role of political efficacy in political engagement; 
(3) it confirms the importance of online and social media as new information sources; and (4) it 
proposes several practical implications to the democracy of South Korea.  
7.2.1 Establishment of a Two-Step (Deliberation & Political Efficacy) Mediation Model 
The analyses of the national panel data provide a range of important insights about the 
implications of the processes through which news consumption influences political engagement 
during an election period. This study, by examining the processes using three different models, 
finds a consistent pattern of information processing in political communication. The results, 
particularly the findings about mediating effects, provide considerable support for the theorized 
model of this study. Although minor differences exist across the three models, analyses revealed 
a consistent pattern of two-step mediation. That is, attention to media news stimulates citizen 
communication and intrapersonal reflection on news, and these deliberative behaviors in turn 
lead to the increase of political efficacy. In addition, political efficacy connects deliberative 
behaviors to political participation. Lastly, deliberation and political efficacy jointly mediate the 
relationship between news attention and political participation, proving the hypothesized model 
to be solid. Across the three models – two cross-sectional models and one auto-regressive model, 
informational media use encouraged citizen communication and reflective behavior on news, 
which in turn spurred political efficacy and participation. The findings suggest that the traditional 
S (Stimuli) – R (Response) approach is overly simplistic, and more complicated cognitive 
processes have to be considered when examining news effects on political participation in the 
digital age.  
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The study successfully establishes a new mediation model beyond previous 
communication mediation model (McLeod et al., 1994) and cognitive mediation model (Eveland, 
2001; Eveland et al., 2003). The current study also makes a significant progress from the O – S – 
R – O – R framework. It does so by integrating news elaboration and political efficacy into the 
model and by offering a much fuller account of the theoretical rationale underlying the 
hypothesized model. The current study’s findings deepen our understanding of the causal flow 
among information seeking, citizen communication, news elaboration, political efficacy, and 
political participation. This study also makes a significant contribution to the literature that deals 
with the impact of digital media on political participation by adding an innovative theoretical 
model to it. 
In detail, the current study finds that interpersonal political discussion mediates the effect 
of news attention on political participation. This suggests that interpersonal discussion, as a 
deliberative behavior, can help individuals to make sense of the political information they obtain 
from news. Several studies have documented that informational media use can foster civic-
oriented behaviors by triggering political discussion, which subsequently promotes citizens’ 
participation in public affairs (Eveland, 2001; McLeod et al., 2001). However, few studies have 
examined how news attention influences interpersonal political discussion and political efficacy, 
and how these two variables jointly affect political participation in one integrated model. How 
people process news information and perceive their political competence is an important 
determinant in leading them into the political process. Furthermore, very few studies have 
examined the relationship between different information sources and political efficacy (Lin, 
2003; Kaid et al., 2007). This study breaks down information sources (the main exogenous 
variable) into three categories – traditional, online, and social media news. And, it tests the 
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hypothesized model in the three different information-seeking situations. To date, little research 
has ever attempted to divide information sources into segmented categories.   
What is also noteworthy in this study is that the hypothesized mediation effects were 
largely replicated across three well-fitted models – two cross-sectional models and one auto-
regressive model. By employing an analytic strategy that examined the change in the variables 
over time (the auto-regressive model), the study demonstrates that the major constructs are 
interrelated not only at a single time point but also over time. The concurrent relationships 
observed in the cross-sectional model were largely replicated when the present study took 
advantage of the panel components of the design. When modeling changes, the structural 
equation models revealed a set of relationships that largely confirm the hypothesized framework. 
That the results are mostly the same across the three approaches lends substantial support to the 
suggested theoretical model of the current research. 
7.2.2 The Crucial Role of Political Efficacy in Triggering Political Engagement 
The outcomes of the current study advocate the idea that news effects are often indirect. 
The indirect process encompasses multiple steps, including information seeking, deliberative 
behaviors, and political efficacy. Thus, this study’s findings make us revise the view that media-
driven messages directly influence audiences. The findings also suggest that citizens are not 
simply passive audiences who are vulnerable to media inputs, but instead are active audiences 
who rework and rethink media content through their interpersonal and intrapersonal deliberation 
behaviors. Citizens not only take advantage of media content by paying attention to it, but also 
try to make sense of it in their own way through interpersonal conversation with others and 
reflection on the content. For example, through robust engagement in discussion, citizens can 
reflect and deliberate about a campaign, become informed, and make sense of issues and 
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candidates, all of which are necessary in encouraging them to engage in the election process.  
However, it should be noted that deliberation behaviors may not be a sufficient condition 
that connects news consumption with political engagement. The current study demonstrates that 
the three deliberative behaviors – offline and online political conversation and individual 
reflective behavior on news content – did not necessarily have positive direct links to political 
participation. In the Wave 2 model and the auto-regressive model, half of the relationships 
between deliberative behaviors and political participation turned out to be non-significant. And, 
deliberation did not play an effective role in mediating news attention and political participation 
in all of the three models as shown in Table 34. These results suggest that interpersonal 
discussion and intrapersonal reflection are not enough to explain citizens’ engagement in the 
political process.  
Unlike the deliberation variables, political efficacy had a positive direct link to both offline 
and online participatory behaviors. Political efficacy also successfully mediated the relationships 
between news attention and participation and between deliberation and participation as shown in 
Table 34. Additionally, in the IPMA (Importance-Performance Matrix Analysis) results show that 
political efficacy had the biggest performance power in leading news consumers to offline and 
online political participation in both the Wave 1 and the Wave 2 models. These outcomes indicate 
that political efficacy is a more important factor than deliberative behaviors in determining 
whether citizens who pay attention to news eventually end up engaging in political processes.  
Political efficacy also outperformed political trust, which is another important determinant 
of political engagement. Those who felt highly efficacious about their thoughts and behaviors 
were more likely to get involved in offline and online political events and cast their ballots in the 
election than people who had a higher level of trust toward politicians or political institutions, yet 
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had a lower level of political efficacy. This study’s findings demonstrate how important a role 
political efficacy plays in the process of citizen engagement in political affairs. 
All in all, the observed relationships speak to the central role of political efficacy in 
bridging news consumption to visible political participation. Although the analyses cannot 
determine political efficacy as a sole and decisive cause of political engagement, they certainly 
suggest that political efficacy exerts a considerable impact on the formation of democratic 
citizenship. This finding deserves attention both in well-democratized countries and in 
democratizing countries. As scholars (Cohen et al., 2001; Delli Carpini, 2004; Kenski & Stroud, 
2006) advocate, political efficacy is one of the most important psychological constructs closely 
related to political participation in Western societies. However, the role of political efficacy as a 
motivator of political engagement has been less investigated in the East, especially in South 
Korea. As stated previously, politics is one of the common topics in everyday conversation in 
South Korea. Through diverse private meetings in restaurants, bars, and homes, South Korean 
voters spend considerable time talking about political issues because of their high interest in 
politics. However, at the same time, the level of frustration of South Koreans toward politicians, 
the government, and power elites is relatively high. Indeed, the results of descriptive statistics in 
this study show that the mean of political interest is 3.05 in Wave 1 and 3.09 in Wave 2, while the 
mean of political trust ranges from 1.80 (Wave 1) to 2.19 (Wave 2). 
The high level of frustration among South Koreans stems in part from the serious conflict 
between political parties, frequent political corruption, and prevalent feeling of deprivation 
among the middle-class and the poor. Political frustration tends to prevent people from 
developing political efficacy. When people feel frustrated about politics, their feeling of 
competence about their behaviors is lowered. A high level of political interest may motivate 
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people to consume more political information, and active news-seeking in turn may facilitate 
conversation about political issues with others. Yet, information seeking and political 
conversation do not necessarily result in citizen engagement in political affairs if people don’t 
feel efficacious enough to change their attitudes or behaviors toward politics. This study 
empirically confirms the importance of political efficacy in the process of citizen engagement in 
the democratic process in the new democracy of South Korea. 
7.2.3 The Increasing Impact of Online/Social Media on Political Processes 
Another intriguing finding in this study is the role played by social media. Information 
seeking via social media strongly influenced deliberation behaviors and political efficacy, often 
more so than traditional and online news media. News attention via social media had a positive 
link to offline and online political talk in all of the three models. News attention via social media 
also significantly affected news elaboration in the Wave 1 and the auto-regressive models. Social 
media news attention also was positively associated with political efficacy in all three models. In 
the Importance-Performance Matrix Analysis (IPMA), the performance scores of social media 
news attention was significantly higher compared with its importance scores. In the Wave 1 
model, the performance ability of social media news attention proved to be the second most 
powerful in explaining offline and online political participation. In other words, social media 
news attention played a very important role in boosting political participation. Likewise, in the 
Wave 2 model, the performance ability of social media news attention proved to be the third 
biggest in explaining offline political participation and the second biggest in accounting for 
online political participation. 
On the other hand, traditional news attention did not play an important role as much as 
online and social media news attention did. In the test of the hypothesized two-step mediation 
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model, traditional news attention failed to support the hypothesized framework. In the IPMA 
analysis, the importance and performance scores of traditional news attention were below 
average. The results imply that consumption of traditional media news lacks the potential to 
mobilize citizens into the democratic process.  
A multitude of studies on news consumption have demonstrated that traditional media 
teeter on the edge of relevance for average citizens (Hussain, 2011). Some even blame traditional 
news media for alienating citizens from the public process (Soffer, 2009). Indeed, the public 
relies less on traditional news than ever before. Only 35% of Americans read the daily news, with 
their younger counterparts the least likely to do so (Paterson, 2007). The consumption of 
television and radio news use is similarly plummeting (Kohut & Remez, 2009). Perceived levels 
of trust and credibility in traditional media news parallel the general decline in news use, where 
only 18% of Americans believe that the press deals fairly with all sides, and only 29% think 
journalists get their facts straight (Kohut, 2009).  
The same trend is observed in South Korea. The average newspaper readership and 
television viewership in South Korea has been falling every year during the last one decade. In 
2005, 45% of adults said they read a newspaper regularly but the rate dipped to 34% in 2008 
(Korea Press Foundation, 2009). Today, the newspaper’s readership is surmised to be below 30%. 
The average viewership of three major network television’s main news programs has dropped 
by .8% from 4.0% in 2008 to 3.2% in 2012 (Korea Press Foundation, 2012). The rate of decrease 
of viewership was the biggest among people in their 30s. 
One possible reason for such a drastic decline in traditional news consumption may be the 
increasing competition in the media market because of the wide penetration of Internet media. 
But the increasing distrust toward the traditional news media seems to be a more important 
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reason. As mentioned in chapter 3, only 44% of South Koreans trust traditional media, such as 
television, and cable TV (Edelman, 2012). Only 20% of citizens trust newspapers. Such a low 
level of credibility for traditional media stems mainly from people’s disappointment in the 
traditional media’s malpractices in their coverage of news (Kim & Hamilton, 2006). In addition, 
a close connection between the traditional media and invested interest groups has fostered 
discontent among audiences (Chang, 2005). As a result, South Korean citizens are gradually 
turning away from traditional media and turning elsewhere to get political information. 
On the other hand, digital media are gaining popularity, providing citizens a new way of 
getting political information. With a variety of available content, citizens are no longer forced to 
rely on traditional media to learn about public affairs. Online and social media are becoming 
important sources from which citizens learn about public issues (Kim et al., 2011). People do 
increasingly turn to the Internet, with 44% of Americans going to the Internet or mobile devices 
regularly for news (Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, 2009). The Internet has 
also bypassed newspapers as the second most important source of national and international news 
(Kohut & Remez, 2008). In South Korea, as much as 98% of citizens said that they accessed the 
Internet to consume news (DMC Media, 2013). Research lends support for the idea that online 
media play a significant role in informing the audience about public affairs. OECD regarded 
South Korea as an example country where online news has already overtaken other forms of 
news (OECD, 2010).   
Also, social media are becoming effective sources of political information. For example, 
voters are increasingly demanding direct and unfiltered political information from campaigns in 
many elections (Hussain, 2012). Social media, by permitting the exchange of views across 
diverse networks, tend to increase the opportunities for individuals to get involved in political 
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issues. Today, in South Korea, a multitude of social media, such as blogs, social networking 
services, podcasts, and social bookmarking sites, are being actively used. They are often regarded 
as politically transformative communication tools (KISDI, 2013). For instance, social media have 
brought a sea change in the ways individuals access political information by allowing them to 
bypass mainstream media (Anduiza, 2009). Social media have expanded the opportunities for 
citizens to express themselves and to interact with others in innovative ways (Dahlgren, 2008).  
Mainly due to their great potential as a provider of open, horizontal, networked, and real-
time exchange of information, social media have been widely used as tools of public expression 
and participation (Bennett, 2008). Especially, social media have shown their political power in 
almost every election since the late 2000s (Park & Kluver, 2009, Sams & Park, 2013). The 2011 
Seoul mayoral election exemplifies how social media are an effective tool to trigger citizen 
engagement in election processes. The mayor of Seoul is one of the nation’s high-profile political 
posts. The Seoul mayor seat was held by conservatives for the last decade. But in 2011, Park 
Won-soon, a political neophyte, who was supported by the majority, clinched the mayoral race. 
Surprisingly, he beat his ruling-party-backed competitor who worked as a former judge. Political 
pundits paid attention to the explosive use of social media, especially Twitter, as a new political 
mobilizer. Most new media described the election as a “Twitter election.”  
The popularity of current affairs podcast shows in South Korea is a good indication of how 
today’s South Koreans desire different types of news content. Since early 2011, the number of 
current affairs podcast shows has skyrocketed. According to Podbbang (2014), a popular podcast 
show titled as Nanun Ggomsuda (“I am Petty-minded Creep”) recorded about six million 
downloads per episode during the 2011 Seoul mayoral election. As of April 20, 2014, about 
6,800 podcast shows are run. According to Park (in press), many podcast shows centered on 
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current affairs deal with news content that satirizes politicians and the establishment. The wide 
consumption of podcast shows in South Korea also reflects citizens’ disillusionment toward 
manipulative and elite-oriented news coverage by mainstream media. 
This study argues that, when properly specified, the impact of social media on political 
discussion and participation rivals the effects of newspaper or television hard news. It is certain 
that consumption of news via social media will continuously increase unless traditional media 
change their ways of news coverage and adopt technological merits. This study empirically 
shows that the wide use of social media in South Korea can result in fostering democratic 
attitudes and behaviors when people use them for the purpose of keeping abreast of news about 
current affairs (Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, & Valenzuela, 2012). 
7.2.4 Practical Meanings to the Democracy of South Korea 
The present study casts important insights into the democracy of South Korea in the digital 
age. The implications of this study’s findings can be more clearly understood when we reflect on 
the unique history of contemporary South Korea. As reviewed previously, the civil society of 
South Korea has been under strict control by a succession of authoritarian regimes. Suppressive 
rule lasted for about three decades after the first military coup in 1961. Massive protests in 1987 
provided momentum for the disruption of the long-lasting authoritarian control (Im, 1994). 
Although authoritarian rule collapsed, South Korean failed to make a successful transition to a 
solid democracy. Various attempts to implement social and political reform floundered mainly 
because of strong resistance from vested interest groups (Chang, 2005). In 1997, South Korea 
underwent its first transfer of governmental power between the ruling and opposition parties. 
However, the transfer failed to make changes in the existing political hegemony.   
Traditional mainstream media posed another obstacle to the democracy of South Korea. 
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They blocked diverse voices from ordinary citizens (Kim, 2002). Mainstream media kept their 
old habits of the past, such as “infringement of editorial rights by media owners, oligopolistic 
dominance of newspaper market, and manipulation of public opinion” (Chang, 2005, p. 928). In 
this way, the media reinforced their autonomy and social influence. They even transformed 
themselves as independent political institutions, neglecting their role as news organizations (Park 
& Jang, 2001). In addition, the mainstream media allied with conservative political groups in 
holding back democratic progress in South Korea (Kang, 2005). 
Therefore, the progress toward democracy in South Korea has been stuck in limbo even 
after the termination of the military rule. Political parties, the government, the power-elite group, 
and the media were reluctant to urge reform in the inchoate democracy. However, under the worst 
of conditions, democratic participation of the public did not vanish. The public made the 
momentum of change. Democracy-hungry citizens of South Korea started challenging the 
establishment and calling for reform. They desired the formation of a democratic public sphere 
(Chang, 2005).  
The foundation that has provided the public of South Korea with a new consciousness 
about democracy is the Internet. People started setting up alternative venues for civic discourse 
and participation on the Internet. People actively leveraged the Internet to disseminate their 
opinions and to participate in reform movements (Han, 2007). As in many countries around the 
world, the use of the Internet in South Korea has shown great potential to empower citizens by 
providing them with an additional avenue of communication, organization, and participation 
(Park & Biddix, 2008). 
Today in South Korea, citizen engagement in political affairs connected to digital media 
technologies shows signs that democracy is gradually advancing. Via online and social media, 
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people frequently intervene in political processes, including parliamentary and presidential 
elections. Today, more and more South Koreans rely on digital media to voice their opinions and 
concerns (Park, Lim, Sams, Nam, & Park, 2011). Digital media not only redistribute the content 
created by mainstream media but also create a good space for citizen-produced content (Min, 
2007; Shumate & Dewitt, 2008). As a result, digital media are increasingly being used as a tool to 
enhance participatory democracy (Park & Kluver, 2009, Sams & Park, 2013). Dahlgren (2009) 
predicted that digital media including online and social media will transform democracy by 
allowing citizens to get involved in democratic processes in ways never before thought possible. 
Despite the importance of online and social media in the democracy of South Korea, there 
has been little research on the mechanisms through which digital news consumers process news 
information and, as a result, engage in political activities. Few studies have focused on 
explaining the nuanced ways by which Internet use relates to civic participation in political 
actions. Studies on the potential of Internet in South Korea centered on examining the 
technological possibilities of online and social media (Han, 2007; Kim, 2006; Park & Yoon, 
2013), content analyzing online messages (Choi, Lee, & Lee, 2004), or portraying political 
attitudes (Kim, 2005). Unlike previous studies in South Korea, the current study investigates the 
underlying mechanisms of political participation among news consumers in South Korea. This 
kind of work is important in that South Korea is a new but not yet established democracy (Lee & 
Glasure, 2007) and many South Koreans still have a high level of frustration and disillusionment 
toward politics (Kim & Cho, 2004). 
The present study delineates the mechanisms by which South Koreans acquire information 
through digital media, discuss or elaborate on the information, feel competent for their activities, 
and finally decide to engage in actual processes of politics. The findings indicate that the Internet 
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provides an opportunity for South Korean citizens to create various online spaces for vibrant 
discussion about public issues. Use of news media has been linked to the increase in political 
discussion between acquaintances during the course of daily life. Such an impact appears to be 
greater when it comes to the Internet, which provides a variety of interactive communication 
methods and political information for users to engage in political discussion. Indeed, the Internet 
generated hundreds of political discussion forums and individual opinion outlets in South Korea 
(Kim & Cho, 2004). In particular, since the exercise of freedom of speech through the existing 
mass media was limited, the Internet has served as a new public forum that allows citizens to 
express political opinions and to organize political activities. As a result, the Korean public 
became exposed to diverse information and viewpoints about public issues that were not easily 
attainable in the past.  
The trend toward increasing engagement in political discussion is causing a big change 
among South Koreans. Under authoritarian regimes, most South Koreans were deprived of their 
freedom of speech. Harsh suppression of expression and punishment for anti-governmental 
opinions forced citizens to censor themselves (Kang, 2005). This tendency lasted even after non-
authoritarian regimes were established. But today, South Koreans are eager to express their 
opinions on controversial issues, especially political affairs through digital media. Therefore, this 
study’s findings imply that the Internet can contribute to overcoming the legacy of the past 
authoritarian regimes by providing an alternative channel of political discourse.  
However, involvement in political discussion is not enough to explain why South Koreans 
who consume news via online or social media are more likely to participate in political processes. 
Especially, it should be noted that a high level of political cynicism has thwarted South Koreans 
from engaging in political affairs for more than three decades (Lee & Glasure, 2007). How could 
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a considerable portion of South Koreans overcome their feeling of frustration and cynicism 
toward politicians and the governmental process? What triggered them to feel competent about 
their behaviors? On the surface, accumulated experiences of collective actions in recent South 
Korea may provide a plausible explanation to the above questions. For instance, during the 2002 
World Cup, people voluntarily disseminated, shared, and organized information to encourage 
people to join gatherings at a main public square in Seoul, the capital of South Korean (Cho et al., 
2004). During the 2002 presidential election, Internet users made a political miracle by 
supporting a political neophyte as their new president. From 2005, social media have been used 
actively by individual citizens for political mobilization (Chang & Bae, 2012). 
However, collective experiences become possible when certain conditions are met. In other 
words, there should be motivations that urge citizens to discard political frustration and cynicism 
and then to encourage them to feel competent about possible changes (Castells, 2013). In order to 
explain anecdotal examples of citizen engagement, the present study concentrated on the concept 
of political efficacy. As explained in previous sections, political efficacy is a focal element in 
political engagement in both theoretical and practical terms. In the Western countries, political 
efficacy has been found to draw public attention to politics and to elicit citizen’s active 
engagement in political affairs. Political efficacy tends to challenge citizens’ political passiveness, 
and enhances their awareness of alternative roles as democratic citizens. Indeed, recent massive 
movements initiated by the general public attest to the fact that previously disparate, indifferent, 
and apolitical people are gradually becoming a formidable force in the democratic process mainly 
due to their increased sense of political efficacy (Park & Park, 2013). In recent several elections, 
those who were alienated from the political process began to regain political efficacy. Younger, 
less affluent, and progressive voters began to realize that they have the power to change the 
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existing political system (Chang & Bae, 2012). This is evidenced by increasing voter turnout for 
the first time in twenty five years since 1987 as indicated in Chapter 1. The current study 
empirically confirms the important role of political efficacy in the democratic process in South 
Korea. 
Of course, there still exists a gap between the public’s expectation of democracy and the 
reality in South Korean politics (Kim & Park, 2005). This discrepancy may keep causing political 
apathy and cynicism among some segments of the public. However, it seems to be true that the 
wide penetration of the Internet is producing a momentum to bring about substantial changes in 
the present democracy of South Korea. The digital environment is constantly creating new 
opportunities for South Koreans to get out of their frustration and to feel motivated to engage in 
reforming representative processes. Also, digital media technologies increasingly play a 
beneficial role in developing individuals’ political efficacy and in encouraging citizens’ voluntary 
involvement in political events. Democracy refers to a political system based on the voluntary 
participation of people (Todd & Taylor, 2004). Considering that the progress of democracy is 
largely measured by the public’s participation in the democratic process, the findings of this 
study lend support to a positive viewpoint by suggesting a theoretical model that explains how 
information-seeking via online/social media and subsequent engagement in deliberative 
behaviors and heightened political efficacy play a crucial role in developing democratic attitudes 
and behaviors among the public of South Korea.  
 
7.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
The present research has several limitations. The treatment of offline and online citizen 
communication and political efficacy as connectors between the information people consume and 
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the actions they take, may oversimplify a much more complex process that involves more diverse 
antecedent variables. For example, Tian (2011) suggests that extremity in political orientation, 
need for cognition, and need to evaluate as antecedent variables of political participation. As 
Shah et al. (2005) showed, the examination of diverse possible mediators preceding political 
participation is needed in following studies.   
The current study cannot exclude the possibility that citizens’ political engagement drives 
deliberate behavior and political efficacy, which in turn fosters information seeking via the media. 
Although this seems considerably less plausible than the suggested theoretical model when 
considering the treatment of information seeking as antecedent to these other variables is 
consistent with a large body of work (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; McLeod et al., 1996, 1999; 
Putnam, 2000; Zaller, 1992), it is necessary for future research to consider these other 
possibilities. Future studies need to continue to move beyond structural modeling of cross-
sectional data toward analytic strategies that employ panel data and explore the possibility of 
alternate causal orderings among these variables. In this way, the understanding of media effects, 
especially social media effects, on contemporary political life can be more refined than before. 
The current study’s model illustrates only part of the whole story concerning news consumption 
and citizens’ political engagement. 
     Another potential weakness may be found in the fact that the current study focused 
attention on the testing of synchronous structural models rather than lagged models involving the 
effects of information-seeking, citizen communication, news elaboration, and political efficacy. 
Although this approach was borne out by the data, future research should continue to examine 
both lagged and synchronous models when examining these relationships. Ideally, future work 
will make use of multiwave panel data, allowing for a full specification of lagged models 
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involving more diverse sets of variables.  
     Notably, the data for this study were collected during the course of the 2012 presidential 
campaign, an intense political communication event. The election context likely intensified the 
current study’s model, which focuses on the deliberation and political efficacy’s joint impact on 
political engagement. Although the present study purposely chose to test the model to maximize 
the potential for change in the panel collection, the question of whether these relationships exist 
outside of an election context remains unanswered. Researchers interested in the role of 
information seeking, deliberation, and political efficacy in political life should attempt to 
replicate these findings outside of an election context to establish the generalizability of these 
results. 
Lastly, a caution is needed in interpreting the current study. Although this study concludes 
that the wide use of digital media helps the development of participatory democracy of South 
Korea, readers should know that such a conclusion is conditional. For example, the positive 
relationship between digital media use and political participation is contingent on the assumption 
that people use the media for the purpose of seeking information on current affairs. It should be 
noted that the using the media for recreational or recreational purposes does not necessarily lead 
to the increase in democratic outcomes. Also, readers should know that this study centered on 
examining individual-level mechanism of political participation. Variables that directly relates to 
organizational, societal, or cultural elements of political participation were not included. 
Additionally, this study’s main claim that digital media and active citizenship play a positive role 
in the democratic process should not be considered equivalent to a dogmatic preposition. 
Although popular support for democracy is one essential element that bolsters democracy, it loses 
its meaning when relevant reforms are conducted in the institutional system. In other words, in 
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order to further democratic consolidation, legal and political reforms should be made whenever 
needed by the public (Dahl, 1992; Dalton, 2004). 
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Appendix 1  
Survey Questionnaire (Wave 1; September 16, 2012) 
1.How old are you? 
____ 
2.What is your gender? 
a. Female 
b. Male 
3. How often during the last 3 months did you read or watch news from the following media?  
 Regularly Sometimes Hardly ever Never 
Web-only news sites     
Portal news boxes     
Blogs     
Social networking sites     
Current affairs podcasts     
Local newspapers     
National newspapers     
News magazines     
Network TV evening news     
Network TV news magazine programs     
Local network TV evening news     
Radio news or news magazine programs     
Comprehensive Cable TV news     
 
4. During the last 3 months, how much attention did you pay to news from the following media?  
 Very  
much 
Much Somewhat A little Nothing 
Web-only news sites      
Portal news boxes      
Blogs      
Social networking sites      
Current affairs podcasts      
Local newspapers      
National newspapers      
News magazines      
Network TV evening news      
Network TV news magazine 
programs 
     
Local network TV evening news      
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Radio news or news magazine 
programs 
     
Comprehensive Cable TV news      
 
*Please indicate your evaluation of the following media for the three points.  
5. Online news media (OhmyNews, Dailian, etc.) 
 
Strongly agree Agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Fair      
Accurate      
Trustworthy      
 
6. Portal news (Daum, Naver, etc.) 
 
Strongly agree Agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Fair      
Accurate      
Trustworthy      
 
7. Conservative National newspapers (Chosun, Donga, etc.) 
 
Strongly agree Agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Fair      
Accurate      
Trustworthy      
 
8. Liberal National Newspapers (Hankyoreh, Kyunghyang, etc.) 
 
Strongly agree Agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Fair      
Accurate      
Trustworthy      
 
9. Network TV news (KBS, MBC, SBS) 
 
Strongly agree Agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Fair      
Accurate      
Trustworthy      
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10. Network radio news 
 
Strongly agree Agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Fair      
Accurate      
Trustworthy      
 
11. Comprehensive Cable TV news (TVChosun, ChannelA, jTBC, MaeKyungTV)  
 
Strongly agree Agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Fair      
Accurate      
Trustworthy      
 
12. Current affairs podcasts (Naggomsu, Bosu of Korea, etc.) 
 
Strongly agree Agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Fair      
Accurate      
Trustworthy      
 
13. Social Network sites (Facebook, Twitter, etc.) 
 
Strongly agree Agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Fair      
Accurate      
Trustworthy      
 
14. How much do you depend on the current affairs podcast shows for the following purposes? 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree 
neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
To decide how to vote      
To decide about important issues      
To judge candidates’ qualities      
To see how politicians stand on 
issues 
     
To stay informed about my 
surroundings 
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To be excited      
To be entertained      
As a habit      
To obtain information to discuss 
with others  
     
 
15. During the presidential election period, how much do you depend on mass media for the 
following purposes? 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree 
neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
To decide how to vote      
To decide about important issues      
To judge candidates’ qualities      
To see how politicians stand on 
issues 
     
To stay informed about my 
surroundings 
     
To be excited      
To be entertained      
As a habit      
To obtain information to discuss 
with others  
     
 
16. How much do you agree with the following statements?  
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
People like me don’t have a say in 
government decisions 
     
I consider myself to be well-
qualified to participate in politics 
     
I feel that I have a pretty good 
understanding of the important 
political issues facing our country 
     
I don’t thing public officials care 
much what people like me think 
     
I think I am as much as informed 
about politics and government as 
most people 
     
If public officials are not interested 
in hearing what the people think, 
there is no way to make them 
listen 
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17. How much do you agree with the statements?  
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
I feel comfortable living with 
other people 
     
Most people are honest      
Most people would try to take 
advantage of me if they got the 
chance 
     
In general, people getting together 
in their own communities can 
solve their problems better than 
the government 
     
The people in government do not 
waste the money we pay in taxes 
     
Most of the people running for 
office are smart people who know 
what they are doing 
     
People running government are 
crooked 
     
 
18. How would you evaluate your interest in politics? 
 
Not at all A little Somewhat interested 
Very 
interested 
Interest in local politics      
Interest in national politics      
 
19. Over the last month, how many total people would you say you have talked to about politics 
or current issues face-to-face? __ 
 
20. Over the last month, how often have you talked about politics or current issues face-to-face 
with the following people? 
 Not at all A little Somewhat Much Very much 
Family      
Friends      
Acquaintances      
Coworkers      
Strangers      
People who express 
views you agree with 
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People who express 
views you disagree with 
     
 
21. Over the last month, how many people would you say you have talked to about politics or 
current issues via the Internet, such as emails and social networking sites? _____ 
 
22. Over the last month, how often have you talked about politics or current issues via the 
Internet, such as emails and social networking sites with the following people? 
 Not at all A little Somewhat Much Very much 
Family      
Friends      
Acquaintances      
Colleagues      
Strangers      
People who express 
views you agree with 
     
People who express 
views you disagree with 
     
 
23. For the following statements, please circle the number that best describes your feelings about 
that statement.  
 Strongly 
agree 
agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
I often find myself thinking 
about what I’ve encountered in 
the news 
     
I often try to relate what I 
encounter in the news to my 
own personal experience 
     
 
24. How often have you engaged in the following activities during the past three months?  
 Regularly Sometimes Hardly ever Never 
Sent an e-mail to an editor of a 
newspaper/magazine 
    
Used e-mail to contact a politician     
Signed an online petition     
Commented news online     
Participated in online discussion forums     
Posted opinion on social networking sites     
 ２０８ 
 
Forwarded a link to political video or 
news to others 
    
Contacted members of a political group I 
joined online 
    
Joined collective action organized 
through an online political group 
    
Wrote a letter to an editor of a 
newspaper/magazine 
    
Displayed a campaign button, sticker, or 
sing 
    
Wrote a letter to a politician     
Signed a paper petition     
Attended a political meeting, rally, or 
speech 
    
Worked for a political party or candidate     
Contributed money to political campaign 
or candidates 
    
Volunteering for civic or political 
projects 
    
 
25. Which of the following best describes your political orientation? 
a. very liberal  b. liberal  c. moderate  d. conservative  e. very conservative 
26. Which party of the following do you support? 
a. Sanuri   b. Democratic United  c. Unified Progressive d. Advancement & Unification  e. 
Independent 
27. Which candidate of the following are you going to vote for? 
a. Park Keun-hye  b. Ahn Chul-soo  c. Moon Jae-in  d. other candidate  e. not likely to vote  
f. will never vote 
 
* Please answer the following questions.  
28. Which candidate promised the electorate that she/he would implement an action of a free 
education for all high school students right away? 
a. Park Keun-hye  b. Ahn Chul-soo  c. Moon Jae-in d. I don’t know 
29. Which candidate is the author of the book ‘Destiny’? 
a. Park Keun-hye  b. Ahn Chul-soo  c. Moon Jae-in d. I don’t know 
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30. Among the following candidate who support the South Korea-US FTA? 
a. Park Keun-hye  b. Ahn Chul-soo  c. Moon Jae-in d. I don’t know 
31. Recently which candidate attempted to visit the memorial hall of Chun Taeil, a labor activist 
during the 1970s? 
a. Park Keun-hye  b. Ahn Chul-soo  c. Moon Jae-in d. I don’t know 
32. What is the highest level of education you’ve obtained? 
a. Middle school or less 
b. High school 
c. Bachelor’s degree 
d. Master’s degree 
e. Doctoral degree 
33. What was your total household income for 2011? 
a. Less than $20,000 
b. $20,001-$40,000 
c. $40,001-$60,000 
d. $60,001-$80,000 
e. $80,000-$10,000 
f. More than $10,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ２１０ 
 
Appendix 2.  
Survey Questionnaire (Wave 2; December 10, 2012) 
1.How old are you? 
____ 
2.What is your gender? 
c. Female 
d. Male 
3. How often during the last 3 months did you read or watch news from the following media?  
 Regularly Sometimes Hardly ever Never 
Web-only news sites     
Portal news boxes     
Blogs     
Social networking sites     
Current affairs podcasts     
Local newspapers     
National newspapers     
News magazines     
Network TV evening news     
Network TV news magazine programs     
Local network TV evening news     
Radio news or news magazine programs     
Comprehensive Cable TV news     
 
4. During the last 3 months, how much attention did you pay to news from the following media?  
 Very much Much Somewhat A little Nothing 
Web-only news sites      
Portal news boxes      
Blogs      
Social networking sites      
Current affairs podcasts      
Local newspapers      
National newspapers      
News magazines      
Network TV evening news      
Network TV news magazine 
programs 
     
Local network TV evening news      
Radio news or news magazine      
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programs 
Comprehensive Cable TV news      
 
*Please indicate your evaluation of the following media for the three points.   
5. Online news media (Ohmynews, Dailian, etc.) 
 Strongly agree Agree Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Fair      
Accurate      
Trustworthy      
 
6. Portal news (Daum, Naver, etc.) 
 Strongly agree Agree Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Fair      
Accurate      
Trustworthy      
 
7. Conservative National newspapers (Chosun, Donga, etc.) 
 Strongly agree Agree Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Fair      
Accurate      
Trustworthy      
 
8. Liberal National Newspapers (Hankyoreh, Kyunghyang, etc.) 
 Strongly agree Agree Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Fair      
Accurate      
Trustworthy      
 
9. Network TV news (KBS, MBC, SBS) 
 Strongly agree Agree Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Fair      
Accurate      
Trustworthy      
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10. Network radio news 
 Strongly agree Agree Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Fair      
Accurate      
Trustworthy      
 
11. Comprehensive Cable TV news (TVChosun, ChannelA, jTBC, MaeKyungTV)  
 Strongly agree Agree Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Fair      
Accurate      
Trustworthy      
 
12. Current affairs podcasts (Naggomsu, Bosu of Korea, etc.) 
 Strongly agree Agree Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Fair      
Accurate      
Trustworthy      
 
13. Social Network sites (Facebook, Twitter, etc.) 
 Strongly agree Agree Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Fair      
Accurate      
Trustworthy      
 
14. How much do you depend on the current affairs podcast shows for the following purposes? 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
To decide how to vote      
To decide about important issues      
To judge candidates’ qualities      
To see how politicians stand on 
issues 
     
To stay informed about my 
surroundings 
     
To be excited      
To be entertained      
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As a habit      
To obtain information to discuss 
with others  
     
 
15. During the presidential election period, how much do you depend on mass media for the 
following purposes? 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
To decide how to vote      
To decide about important issues      
To judge candidates’ qualities      
To see how politicians stand on 
issues 
     
To stay informed about my 
surroundings 
     
To be excited      
To be entertained      
As a habit      
To obtain information to discuss 
with others  
     
 
16. How much do you agree with the following statements?  
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
People like me don’t have a say in 
government decisions 
     
I consider myself to be well-
qualified to participate in politics 
     
I feel that I have a pretty good 
understanding of the important 
political issues facing our country 
     
I don’t thing public officials care 
much what people like me think 
     
I think I am as much as informed 
about politics and government as 
most people 
     
If public officials are not interested 
in hearing what the people think, 
there is no way to make them 
listen 
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17. How much do you agree with the statements?  
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
I feel comfortable living with 
other people 
     
Most people are honest      
Most people would try to take 
advantage of me if they got the 
chance 
     
In general, people getting together 
in their own communities can 
solve their problems better than 
the government 
     
The people in government do not 
waste the money we pay in taxes 
     
Most of the people running for 
office are smart people who know 
what they are doing 
     
People running government are 
crooked 
     
 
18. How would you evaluate your interest in politics? 
 Not at all A little Somewhat interested Very 
interested 
Interest in local politics      
Interest in national politics      
 
19. Over the last month, how many total people would you say you have talked to about politics 
or current issues face-to-face? __ 
 
20. Over the last month, how often have you talked about politics or current issues face-to-face 
with the following people? 
 Not at all A little Somewhat Much Very much 
Family      
Friends      
Acquaintances      
Colleagues      
Strangers      
People who express 
views you agree with 
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People who express 
views you disagree with 
     
 
21. Over the last month, how many people would you say you have talked to about politics or 
current issues via the Internet, such as emails and social networking sites? ____ 
 
22. Over the last month, how often have you talked about politics or current issues via the 
Internet, such as emails and social networking sites, with the following people? 
 Not at all A little Somewhat Much Very much 
Family      
Friends      
Acquaintances      
Colleagues      
Strangers      
People who express 
views you agree with 
     
People who express 
views you disagree with 
     
 
23. For the following statements, please circle the number that best describes your feelings about 
that statement.  
 Strongly 
agree 
agree Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
I often find myself thinking 
about what I’ve encountered in 
the news 
     
I often try to relate what I 
encounter in the news to my 
own personal experience 
     
It’s difficult to related to 
different races 
     
Contacting with diverse 
viewpoints makes me 
interesting 
     
I don’t spent time with non- 
friends 
     
I seek relationship with 
dissimilar people 
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24. How often have you engaged in the following activities during the past three months? 
 Regularly Sometimes Hardly ever Never 
Sent an e-mail to an editor of a 
newspaper/magazine 
    
Used e-mail to contact a politician     
Signed an online petition     
Commented news online     
Participated in online discussion forums     
Posted opinion on social networking sites     
Forwarded a link to political video or 
news to others 
    
Contacted members of a political group I 
joined online 
    
Joined collective action organized 
through an online political group 
    
Wrote a letter to an editor of a 
newspaper/magazine 
    
Displayed a campaign button, sticker, or 
sing 
    
Wrote a letter to a politician     
Signed a paper petition     
Attended a political meeting, rally, or 
speech 
    
Worked for a political party or candidate     
Contributed money to political campaign 
or candidates 
    
Volunteering for civic or political 
projects 
    
 
* Please answer the following questions.  
25. Who is the candidate Kim Ji-ha recently proclaimed publicly that he would support 
a. Park Keun-hye  b. Moon Jae-in c. Lee Jung-hee  d. I don’t know 
26. Which candidate pledged that he would apply a half-tuition policy to all public university 
from the next year? 
a. Park Keun-hye  b. Moon Jae-in c. Lee Jung-hee  d. I don’t know 
27. Which election is not scheduled on the presidential election day? 
a. Kyungnam governor election b. Superintendent of education of Seoul c. Anyang Mayoral 
election d. I don’t know 
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28. What minimum level of approval rating was required for a candidate to attend the 1
st
 
television debate?  
a. 1%  b. 3%  c. 5%  d. 7%  e. 10%  f. I don’t know 
29. Which of the following best describes your political orientation?  
a. very conservative  b. conservative  c. moderate  d. progressive  e. very progressive 
30. Which party of the following do you support? 
a. Saenuri   b. Democratic United  c. Unified Progressive d. other parties  e. Independent 
31. Which candidate of the following are you going to vote for? 
a. Park Keun-hye  b. Moon Jae-in c. Lee Jung-hee  d. other candidate 
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